OPINION

This appeal requires that we resolve a hair length controversy arising from the enforcement of a junior high school grooming regulation. If the regulation in the case at bar is upheld, the student will be denied a public education unless he conforms his hair style to the regulation’s standards.

Michael Breese enrolled in the seventh grade class at Main Junior High School in Fairbanks on September 13, 1971, shortly after the fall term had begun. Some three years prior thereto, Elmer C. Smith, principal of Main, had promulgated an unwritten hair regulation which required that male students’ “hair must not be down over the ears, over the eyes, . . . [or] over the collar.”

From the date of his enrollment, the length of Breese’s hair violated the school regulation. School officials immediately informed Breese that his hair length was out of conformity with the rule and that his hair would have to be cut. With the knowledge and support of his father, Breese refused to cut his hair to the school standards. Smith suspended Breese from Main on September 21, 1971. Thereafter, Smith recommended to the School Board, Fairbanks North Star Borough School District, that Breese be expelled for wilful disobedience of the hair regulation.1

On September 22, 1971, an action in Breese’s behalf was commenced in superior court seeking injunctive relief. Five days later, the superior court issued an ex parte *162temporary restraining order enjoining Smith and the Superintendent of Schools of the Fairbanks North Star Borough School District from denying Breese permission to attend classes until a hearing could be held on Breese’s application for a preliminary injunction.

On the evening of October 7, 1971, the School Board convened and held a hearing to consider Smith’s recommendation that Breese be expelled. After hearing Smith’s testimony and other witnesses called by Smith, no testimony having been adduced in Breese’s behalf, the Board accepted the recommendation, and expelled Breese on the following day. Thereafter a hearing on the merits of Breese’s application for preliminary injunction was held in the superior court on October 15, 1971.2 The parties produced conflicting evidence concerning the effects of Breese’s hair, the effects of long hair generally, and the causal relationships between long hair, disruptive behavior, and academic performance. The superior court subsequently entered a memorandum opinion and order in which it found the school’s hair regulation reasonable, entered judgment against Breese, and dissolved the outstanding temporary restraining order. Breese now appeals the decision of the superior court.3

Initially, we are confronted with the threshold question of whether this *163court .possesses appellate jurisdiction to consider the superior court’s decision. Breese contends that the lower court’s memorandum opinion and order constitute a “final judgment” within the intendment of Rule 6 of the Alaska Supreme Court Rules 4 and AS 22.05.010,5 and that therefore the jurisdiction of this court is properly invoked. Smith and the School Board, on the other hand, urge that the superior court’s decision is not a “final judgment” within the meaning of Rule 6, but rather, is an interlocutory order dissolving an injunction and reviewable only under Rule 23(a).6 Rule 27 7 provides that a petition for review must be filed within ten days, or if “good cause” for an extension of time is shown, then within an additional ten day period. Smith and the School Board argue that since review of an interlocutory prder may be obtained only by way of petition for review, and that in the instant case, no such petition was timely filed by Breese, this court lacks appellate jurisdiction and the appeal must be dismissed.

We are persuaded that Breese’s interpretation of the superior court’s decision is correct. The superior court’s memorandum opinion and order constitute a “final judgment” within the meaning of Rule 6. We have in the past interpreted a memorandum opinion as a “final judgment” for purposes of appeal where such opinion “clearly evidences the judge’s intent to presently and finally dispose” of the matter pending before him.8 Here, there is no question that the superior court intended to completely and finally dispose of Breese’s complaint for injunctive relief. In its opinion, the superior court did more than merely dissolve the outstanding temporary restraining order; it also considered the parties’ claims and evidence, balanced the competing interests in favor of the “orderly management of our schools,” held that the administrative hair regulation is a “reasonable regulation,” and rendered judgment in favor of Smith and the School Board. The superior court, in short, manifested its intention to finally dispose of Breese’s claim for relief. We therefore conclude that this court possesses appellate jurisdiction in the case at bar.9

We next turn to the merits of this litigation. In regard to this the superior court, *164in its memorandum opinion and order, stated in part that:

The Board’s decision should stand unless it flies in the face of a constitutionally prohibited interference to a citizens [sic] rights. This Court is not persuaded that it has.

In reviewing the superior court’s decision, this court is called upon to determine whether the trial court erred in holding that none of Breese’s constitutional rights had been violated by the School Board’s decision to expel him for wilful disobedience of the hair length regulation in question. Resolution of this issue in turn involves consideration of the question of whether a male junior high school student’s decision to fashion his own appearance by adopting a long hair style10 is constitutionally protected. The trial court found no express constitutional quarantee of the right to wear long hair in school and further concluded that such right could not be found within the parameters of any emerging constitutional notion of “right to privacy.” 11

The United States Supreme Court has not yet passed on the question of whether a student’s personal appearance is constitutionally protected. In the landmark case of Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District,12 wherein the Supreme Court of the United States held that junior high school students had a right under the first amendment to wear black armbands in school in order to dramatize their opposition to the Vietnam war, the question of hair styles was expressly distinguished. In that case, the Court stated :

The problem posed by the present case does not relate to regulation of the length of skirts or the type of clothing, to hair style, or deportment.13

Since Tinker, the Supreme Court has consistently declined to consider the matter of school hair regulations and dress code. For example, the Court recently denied a petition for certiorari in Swanquist v. Livingston,14 thereby leaving a Seventh Circuit decision standing which invalidated a hair regulation. In the same term the Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari in Olff v. East Side Union High School District15 left undisturbed a Ninth Circuit ruling that a public school district’s long hair regulation did not violate the first amendment, right to privacy, fundamental liberties or due process rights.16

The question of personal appearances in public classrooms is one of the liveliest of current constitutional issues, and the after*165math of Tinker has witnessed a great proliferation of student-initiated suits in this area. In the absence of a definitive interpretation by the United States Supreme Court on the question of whether students have any constitutionally protected freedom to govern their individual appearances, the various circuits and district courts of the federal judiciary which have considered the matter are in disagreement.17 Similarly, the decisions of state courts which have considered the issue are also reflective of divergent views.18

State and federal courts which have invalidated school hair regulations lack uniformity as to the precise nature and source of the students’ rights. As a result, a variety of federal constitutional theories have been advanced.19 Some courts have embraced a first amendment rationale, made applicable to the states under the fourteenth amendment, and have held that long hair is a constitutionally protected form of expression.20 Others21 have grounded their opinions on a ninth amendment justification.22 Under this theory, “re*166tained rights” under the ninth amendment are binding on the states by virtue of the fourteenth amendment. Still other courts have resorted to the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to invalidate hair regulations for male high school students.23 Several authorities have struck down hair length regulations as being unconstitutional deprivations of liberty24 under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The emerging notion of the “right to privacy,” as found within the penumbra of the Bill of Rights mentioned by Justice Douglas in Griswold v. Connecticut,25 has also been advanced as the constitutional source of a student's right to wear long hair.26

In view of the conflict between the circuits in the federal judiciary, and the general lack of consensus among the authorities over federal constitutional theory, counsel for Smith and the School Board urges that this court abstain from deciding whether Breese has any rights under the federal constitution. We are inclined to agree with appellees that in the instant case avoidance of the federal thicket is the better course. We also concur, however, in Judge Breitenstein’s observation, made in Freeman v. Flake,27 that:

The states have a compelling interest in the education of their children. The states, acting through their school authorities and their courts, should determine what, if any, hair regulation is necessary to the management of their schools.28

Thus, whether Breese has a constitutional right to wear long hair and whether the school’s hair length regulation is valid will be decided under Alaska’s constitution.

Two provisions of Alaska’s constitution are relevant in the instant case. First, article I, section 1 affirms that all persons in the state of Alaska are granted certain inherent and natural rights. More precisely, that section states:

This constitution is dedicated to the principles that all persons have a natural right to life, liberty, the pursuit of happiness, and the enjoyment of the rewards of their own industry; that all persons are equal and entitled to equal rights, opportunities, and protection under the *167law; and that all persons have corresponding obligations to the people and to the State.

The second relevant provision is article VII, section 1, which guarantees all children of Alaska a right to public education. This section of Alaska’s constitution provides :

The legislature shall by general law establish and maintain a system of public schools open to all children of the State, and may provide for other public educational institutions. .

While some of the terms of article 1, section 1 parallel the language of various federal constitutional provisions,29 we have repeatedly held that this court is not obliged to interpret our constitution in the same manner as the Supreme Court of the United States has construed parallel provisions of the federal Constitution.30 Thus, in the case at bar, although sound analysis requires that we look to the various federal precedents that have interpreted provisions of the federal constitution that parallel Alaska’s constitution, we are not necessarily limited by those precedents in expounding upon Alaska’s constitution.

Given this backdrop of constitutional interpretation we begin with the established premise that children are possessed of fundamental rights under the Alaska constitution.31 Moreover, we have previously stated that children’s constitutional rights will not be denied in deference to governmental benevolence or popular social theories.32 Our decisions in RLR v. State33 and other cases involving constitutional rights of children are in accord with the United States Supreme Court’s statement in Tinker that:

Students in school as well as out of school are “persons” under our Constitution. They are possessed of fundamental rights which the State must respect, just as they themselves must respect their obligations to the State.34

*168We hold that under article I, section 1 of the Alaska constitution’s affirmative grant to all persons of the natural right to “liberty,” students attending public educational institutions in Alaska possess a constitutional right to wear their hair in accordance with their personal tastes. In reaching this conclusion, we are cognizant of the fact that the term “liberty” is an illusive concept, incapable of definitive, comprehensive explication. Yet at the core of this concept is the notion of total personal immunity from governmental control : the right “to be let alone.”35 In 1891, the Supreme Court of the United States embraced Judge Cooley’s famous definition of “liberty”:

No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law. As well said by Judge Cooley, “The right to one’s person may be said to be a right of complete immunity: to be let alone.” (emphasis in the original).36

More recently the First Circuit in Richards v. Thurston,37 held that the right of students to determine their personal appearance is implicit in the liberty assurance of the due process clause. There the court said:

We do not say that the governance of the length and style of one’s hair is necessarily so fundamental as those substantive rights already found implicit in the “liberty” assurance of the Due Process Clause, requiring a “compelling” showing by the state before it may be impaired. Yet “liberty” seems to us an incomplete protection if it encompasses only the right to do momentous acts, leaving the state free to interfere with those personal aspects of our lives which have no direct bearing on the ability of others to enjoy their liberty. . . . 38

We think the Pounding Fathers understood themselves to have limited the government’s power to intrude into this sphere of personal liberty, by reserving some powers to the people. The debate concerning the First Amendment is illuminating. The specification of the right of assembly was deemed mere sur-plusage by some, on the grounds that the government had no more power to restrict assembly than it did to tell a man to wear a hat or when to get up in the morning. The x'esponse by Page of Virginia pointed out that even those “trivial” rights had been known to have been impaired — to the Colonists’ consternation — but that the right of assembly ought to be specified since it was so basic to other rights. The Founding Fathers wrote an amendment for speech and assembly; even they did not deem it necessary to write an amendment for personal appearance. We con-*169elude that within the commodious concept of liberty, embracing- freedoms great and small, is the right to wear one’s hair as he wishes. 424 F.2d at 1285 (citations omitted).

Similarly, the Third Circuit reached the same conclusion in Stull v. School Board of Western Beaver Jr.-Sr. H.S.39

However, it is our view that the First Circuit’s approach [in Richards v. Thurston] was correct; we therefore prefer to follow it and hold that the governance of the length and style of one’s hair is implicit in the liberty assurance of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.40

Hairstyles have been the subject of great variety and individual taste and have traditionally been left to personal decision; they are the manifestations of our diverse and numerous individual personalities.41 The United States of America, and Alaska in particular, reflect a pluralistic society, grounded upon such basic values as the preservation of maximum individual choice, protection of minority sentiments, and appreciation for divergent lifestyles. The spectre of governmental control of the physical appearances of private citizens, young and old, is antithetical to a free society, contrary to our notions of a government of limited powers, and repugnant to the concept of personal liberty. It has been observed that “[t]here are few things more personal than one’s body and its appearance, and there could be few laws more destructive of the notion that there is a range of decisionmaking within which the individual is autonomous than a rule regulating physical makeup.” 42 Whatever else “liberty” may mean as used in article I, section 1 of the Alaska constitution, we hold that the term at least encompasses the fundamental personal right of students in our public schools to select their own individual hair styles without governmental direction.43

This Court takes judicial notice that hairstyles have altered from time to time throughout the ages. Sampson’s locks symbolically signified his virility. Many of the Founding Fathers of this country wore wigs. President Lincoln grew a beard at the suggestion of a juvenile female admirer. Chief Justice Hughes’ beard furnished the model for the frieze over the portico of the Supreme Court of the United States proclaiming “equal justice under law.” Today many of both the younger and the older generations have avoided the increased cost of barbering by allowing their locks or burnsides to grow to greater lengths than when a haircut cost a quarter of a dollar.

Whether hair styles be regarded as evidence of conformity or of individuality, they are one of the most visible examples of personality. This is what every woman has always known. And so have many men, without the aid of an anthropologist, behavioral scientist. psychiatrist, or practitioner of any of the fine arts or black arts.

*170While we have concluded that the right of students to fashion their own appearances by wearing their hair in accordance with their own individual preference in public schools is a fundamental constitutional right implicit in the concept of liberty as guaranteed by the constitution of Alaska, we do not hold that such right is absolute.44 There may be instances in which the state acting through a school administration would be justified in regulating the hair length of its citizenry. We are in accord with the observation made by the court in Bishop v. Colaw 45 that “personal freedoms are not absolute; they must yield when they intrude upon the freedom of others.” 46

Given our conclusion that a fundamental constitutional right is involved in the case at bar, we next consider the impact of such right on the question of the appropriate standard and burden of proof. In this regard, we have previously held that the state’s encroachment upon an individual’s constitutional rights is justifiable only upon a showing by the government of a compelling interest. More specifically, in Baker v. City of Fairbanks 47 we indicated that:

If an individual right is vested by the Constitution, the overriding demands of governmental efficiency must be of a compelling nature and must be identifiable as flowing from some enumerated constitutional power.48

The compelling interest standard is not a novel requirement in constitutional law,49 and has often been invoked by the United States Supreme Court in determining the validity of state regulations which violate fundamental federal constitutional rights. The use of this standard of proof is exemplified in Griswold.

In a long series of cases this Court has held that where fundamental personal liberties áre involved, they may not be abridged by the States simply on a showing that a regulatory statute has some rational relationship to the effectuation of a proper state purpose. “Where there is a significant encroachment upon personal liberty, the State may prevail only upon showing a subordinating interest which is compelling,” . . . (citations omitted) .50

We think the compelling interest standard has merit and should be adopted in cases where a person’s individual liberty, as guaranteed by the Alaska constitution, allegedly has been encroached upon.51 In applying this criterion to the'issues in the *171case at bar we must determine whether the record disclosed a compelling government interest necessitating the abridgment of the student’s constitutionally protected right to fashion his own personal appearance. Once a fundamental right under the constitution of Alaska has been shown to be involved and it has been further shown that this constitutionally protected right has been impaired by governmental action, then the government must come forward and meet its substantial burden of establishing that the abridgment in question was justified by a compelling governmental interest.

We recognize that courts in other jurisdictions have adopted different standards of proof in litigation of this character and have allocated burdens of proof in divergent ways. Some have imposed upon the state a “substantial burden of justification,” under which the state must show the furtherance of an “important or substantial governmental interest.”52 Other courts have employed the so-called “traditional” equal protection test, and have required that the state merely demonstrate the existence of a “rational basis” for its regulation encroaching upon a student’s constitutional rights.53

Smith and the School Board contend that this court should adopt as an appropriate standard of proof the formula articulated by Justice Harlan in his dissenting opinion in Tinker:

. . . I would, in cases like this, cast upon those complaining the burden of showing that a particular school measure was motivated by other than legitimate school concerns. . . . 54

Since we have held that the right “to be let alone” — including the right to determine one’s own hairstyle in accordance with individual preferences and without the interference of governmental officials or agents — is a fundamental right under the constitution of Alaska, we reject the test proposed by Justice Harlan. Adoption of his standard would make this fundamental constitutional right dependent upon the subjective elements of motivation and good faith of school administrators.55 *172In short, we think adoption of the compelling interest standard best comports with the kind of ordered liberty which represents the core of Alaska’s constitutional heritage and will afford the necessary degree of protection against attempted infringement of the students’ individual constitutional right involved in this litigation.

Breese established the existence of a fundamental constitutional right and the encroachment thereof by the school hair regulation. We hold that on this record, Smith and the School Board have failed to prove that their interest in promulgating the hair length regulation is compelling.56 In their attempt to justify the rule, Smith and the School Board produced lay opinion testimony, unsupported by figures or statistics, on the relationships between long hair and disruptive behavior and between long hair and academic performance. That testimony included a few references to specific disturbances involving students with long hair. Absent from the appellee’s proof, however, were “hard facts” 57 pertaining to the causal relationship between appearance and behavior. No empirical studies were offered. No testimony from experts such as psychologists or psychiatrists was introduced.

Instead, Smith testified that his primary objection to long hair being worn by male students was that it was a deviation from the norm of appearances and caused distractions and disruptions within the school system. He further testified that he believed that good grooming improves personal behavior, that the student with long hair has a poor self-image and consequently his personal behavior is not what it could be, that the long haired student is negative, defensive and in trouble, and that there is a very direct relationship between personal appearance and behavior. Smith *173also testified that university students with long hair had caused an “excitement” when they visited his school, that he was informed of an instance in which a classroom fight between two boys broke out after one called the other a “pretty boy,” and that he had overheard students who were observing Breese in the hallway say, “isn’t he cute” and laugh. A mathematics teacher from Main testified in defendants’ behalf and stated that on one occasion, Breese had caused a minor disruption in her class when he got his hair caught in the pins on her bulletin board. The assistant principal of Main testified that in his professional opinion, long haired students are proportionately more of a disciplinary problem than short haired students. He further stated that he believed the long hair of a student could cause a disruption, could become a disciplinary problem. A counselor at Main testified that two boys in her room had caused a disruption by saying that “my hair is longer than yours” and by pulling on each other’s hair and fighting. Another counselor from Main, who was also a priest and possessed considerable teaching and administrative experience, testified that when he was a principal at another high school, he experienced more disciplinary problems with students on “hobo day,” a special occasion on which the school dress code was relaxed and students were allowed to wear old clothes. He later admitted, however, that the increased unruly behavior on “hobo day” might have been a function of the holiday atmosphere. He further testified that in his professional opinion, there could be a relationship between long hair and behavior and disciplinary problems. An English teacher at Main testified that the title of the play Hair perhaps has some relationship with an attitude of protest, that long hair on a student interferes with teaching by preventing “eye contact,” and that a student who is constantly flipping his hair back or moving it back out of his eyes creates a distraction. Another English teacher from Main gave her opinion that students’ long hair and their behavior “go together.” A teacher testified that “I’ve had more combs in my classroom lately than I’ve seen in a chicken yard.” Finally, a juvenile officer of the Fairbanks police department testified that probably more than half of the juvenile males with whom he came into contact had long hair. He acknowledged, however, that “contacts” and “juveniles” were not synonymous, and that the police department kept no figures, percentages or statistics on the length of hair of juvenile offenders.

This evidence offered by Smith and the School Board to justify the hair length regulation, however, was not uncontrovert-ed. Breese offered both lay and expert opinion testimony that rebutted the evidence presented by appellees. Breese’s father testified that he wanted his son to have long hair and that he believed his son had a right to wear long hair since the youth was not infringing anyone else’s rights. A biology teacher from Lathrop High School testifying in Breese’s behalf stated that long haired students did not cause discipline problems, and that they were among the academically superior students who took his advanced biology course. A social studies teacher from Lathrop testified that she could not tell any difference between long and short haired students in deportment, grades, attitude or anything. She further testified that long haired males in her classes did not cause distractions or create disruptions but opined that crew cut males might create a disturbance. A current events and “American Minorities” teacher from Lath-rop testified that she could not see any difference in behavior between the male students in her classes with long hair and those with short hair, and that she did not tend to have more long haired people in her special classes for “underachievers.” A French and social studies teacher from Ryan Junior High gave testimony that she could see no relationship at all between her students’ long hair and their behavior. She further testified that the length of a male student’s hair had never led to distractions in her class, that long haired stu*174dents were no better or worse achievers than short haired students, and that long haired students did not give her any more trouble than short haired students. A psychologist who worked in a Fairbanks mental clinic for five years gave her expert opinion that there was no cause and effect relationship between the length of hair and the behavior problems of a child, and that short haired and long haired kids got into trouble with equal frequency. She also testified that her own son, a high school student who wore long hair, was a semi-finalist in the national merit scholarship competition. An assistant professor of education at the University of Alaska, who is a registered psychologist in the state of Alaska, gave his expert opinion that there is no direct causal relationship between hair length and behavior. He further testified that in no case could he actually correlate, let alone find a causative relationship between hair length and personality. Finally, a seventh grade student from Main testified that in the class she shared with Breese, the latter’s hair created no distractions and caused no disruptions or talk.

We express no view as to the nature or exact amount of evidence necessary to establish the existence of a compelling state interest. Rather, we conclude only that on the basis of the entire record in the case at bar, Smith and the School Board did not meet the requisite burden of showing a compelling justification for the Main Junior High School hair length regulation. In the absence of any compelling justification, we hold that the school hair length regulation impermissably infringed upon Breese’s constitutional right under Alaska’s constitution which guaranteed him the liberty of personal choice as to appearance.

Several courts have found regulations more acceptable where some sort of intra-school “procedure for review of any punishments” has been provided.58 Similarly, Smith and the School Board argue that the fact that the Board is “democratically elected” acts as a “brake” upon unreasonable and arbitrary actions of schoolmen.59 In the case at bar the hair regulation was promulgated by a single school official, and was based on his conception of fashion. Even if such a regulation were arrived at and promulgated by a more democratic process, a student’s claim to liberty would remain undiminished, for this court is held to a standard of vigilance in the matter of the protection of an individual’s constitutional liberties. Protection of personal liberty cannot be left to depend upon the will of the majority for those are antithetical concepts.60 The tension between the notions of liberty and majority rule is illuminated by Judge Mann in Conyers v. Glenn.61

*175The order appealed from is grounded on the theory that parental authority has been transferred by the will of the majority to the board, and that the board has authority to prescribe the students’ dress. The corollary of this proposition is that if these long-haired young, grown to legal age, sufficiently persuade their fellow citizens to elect, by a bare majority, a bare majority of a school board, then that governmental body shall have the authority, by vote of its new majority, to suspend the student who cuts his hair during the term.

. We would surmise that many who are not offended in the slightest by the imposition of the collective will on the long-haired boy of today would be early advocates of the short-haired individual’s right to be different in a long-haired society.62

Similarly, the tension between personal liberty and majority will would not be eliminated by the fact that hair regulations were promulgated by some democratically elected, intra-school body. An attempted justification of this nature was properly rejected by the Seventh Circuit in the very recent case of Arnold v. Carpenter,63 where the court stated:

We conclude that the democratic process used in adopting the code does not per se justify the denial of [the students’] constitutional right to wear his hair in the mode he chooses.64

The superior court’s judgment is reversed and the case remanded with directions to enter a judgment in conformity with this opinion.

Reversed and remanded.

(concurring).

I regret that I am forced to dissent from the reasoning expressed even though I agree with the result in this case. “I have no objection, dislike or distaste for any particular hair style worn by either male or female of any age. My acceptance of the hair styling of other human beings is tempered by my thinking that whatever the style it should be clean, reasonably neat (whatever that means, and present no danger to. the health or safety of the individual or to others.” 1. In the case at hand, there appears to be no question but that the hair in question was clean, neat and presented no danger to the health or safety of Breese or anyone else.

But the length or style of Michael Breese’s hair is not the issue here. It is rather the nature and scope of the power of the school board — more precisely, the limits of that power. Traditionally, the board’s power has rested on the common law doctrine of in loco parentis. William Blackstone has provided us with what is perhaps the classic statement of this doctrine :

“[A parent] may also delegate part of his parental authority, during his life, to the tutor or school master of his child; who is then in loco parentis, and has such a portion of the power of the parent committed to his charge, viz that of restraint and correction, as may be necessary to answer for the purposes for which he is employed.” 2

Thus the board’s authority must be delineated on the basis of subtle distinctions de*176rived from the functions that society has given it to perform. Today the situation has changed somewhat and the modern school board is a public agency operating under a legislative grant of authority. While the statutory delegation of school board authority is exclusive, the statutory scheme must nevertheless be read against the background of the common law rules.3

The American community groups together in its schools hundreds, even thousands, of energetic, volatile and sometimes aggressive young people in close contact with one another and in confined areas, during a substantial part of each school day for three-fourths of each year and twelve years of their lives.

The bare process of teaching them in the traditional sense demands the best that the profession can offer. But in addition we call upon the schools to give our children driver training, vocational skills, public speaking, music instruction, and sex education, and to maintain their physical fitness, to carry on ever broadening athletic programs, engage in fund raising, and plan, produce and chaperone social events.

Citizens expect and demand that their children be physically safe in the schools to whose supervision they are consigned, and the citizenry is outraged if the schools are less than safe and orderly. At the same time we expect that the requirements of order, and of protection and implementation of the educational program of the school, will be met by limited enforcement means — the force of the school establishment itself and the school-related disciplines of reprimand, suspension, and expulsion — recognizing that the schoolroom is an inappropriate place for the policeman to be, whether called or needed.

Just as we do not expect parents to be perfect, recognizing that a certain amount of trial and error is necessary for the development of both the parents and the child, we cannot rationally demand perfection from the school. Each year, as the makeup of a school class changes, the same trial and error process is necessary to establish an atmosphere for teaching. The initial guidelines provide a basic starting point for teachers and students alike to assess each other and to establish a working relationship. In measuring the appropriateness and reasonableness of school regulations against constitutional protections, the courts must give full credence to the role and purposes of the schools and of the tools with which they must deal with their problems. The courts must be careful to recognize the differences between what are reasonable restraints in the classroom and what are reasonable restraints on the street corner. This is not to say, however, that there are no limits to board authority. Indeed, there must be (just as there must be limits on parental authority).

The majority opinion balances these interests by placing the burden of a school board of justifying each regulation which restricts any constitutional right of a student to establish a “compelling state interest” before the regulation will be upheld. I feel that the majority has placed the wrong burden on the wrong party. I view of the nature and function of the school board in the present day educational process, I am strongly of the opinion that it is the student who should bear the burden of showing that a particular rule bore no reasonable relationship to the purpose for which it was promulgated. This reasonable relationship “must be an obvious and real connection between the regulation and its purpose. . . . ”4

The effect of the majority opinion is to tightly constrict board authority at a time when citizens are demanding more from *177the school. This could bring the educational process to a ponderous halt:

“Some lines must be drawn. To challenge such lines by the ‘compelling state interest’ standard is to condemn them all. So far as I am aware, no state law has ever satisfied this seemingly insurmountable standard, and I doubt one ever will, for it demands nothing less than perfection.5

This court is in a difficult position to judge the needs of local school districts scattered over the reaches of Alaska. Their problems are as diverse as the inhabitants and the climate. Innovation and experimentation have been the order of the day as local schools met local problems. I fear the perfection we now require will greatly limit this at a time when we most need new ideas and approaches to solve our basic problems. The board may spend its time repetitively justifying its legitimate authority rather than solving its problems.

However, the application of a burden such as I have proposed would not have changed the result in the case at bar. The school board, in its arguments both below and on appeal, limited its justification of the instant rule to a claim that the regulation of hair length was conducive to good academic performance and deportment.6 Highly qualified expert testimony brought forth by appellant was unanimous in denying that there was any “obvious and real connection” between the length of hair and academic performance or deportment. We have not been cited to nor have we found any medical authority which refutes this testimony.7 It is on this very narrow basis that I concur in this case.