OPINION

We are called upon here to determine whether the superior court’s order terminating the parental rights of the mother of E.C. and D.C. was supported by clear and convincing evidence, as required by AS 47.-10.080(c)(3).1 We conclude that it was so supported, and affirm.

The state presented testimony from, inter alia, three of the mother’s social workers, two school nurses where D.C. attended kindergarten, a pediatrician who examined both children, a foster parent who had cared for both children, a psychiatric social worker who had worked with D.C. and interviewed the mother, and a family therapist who had counseled the mother and her new husband. This testimony established three incidents of beatings causing extensive bruising of the children, and indicated a general pattern of child abuse.2 The fam*23ily therapist felt that the home was “potentially life threatening” to the children. The testimony also showed that the children’s home situation was causing major psychological problems, and that they had developed a great fear of their parents, especially their stepfather. Several witnesses also testified that the mother and stepfather found these beatings to be an acceptable form of discipline, and that there had been no change in their attitudes toward this harsh discipline, even after the children had been removed from the home as a result.

The mother admitted to spanking the children, even to the point of bruising,3 but felt that such punishment was necessary, since she claimed the children had not responded to other forms of discipline. She has argued on appeal that her actions fell within the discretion allotted a parent in the administration of punishment. However, this discretion is not unlimited. Clearly it does not extend to punishment regularly causing the “substantial physical harm” which under AS 47.10.010(a)(2)(C)4 determines that a child is in need of aid.

While a parent has a right to the care, custody and control of his or her children, this right is not absolute, and “courts have become increasingly aware of the rights of children.” In the Matter of S.D., Jr., 549 P.2d 1190, 1201 (Alaska 1976). The Alaska legislature has struck a balance between these potentially competing rights by requiring the state to prove its allegations by clear and convincing evidence in parental rights termination cases. Once this burden of proof has been met, however, the statute mandates a termination. Our review of the record here has convinced us that the mother’s conduct, and the stepfather’s conduct acquiesced in by the mother, have resulted in substantial physical harm to E.C. and D.C., and that there would be an imminent and substantial risk of its continuation if her parental rights were not terminated.

AFFIRMED.