. The substantive right to peremptorily challenge a judge came into being with the enactment of AS 22.20.022, the validity of which we upheld in Channel Flying, Inc. v. Bernhardt, 451 P.2d 570 (Alaska 1969). That section provides in part:

(a) If a party or his attorney in a district court action or a superior court action, civil or criminal, files an affidavit alleging under oath that he believes that he cannot obtain a fair and impartial trial, the presiding district court or superior court judge, respectively, shall at once, and without requiring proof, assign the action to another judge of the appropriate court in that district, or if there is none, the chief justice of the supreme court shall assign a judge for the hearing or trial of the action. The affidavit shall contain a statement that it is made in good faith and not for the purpose of delay.

AS 22.20.022(a).

Subsequent to the enactment of AS 22.20.022 this court promulgated Civil Rule 42(c), which established the procedure to be followed in implementing the substantive right created by the statute. See Gieffels v. State, 552 P.2d 661 (Alaska 1976). Civil Rule 42(c) provides in part:

(1) Nature of Proceeding. In an action pending in the Superior or District Courts, each side is entitled as a matter of right to a change of one judge and of one master. Two or more parties aligned on the same side of an action, whether or not consolidated, shall be treated as one side for purposes of the right to a change of judge, but the presiding judge may allow an additional change of judge to a party whose interests in the action are hostile or adverse to the interests of another party on the same side. A party wishing to exercise his right to a change of judge shall file a pleading entitled “Notice of Change of Judge.” The notice may be signed by an attorney, it shall state the name of the judge to be changed, and it shall neither specify grounds nor be accompanied by an affidavit. A judge may honor an informal request for change of judge. When he does so, he shall enter upon the record the date of the request and the name of the party or parties requesting change of judge. Such action shall constitute an exercise of the requesting party’s right to change of judge.

Rule 42(c)(1), Alaska R.Civ.P.

. AS 44.62.560-.570 are part of the Administrative Procedure Act. However, “[t]he [other] administrative adjudication procedures of the ... Act (AS 44.62) do not apply to adjudicatory proceeding of the Commission ... . ” AS 16.-43.120(a).

. Such proceedings, we believe, are substantially different from the sort of “appeal” that was before us in Halligan v. State, 624 P.2d 281 (Alaska, 1981). In that case we considered the availability of a peremptory challenge to one petitioning the superior court for review of an order of the district court suppressing part of the state’s evidence in a district court criminal prosecution. We held that AS 22.20.022 does not apply to such cases, when the only action contemplated is review by the superior court of the subordinate court’s ruling, on the record of the proceedings in the district court. As noted in the text of our present opinion, supra, in an appeal from an administrative determination by the Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission, the superior court “may exercise its independent judgment on the evidence.” AS 44.-62.570(c). Moreover, short of hearing the matter de novo, “[t]he court may augment the agency record in whole or in part,” admit evidence that it believes “was improperly excluded,” and “enter judgment.” AS 44.62.570(d)-(e). Thus, Halligan does not control the result in the case at bar.

. As noted, each of the challenges was timely. We are satisfied that they were otherwise adequate as well.

. The majority points out that, with respect to administrative appeals, AS 44.62.570 provides that the court may augment the agency record in whole or in part; admit evidence unavailable at the time of, or wrongfully excluded from, the agency hearing; or hold a hearing de novo. The superior court, however, has the same discretion on petitions for review from the district court. Alaska Dist. Ct.R.Civ.P. 31(g) provides that review “shall be on the record unless the superior court, in its discretion, shall direct that the matter be heard wholly or partly on oral testimony or depositions or that other evidence be submitted.” Similarly, Alaska Dist. Ct.R. Crim.P. 3 provides that hearings on petitions for review are to be based upon the record generated in the district court unless otherwise ordered by the court.

. In Commercial Fisheries Entry Comm’n v. Templeton, 598 P.2d 77 (Alaska 1979), the court noted that the same standard applied both to the superior court’s review of the agency’s decision and to the supreme court’s review of the superior court’s decision:

[Superior Court] Judge Stewart was free to substitute his own judgment as to the proper interpretation of the Act .... Judge Stewart *9was in just as good a position to make that judgment as the Commission. Similarly, since a question of statutory interpretation is involved, this court will independently evaluate the trial court’s interpretation.

Id. at 80-81 (citations and footnotes omitted).

. Id. See also Guin v. Ha, 591 P.2d 1281, 1284 n.6 (Alaska 1979).

. Interior Paint Co. v. Rodgers, 522 P.2d 164, 170 (Alaska 1974).

. Alaska R.Civ.P. 52(a).

. [Tjhe scope of review of jury verdicts and of administrative findings is the same .... The scope of review of findings of a judge without a jury, however, is different from the scope of review of administrative findings and of jury verdicts, for findings of a judge may be upset if they are ‘clearly erroneous.’ Because findings may be clearly erroneous without being unreasonable so as to be upset under the substantial-evidence rule, the scope of review of administrative findings is narrower than the scope of review of a judge’s findings.

4 K. Davis, Administrative Law § 29.02, at 120-21 (1958).

. Implicit in this reasoning is a rule that, when the superior court judge decides that a case should be reviewed on facts dehors the record, he should so advise the parties and give them a reasonable opportunity to exercise their right.

. I realize that it may seem premature to allow a peremptory challenge solely on the basis of a request for the submission of additional evidence, rather than gearing it to the judge’s actual decision as to whether or not to hear such evidence. However, a party concerned about the judge’s bias is likely to suspect that any decision not to accept additional evidence was colored by that judge’s bias and by the judge’s knowledge that acceptance of the evidence would afford the party a peremptory challenge. In the interests of avoiding even the appearance of judicial impropriety, I would find that the peremptory challenge right attaches at the point of the request rather than the actual decision.