Cole v. Gene by Gene, Ltd.
Cole v. Gene by Gene, Ltd.
Opinion of the Court
ORDER RE MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION
Before the Court is Plaintiff Michael Cole’s Motion for Class Certification and Appointment of Class Counsel.
BACKGROUND
Gene by Gene sells at-home DNA testing kits, which allow for comparisons between individuals to determine whether the individuals are related. There are three varieties of tests: Y-DNA, mtDNA, and autosomal DNA.
Mr. Cole now moves the Court to certify the following class:
Project Membership Class: all individuals who purchased a DNA test from Gene by Gene, Ltd. and who executed a release form and joined a Family Tree DNA “project” between May IS, 2012 and August 1, 2016, while residing in the State of Alaska.
Mr. Cole further moves to certify the following subclass:
Worldfamilies Subclass: all Project Membership Class members who joined a Family Tree DNA “project” administrated or co-administered by Terry Barton and/or WorldFamilies.net.14
Gene by Gene opposes Mr. Cole’s motion and argues that class certification must be denied because: (1) Mr. Cole’s claim is unique: therefore, there are issues with commonality and typicality: (2) other class members might be entitled to actual damages that Mr. Cole is “expressly uninterested in representing”: (3) individual interests predominate over potential class interests and a class action is not superior to other methods to adjudicate this controversy: and (4) “the application of solely punitive damages, in the absence of alternate harm, is overly burdensome and disproportionate.”
I. Jurisdiction
This Court has diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
II. Legal Standard
“The class action is ‘an exception to the usual rule that litigation is conducted by and on behalf of the individual named parties only.’ ”
Before certifying a class, a court must also find that one of the requirements of Rule 23(b) has been meet. Here, Mr. Cole relies on Rule 23(b)(3), which requires finding (1) that questions of law or fact common to the class predominate over any questions affecting individual class members: and (2) that a class action is superior to other available methods for resolving the controversy.
The party seeking class certification “bears the burden of demonstrating that the requirements of Rule 23(a) and (b) are met.”
a. Predominance
The predominance requirement is met where the proposed class’s interests are “sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation.”
Mr. Cole brings this action against Gene by Gene for violating Alaska’s Genetic Privacy Act. To prevail in a class action, each plaintiff must demonstrate that Gene by Gene disclosed the results of that customer’s DNA analysis and that it did so without that customer’s informed and written consent.
Mr. Cole has demonstrated that this case involves certain questions common to the proposed class and subclass. For example, whether Gene by Gene’s DNA testing constitutes a “DNA analysis” under the Act is a
Whether Gene by Gene’s alleged disclosures were for profit is another question that is common to the proposed classes.
The Court agrees with Mr. Cole that whether Gene by Gene performs genetic testing and whether the alleged disclosures resulted in profit are questions common to the proposed class and subclass.
Mr. Cole also argues that “[wjhether Gene by Gene’s sharing of its customer’s Genetic Information constitutes a ‘disclosure’ is common to each member of the Glasses” because “every time a customer joined a project, the customer’s testing results were automatically provided to the relevant group administrators.”
To show that the alleged disclosures were uniform and automatic, Mr. Cole cites Elliott Greenspan’s deposition testimony. He testified, “[W]hen the customer’s results come back, they will get notified, the customer themselves, as well as a group administrator that is managing that sample, if there is one.”
Whether each proposed class member gave informed and written consent to disclosure could depend on several individualized determinations: whether the customer signed a release form, the precise language of that particular customer’s form, and the information provided to that customer about potential disclosures of genetic information. Bennett Greenspan testified that when a customer first orders a test kit, he or she receives a release form, which gives Family-Tree DNA the customer’s “consent to match them against other people in the database so they can see who they are related to.”
The individualized proof that would be required to establish each customer’s consent, together with the individualized proof needed to demonstrate Gene by Gene’s disclosure of each customer’s test results, supports a finding that individual questions predominate over common questions, as both consent and disclosure are key elements of the Genetic Privacy Act.
Gene by Gene also argues that the “individual extent of damages is fatal to Plaintiffs certification motion.”
While “damage calculations alone cannot defeat certification,” “plaintiffs must show that ‘damages are capable of measurement on a classwide basis.’ ”
The present case is distinguishable from the case Mr. Cole cites in his motion, Harris v. comScore, Inc.
But here, the record indicates that proposed class members received different release forms, joined different projects run by different administrators, and could adjust the privacy settings to different degrees of disclosure. And to the extent that any of the approximately 900 proposed class members claims actual damages, such plaintiff would need to individually establish actual harm and connect that harm to Gene by Gene’s alleged violation of the Genetic Privacy Act. The potential variance among the proposed class is substantially at odds with the uniformity of the proposed class in Harris.
b. Superiority
“The policy at the very core of the class action mechanism is to overcome the problem that small recoveries do not provide the incentive for any individual to bring a solo action prosecuting his or her rights.”
The first factor asks whether the cost of pursuing individual litigation is prohibitive, thereby rendering a class action the presumptively superior method of adjudication.
Moreover, the available remedy under the Alaska Genetic Privacy Act for a for-profit violation would appear to be sufficient to make an individual suit economical. Mr. Cole has alleged that Gene by Gene’s violations resulted in profit, which could render him entitled to a minimum of $100,000 for his claim alone.
The second factor, the extent and nature of any already-pending litigation, is “intended to serve the purpose of assuring judicial economy and reducing the possibility of multiple lawsuits.”
The third factor evaluates the advantages of concentrating litigation in this forum. Here, the Genetic Privacy Act is an Alaska statute and each proposed class member is an Alaska resident. And yet there is no other case of this nature pending in the District of Alaska. The Court finds that, if there were to be other claims, concentrating litigation in one class action in the District of Alaska could be desirable, unless, as discussed above, there were variations in the releases, privacy settings, actual damages sought, or other individualized determinations that made a class action unwieldy.
The fourth factor examines the difficulties in managing the class action. The Ninth Cir
In light of the foregoing, the Court finds that a class action is not the superior method for adjudicating this dispute.
3. Due Process Concerns
Gene by Gene also argues that “even if Plaintiff can meet his burden to establish the elements of Rule 23,” the Court should deny class certification because the potential “damages are overly excessive,”
CONCLUSION
Because Mr. Cole has not established that common questions predominate and that a class action is the superior method of adjudication, the Court finds that class certification is inappropriate for the proposed Class and Subclass at this time.
. Docket 138 (Redacted Cole Mot. for Class Cert.): Docket 140 — 1 (Unredacted Cole Mot. for Class Cert.).
. Docket 146 (Redacted Gene by Gene Opp’n): Docket 170 (Unredacted Gene by Gene Opp’n).
. Docket 150 (Redacted Cole Reply): Docket 162 (Unredacted Cole Reply).
. Docket 169 (sealed E. Greenspan Dep.) at 6-7.
. Docket 140-4 (sealed Blankfeld Dep.) at 10.
.Docket 139-4 (Cole’s Release Form) at 2: see also Docket 140-4 (sealed Blankfeld Dep.) at 11 ("Q: And in terms of the contents of that kit, the two vials, the two swabs, the release form, the letter, the instructions and the return envelope, that’s the same for each test that’s ordered, correct? A: Correct.”): Docket 139-5 (other release forms). The Court notes that at least one of the release forms in the record does not expressly grant Gene by Gene the right to share any genetic testing result. See Docket 139-5 at 2.
. Docket 140-5 (sealed E. Greenspan Dep.) at 14. Gene by Gene does business as Family Tree DNA. The Court uses the names interchangeably.
. Docket 140-3 (sealed B. Greenspan Dep.) at 7-8.
. Docket 140-8 (sealed Barton Email to Gene by Gene) at 2.
. Docket 140-5 (sealed E. Greenspan Dep.) at 13 (''[I]n general, when the customer's results come back, they will get notified, the customer themselves, as well as a group administrator that is managing that sample.”): Docket 140-4 (sealed Blankfeld Dep.) at 27 ("Q: [I]f a new person becomes a project administrator, they are then able to view the information about project members that is also available to the original project administrator, right? A: Correct. Q: And that would include name, E-mail if available, kit number, as well as earliest known ancestor and test result information? A: Correct.”).
. Docket 140-1 (sealed Cole Mot. for Class Cert.) at 11 (citing Docket 140-7 (sealed Blacker-by Dep.)) at 9 ("A: I'm pretty sure the default is to have the kit number show. Q: And what about the relevant portions of the DNA test results, those are generally posted, correct?” A: Generally.").
. See Docket 140-1 at 11 (citing Docket 140-3 (sealed B. Greenspan Dep.) at 17-18 (referring to a printout of the WorldFamilies website, which "displays project information”)). Bennett Greenspan's deposition supports a finding that the WorldFamilies website publically displays the same information as would be available on "a Family Tree DNA cookie-cutter website." The record does not contain a description of what the site actually displays.
. Docket 140-1 at 11.
. Docket 140-1 at 13.
. Docket 170 (sealed Gene by Gene Opp’n) at 6.
. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 348, 131 S.Ct. 2541, 180 L.Ed.2d 374 (2011) (quoting Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 700-01, 99 S.Ct. 2545, 61 L.Ed.2d 176 (1979)).
. Connecticut Retirement Plans and Trust Funds v. Amgen Inc., 660 F.3d 1170, 1174-75 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting United Steel, Paper & Forestry, Rubber, Mfg. Energy, Allied Indus. & Serv. Workers Int’l Union v. ConocoPhillips Co., 593 F.3d 802 (9th Cir. 2010)).
. Id. at 1175 (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161, 102 S.Ct. 2364, 72 L.Ed.2d 740 (1982)).
. Accordingly, the Court does not reach the Rule 23(a) requirements. See, e.g., Friedman v. Old Republic Home Prot. Co., No. EDCV121833AGOPX, 2015 WL 9948093, at *5 (C.D. Cal. May 18, 2015) ("Because the Court does not find certification of the proposed class is appropriate under Rule 23(b)(3) or (2), the Court does not address the Rule 23(a) requirements.1’).
. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 623, 117 S.Ct. 2231, 138 L.Ed.2d 689 (1997).
. Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1022 (9th Cir. 1998).
. Stockwell v. City and Cnty. of San Francisco, 749 F.3d 1107, 1113 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Amchem, 521 U.S. at 624, 117 S.Ct. 2231).
. Levias v. Pac. Mar. Ass'n, No. 08-CV-1610-JPD, 2010 WL 358499, at *7 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 25, 2010); In re Dynamic Random Access Memory Antitrust Litigation, 2006 WL 1530166, at *7 (N.D. Cal. June 5, 2006).
. Docket 140-1 (sealed Cole Mot. for Class Cert.) at 16. Cf. Docket 170 at 8.
. See Docket 81 (Brauchli Decl.) at 3, ¶ 6.
. Docket 169 (sealed E. Greenspan Dep.) at 6-7 (comparing the testing process for Y-DNA products, mtDNA, and Big Y).
. Docket 140-4 (sealed Blankfeld Dep.) at 29.
. Docket 140-1 (sealed Cole Mot. for Class Cert.) at 21.
. See Docket 110 (B. Greenspan Deck) at 2.
. Docket 140-3 (sealed B. Greenspan Dep.) at 12.
. Docket 140-1 (sealed Cole Mot. for Class Cert.) at 17, 18 (emphasis in original).
. Docket 170 (sealed Gene by Gene Opp’n) at 9.
. Docket 170 at 9.
. Docket 140-5 (sealed E. Greenspan Dep.) at 13.
. See Docket 140-5 at 13. Mr. Greenspan testified that there are three privacy settings: private, public, and group, Docket 169 at 15, and that a customer can turn his or her settings onto private for each project and still join groups. Id. at 16. But see Docket 152-2 (sealed B. Greenspan Dep.) at 10 (Q: Was there anything that Mr. Cole could have done to change the types of information that were viewable to Mr. Taylor on the private group administrator page? A: Yes. He could have not joined the project.”). Mr. Cole notes that privacy control was not available to the customers until November 11, 2014 — two years into the proposed class period. See Docket 162 at 9, However, there would still be a need for individualized determinations of when each proposed class member joined each project, whether
. Docket 106-2 (B. Greenspan Dep.) at 8.
. See Docket 75 (Blankfeld Decl.) at 1.
. Docket 128-7 (Blankfeld Dep.) at 9.
. Compare Docket 139-4 (Cole Release Form) at 2 ("In tlte event I sign this document, I understand that FTDNA will share my name, email address and relevant DNA results information only with other persons who are a genetic match to me....") (emphasis added) with Docket 139-5 (Sample Release Form) at 2 ("I [] give permission to Family Tree DNA to make my name and e-mail address available to my genetic matches.”).
. Docket 170 (sealed Gene by Gene Opp'n) at 19.
. Docket 170 (sealed) at 19 (citing Wheeler v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 3:11-CV-00018-SLG, 2013 WL 4525312, at *4 (D. Alaska Aug. 27, 2013)).
. Docket 162 (sealed Reply) at 13 (citing W. Rubenstein, Newberg on Class Actions § 4:54 (5th ed.)).
. W. Rubenstein, Newberg on Class Action § 4:54 (5th ed.).
. Just Film, Inc. v. Buono, 847 F.3d 1108, 1120 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Yokoyama v. Midland Nat. Life Ins. Co., 594 F.3d 1087, 1094 (9th Cir. 2010) and Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27, 133 S.Ct. 1426, 1433-35, 185 L.Ed.2d 515 (2013)).
. Comcast, 133 S.Ct. at 1435 (quoting Federal Judicial Center, Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence 432 (3d ed. 2011)) (emphasis in original).
. See Docket 1 (Compl.) at 13. Mr. Cole argues that Gene by Gene has not provided an example of a class member who changed his or her privacy setting or who is seeldng actual damages. But the plaintiff bears the burden of satisfying the Rule 23 requirements. See Marlo v. UPS, 639 F.3d 942, 947 (9th Cir. 2011). And while Gene by Gene has not identified a plaintiff who opted for a private setting or who is seeking actual damages at this point in the litigation, Mr. Cole’s argument that disclosure automatically occurred for all class members is refuted by the availability of the privacy settings feature. And one or more of the proposed class member may seek actual damages as Mr. Cole’s Complaint includes a prayer for actual damages, which is permitted by the Genetic Privacy Act. See Docket 1 (Compl.) at 15, ¶ 3.
. Harris v. comScore, Inc., 292 F.R.D. 579 (N.D. Ill. 2013).
. Harris, 292 F.R.D. at 585, 590.
. See also Coulter-Owens v. Time, Inc., 308 F.R.D. 524, 534 (E.D. Mich. 2015) (certifying proposed class where subscribers could opt in or out of allowing defendant to disclose personal information because evidence established that misconduct occurred regardless of the subscribers' consent: thus individual determination of whether the plaintiff opted-in or out was not relevant to defendant’s liability).
. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 617, 117 S.Ct. 2231 (quoting Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (7th Cir. 1997)).
. W. Rubenstein, Newberg on Class Actions § 4:65 (5th ed.).
. See W. Rubenstein, Newberg on Class Actions § 4:67 (5th ed.) (citing Advisory Committee Note to 1966 Amendments, 39 F.R.D. 69, 102 (1966)).
. See Zinser v. Accufix Research Institute, Inc., 253 F.3d 1180, 1190-91 (9th Cir. 2001), amended on denial of rehearing, 273 F.3d 1266 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing In re N. Dist. of Cal., Dalkon Shield IUD Prod. Liab. Litig., 693 F.2d 847, 856 (9th Cir. 1982), abrogation on other grounds recognized in Baxter Healthcare Corp. v. U.S. Dist. Court for Cent. Dist. of Cal., 121 F.3d 714, 1997 WL 441397 (9th Cir. Aug. 4, 1997)) (“We recognize that a parly with a claim of $50,000 might have a difficult time alone pursuing a complex products liability case. However, the minimum amount alleged to be in controversy for each putative class member does not argue persuasively for class certification.”): see also W. Ru-benstein, Newberg on Class Actions § 4:65 (5th ed.).
. W. Rubenstein, Newberg on Class Actions § 4:65 (5th ed.).
. Cf. Epifano v. Boardroom Business Products, Inc., 130 F.R.D. 295, 299 (S.D. N.Y. 1990) ("Although the damages the plaintiffs claim to have suffered range from $50,000 for Solar to $285,000 for Epifano, given the complexity of securities law cases, and the high cost of litigation, it is not clear that the cases would have been pursued without the class action possibility.").
. See Docket 140-1 (sealed Cole Mot. for Class Cert.) at 20 ("Plaintiff firmly believes that [$100,-000] will ultimately be recovered.”).
. Zinser, 253 F.3d at 1191 (quoting 7A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1780 at 568— 70 (2d ed. 1986)).
. Zinser, 253 F.3d at 1192 (citing Valentino v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 97 F.3d 1227, 1234-35 (9th Cir. 1996) and Dalkon Shield, 693 F.2d at 856).
. Docket 170 (sealed Gene by Gene Opp’n) at 22.
. Bateman v. American Multi-Cinema, Inc., 623 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2010): see also Stockwell, 749 F.3d at 1111-12 (quoting Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 568 U.S. 455, 133 S.Ct. 1184, 1194-95, 185 L.Ed.2d 308 (2013)) ("Merits questions may be considered to the extent — but only to the extent — that they are relevant to determining whether the Rule 23 prerequisites for class certification are satisfied.”).
. In Bateman, the Ninth Circuit reviewed a district court's decision to deny class certification. There, despite the small amount of statutory damages available — $100 to $1,000 if willful— the district court was troubled by the magnitude of the defendant's potential liability, which if the class were certified may have amounted to $29 million to $290 million due to the number of alleged violations. The district court denied class certification on that basis, holding that "class treatment could result in enormous liability completely out of proportion to any harm suffered by the plaintiff.” 623 F.3d at 711. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's decision, holding that consideration of the total potential liability is not appropriate at the class certification stage of the litigation. Id. at 723.
.A court may revisit its certification decision at any time before final judgment. See Rule 23(c)(1)(C) (providing that "[a]n order that grants or denied class certification may be altered or amended before final judgment.”).
Reference
- Full Case Name
- Michael COLE, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. GENE BY GENE, LTD., a Texas Limited Liability Company d/b/a Family Tree DNA
- Cited By
- 2 cases
- Status
- Published