OPINION

Child Support Recovery Services, Inc. (CSRS) appeals the grant of summary judgment by the superior court in favor of Inn at the Waterfront, Inc. For the reasons stated in Judge Larry Weeks's thorough and *64thoughtful summary judgment decision, relevant portions of which we set out in Appendix A, we affirm the grant of summary judgment. We add the following with respect to points specifically raised on the appeal:

1. At oral argument, counsel for appellant CSRS abandoned reliance on AS 25.27.260(b)1 Accordingly, we have excised Judge Weeks's analysis of the legislature's 1994 amendment of AS 25.27.260, which added subsection (b).

2. CSRS first appeared in this case in 1993 when the Child Support Enforcement Division assigned its enforeement right to 'CSRS. The sole defendant at the time, Cul-Tinane, did not object to this substitution, and the superior court allowed it. No question of CSRS's standing to pursue this case was raised until the superior court's summary judgment ruling. There, Judge Weeks ruled:

Finally, AS 25.27.260(b) which permits recovery by an individual as opposed to the state, was not enacted until a year after the last [order to withhold and deliver] was served in this case. The court believes that this fact precludes the individual plaintiff CSR[S] from recovery.

CSRS appealed the superior court's conclusion that it lacked standing to bring this action and argued in this court that Inn at the Waterfront should be equitably estopped from arguing lack of standing. Because at oral argument CSRS abandoned reliance on AS 25.27.260(b), and because we conclude that summary judgment was properly granted on the merits, we do not address CSRS's argument that Inn at the Waterfront should be equitably estopped from arguing that CSRS did not have the right to maintain its action. For this reason, and because the parties have not briefed the issue, we decline to address whether the state may assign its enforcement right to a private collection agency such as CSRS.

The judgment entered by the superior court is AFFIRMED.

APPENDIX A **

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION

This case is before the court on defendant Inn at the Waterfront's motion for summary judgment, or in the alternative, for relief from judgment under Civil Rule 60(b)(5), and for costs and fees. CSRS opposes both motions.. Resolution of the pending issues depends on the court's interpretation of AS 25.27.260:; Civil Hability upon failure to comply with an order or lien.

A. Factual Background

In 1981, a Nevada court established a child support obligation for William J. Cullinane, the non-custodial parent of a minor child, S.C. In 1986, the Alaska Child Support Enforcement Division (CSED) began efforts to collect unpaid child support due under the Nevada order. Those efforts included the issuance of three Orders to Withhold [Income] and Deliver Property (WIDs) to Inn at the Waterfront, Inc., based on CSED's understanding that Inn was Cullinane's employer. The WIDs were issued pursuant to AS 25.27.250, formerly AS 47.28.2503

*65The first WID, dated May 12, 1988, instructed Inn inter alia to withhold and deliver to CSED all of Cullinane's real or personal property in its possession, fifty-five percent of his wages and earnings when payable, and fifty percent of any unemployment insurance benefits when payable, up to $28,-321.74, the amount of arrearage, interest and penalties due as of the date of the WID. The second WID, dated April 5, 1989, set forth the same withholding instructions but raised the maximum allowable withholding to $81,807.74 to reflect Cullinane's arrearage, interest and penalties due as of the date of the second WID. The third WID, dated September 30, 1993, instructed Inn to withhold and deliver by the same terms as the first two WIDs, with the exeeption that Inn should withhold sixty percent of Cullinane's wages and earnings when payable, up to $57,455.05, the amount of arrearage, interest and penalties due as of the date of the third WID. The legal sufficiency of the WIDs has not been argued. Likewise, Inn has not argued about whether it received the WIDs or whether it failed to withhold or deliver Cullinane's income or assets in its possession as required by the terms of the WIDs, On a motion for summary judgment the court infers CSRS prevails on this issue.4

CSED initiated litigation in 1989 against Cullinane. Additional parties, including Inn, Ann House and Cullinane Corporation, were joined in the litigation as a result of their association with Cullinane. Prosecution of the case was assumed by CSRS in 1998. On February 27, 1995, in the context of a cross motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability, this court determined Inn was "liable for any unpaid WIDs accruing from the time the first WID was served."

Cullinane's outstanding arrearage obligation was reduced to judgment on January 2, 1996. On July 22, 1996, Cullinane paid $70,658.33 in full satisfaction of the outstanding judgment for child support arrearage plus interest and costs of execution.5 CSED issued a notice of intent to close the case, addressed to Cullinane, on November 6, 1996. CSED filed notice of full satisfaction of the judgment against Cullinane on November 15, 1996. On March 12, 1997, CSED notified Inn that the September 30, 1998 withholding order (WID No. 3) was terminated.

B. Summary of Parties' Arguments

Inn argues summary judgment is appropriate in this case because it was liable only for "unpaid WIDs" which no longer exist. Inn interprets AS 25.27.260 to impose joint and several liability on the obligor-employee and his or her employer for the accrued and unpaid support arrearage indicated in the WIDs. According to Inn, this court's January 1996 judgment was "fully executable either against Mr. Cullinane or Inn to the extent of the unpaid WIDs." According to Inn, satisfaction of the underlying judgment against Cullinane necessarily relieves Inn of continuing liability.

CSRS argues Inn's liability for failure to comply with the WIDs in violation of AS 25.27.260 is continuing and independent of Cullinane's Hability. It says that Inn's liability may be as much as $70,658.33. According to CSRS, Cullinane's satisfaction of the underlying arrearage obligation terminated the withholding requirement of the WIDs but did not erase Inn's liability based on its previous non-compliance.

Inn also argues AS 25.27.260 should not be construed as a penalty absent express legislative intent. Inn argues against permitting *66a double recovery or a civil penalty in excess of the eriminal fine provided in AS 11.51.122 for "aiding the nonpayment of child support.6 CSRS argues AS 25.27.260 should be construed as a penalty in that its purpose is to encourage employers to obey WIDs. According to CSRS, employers should not be permitted to disobey WIDs without consequence.

Inn argues a construction of AS 25.27.260 which permits double recovery is inconsistent with other provisions of the child support enforcement act and the statute's express purpose of enforcing the child support obligations of responsible parents. CSRS argues it does not seek a double recovery from the same person. CSRS also argues the policies underlying the legislative enactment of strong enforcement mechanisms would warrant a double recovery.

As an alternative to summary judgment, Inn argues the full satisfaction of the arrear-age obligation underlying the WIDs operates as a release of Inn's liability and Inn should therefore be granted relief from judgment pursuant to Civil Rule 60(b)(5b). CSRS argues relief from judgment under Civil Rule 60(b)(5) is inappropriate because no judgment yet exists against Inn from which the court can give it relief.

C. Summary Judgment and Civil Rule 60(b) Standards

The court may grant summary judgment pursuant to Civil Rule 56 when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.7 Onee the moving party establishes by competent evidence the absence of genuine issues of material fact, the non-moving party must clearly and specifically demonstrate that it can produce admissible evidence disputing the moving party's evidence.8 All reasonable inferences of fact are drawn in favor of the non-moving party.9

Civil Rule 60(b)(5) provides for relief from a final judgment, order, or proceeding where "the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application."

II. ISSUE

Is Inn's civil liability under AS 25.27.260 for failure to comply with the WIDs continuing and independent of or joint and several with the full satisfaction of William Cullinane's child support judgment?

III. DISCUSSION

The legislative intent of AS 25.27.260 is ambiguous, but suggests that Inn's liability for failure to comply with the WIDs is joint and several with William Culli-name's support obligation.

In the context of a prior summary judgment motion by defendant Ann House, this court found Inn liable for its failure to comply with the terms of the three WIDs it received concerning Cullinane. That finding was based on application of AS 25.27.260 to facts in this case which are not in dispute. Alaska Statute 25.27.260 provides:

Civil liability upon failure to comply with an order or lien. (a) If a person, political subdivision, or department of the state (1) fails to make an answer to an order to withhold and deliver within the time prescribed in AS 25.27.9250; (2) fails or refuses to deliver property in accordance with an order issued under AS 25.27.250; (8) pays over, releases, sells, transfers, or conveys real property subject to a lien recorded under AS 25.27.2830 to or for the benefit of the obligor or any other person; (4) fails or refuses to surrender *67upon demand property attached; or (5) intentionally fails or refuses to honor an assignment of wages or an income withholding order under AS 25.27.062 that was served by the agency through personal service by a process server or through certified mail, return receipt requested, the person, political subdivision, or department of the state is Hable to the agency in an amount equal to 100 percent of the amount constituting the basis of the lien, order to withhold and deliver, attachment, or withholding of wages or income, together with costs, interest, and reasonable attorney fees. (Emphasis added.)

Inn's liability arose from its failure to answer and to withhold and deliver income and property in accordance with the three WIDs issued pursuant to AS 25.27.250.10 Inn does not contest its liability for "unpaid WIDs" as established in this court's order of February 1995, but argues its liability has since been extinguished by Cullinane's payment in full of his child support arrearage. The legislative intent behind Chapter 27 of Title 25 and the meaning conveyed by the statute's language and context are ambiguous, but do support a finding of joint and several liability.

A. Legislative Intent

In interpreting a statute, the court's goal is to give effect to the intent of the law-making body with due regard for the meaning that the language employed in the statute conveys to others.11 Alaska Statute 25.27.260 is one of numerous enforcement provisions enacted in 1977 by the state legislature to increase the effectiveness of child support collections. The express purpose of the 1977 act is as follows:

PURPOSE. Common law and statutory procedures governing the remedies for enforcement of support for financially dependent minor children by responsible parents have not proven sufficiently effective or efficient to cope with the increasing incidence of financial dependency. The increasing workload of courts, district attorneys, and the attorney general has made such remedies uncertain, slow and inadequate, thereby resulting in a growing burden on the financial resources of the state which is required to provide public assistance grants for basic maintenance requirements when parents fail to meet their primary obligations. The state, therefore, exercising its police and sovereign power, declares that the common law and Alaska statutes pertaining to the establishment and enforcement of child support obligations shall be augmented by additional remedies in order to meet the needs of minor children. It is declared to be the public policy of this state that this Act be construed and administered to the end that children shall be maintained from the resources of responsible parents, thereby relieving, at least in part, the burden presently born by the general citizenry through welfare and welfare-related programs.12

Subsequent amendments to the provisions of Chapter 27 have been accompanied by similar statements of purpose and intent:

LEGISLATIVE FINDINGS AND PURPOSE. (a) The legislature finds that the effect on the general public of the failure of parents to support their children is vast and far reaching. The harmful effects of unpaid child support touch not only the poor but reach far beyond, diminishing the overall quality of life for all Alaskans. The purpose of the amendments in this Act is *68to enbanee the efforts of those persons who seek to enforce the payment of child support obligations by noncustodial parents having the duty of support.

(c) The legislature also finds that the hardship experienced by children in families who may rely on support from a noncustodial parent should not be a necessary condition that must be endured by those families. Statutory tools have been provided to enable the child support enforcement agency to collect unpaid child support owed by a parent, including the authority to order an employer to withhold and deliver part of an employee's earnings. This tool, however, is not usable against a self-employed parent who owes child support. The legislature finds that if delinquency in making child support payments could be reflected in a person's credit history, an effective collection and deterrent tool would exist-a tool that would be effective against those self-employed parents who owe child support.13

The Senate adopted the following letter of intent to accompany the 1994 amendments to the Act:

Apart from the statutory changes enacted in this bill, the legislature wishes to convey its intent that the Child Support Enforeement Division distinguish between obli-gors, employers and others who voluntarily meet their support, withholding or other obligations under this chapter and those who do not. To the extent allowed by this chapter and federal law, this distinction should be actively reflected in all ageney communications as well as in the nature, extent and timing of enforcement actions, subject to reasonable precautions to avoid uncollectability of funds necessary for support.14

Chapter 27 as amended was enacted to satisfy the federal mandate for compliance with 42 U.S.C. §§ 651-667.15" The relevant portion of the federal statute, 42 U.S.C. § 666(b)(6)(C), requires:

The employer must be held liable to the State for any amount which such employer fails to withhold from income due an employee following receipt by such employer of proper notice under [the previous sub-paragraph requiring employers to withhold and deliver the amount specified in the notice to the agency or other entity authorized to collect].

Federal regulations promulgated by the federal Office of Child Support Enforcement also require:

(iv) That the withholding [provision created by the state] is binding upon the employer until further notice by the State;

(vi) That, if the employer fails to withhold wages in accordance with the provisions of the notice, the employer is liable for the accumulated amount the employer should have withheld from the absent parent's wages[.] 16

Thus, the express intent of the legislature with regard to the provisions of Chapter 27 has consistently been to increase the ability of the state to enforce child support obligations and, toward that goal, to impose federally mandated lability on employers who fail to aid in that enforcement effort. The imposition of joint and several liability on the employer comports with that intent. The employer becomes a readily available source of funds in cases where funds are not available from the obligor. This responsibility on employers is new and significant It is a "penalty" even with joint and several Hiability; the non-compliant employer ends up paying the employee's child support.

*69B. Statutory Enforcement Obligations

In effect, the state has recruited employers as private child support enforcement agen-cles. The WID statute is one of several provisions in Chapter 27 which impose enforcement obligations on employers. For example, AS 25.27.062 17 provides for income withholding orders which must be implemented by employers. Alaska Statute 25.27.0638 18 limits an employer's discretion with regard to health care coverage required under a medical support order.19 Alaska Statute 25.27.070 provides for assignment of wages which must be implemented by the employer.20 Alaska Statute 25.27.062(k) re*70quires employers subject to withholding orders to maintain independent records on obli-gor-employees and notify CSED in the event of termination.21 Alaska Statute 25.27.075 requires employers with 20 or more employees to report hirings to CSED .22

These statutory enforcement obligations are not voluntary; an employer is subject to civil penalties and liability for failure to comply. In addition to civil liability under AS 25.27.260, an employer is subject to a civil penalty of up to $1,000 for failure to comply with the reporting statute.23 An employer is subject to a maximum $1,000 civil penalty for retaliatory discharge of an obligor-employee based on receipt of a withholding or reporting order.24 The WID provision likewise provides for employer liability for failure to comply. Alaska Statute 25.27.250(J) provides: "A person, political subdivision, or department that fails to comply with an order to withhold and deliver served under this subsection is subject to penalties under AS 25.27.260." Imposition of this liability is a significant change to child support enforeement law and provides material benefit to the state's ability to collect support. The state has the option of pursuing recovery from the obligor and/or the non-compliant employer. In either event, the support obligation may be met.

C. Statute Creates Joint, not Independent Liability

Under AS 25.27.260(a), liability is measured by the extent of the employer's noncompliance with the WID. A noncompliant employer is liable "to the agency" for "100 percent of the amount" due under the WID, plus costs, interest and fees.25 Each of the WIDs expressly state: "this order is binding until you receive a notice of satisfaction of requirement from the State of Alaska." Pri- or to receiving notice of satisfaction, the employer can satisfy its obligation by "delivery to the agency of the money or other property due, owing, or belonging to the obligor." 26 Property turned over to the state is held in *71trust for application against the Hability of the obligor or for return to the obligor depending on a final determination of liability or nonliability under the chapter.27

The employer's liability for failure to comply therefore depends on the terms of the WID. In a case where CSED issues a WID and pursues a recovery against the employer within a relatively short period of time, the employer's liability would be limited. The enforcement statute in a case like that would operate like a civil contempt order; the employer could avoid increased liability by complying with the WID. This is not that type of case.

In this case, Inn failed to withhold or deliver beginning in May 1988. Inn's Hiability under the statute potentially equaled Cul-linane's $70,000 support arrears obligation. To permit CSRS to recover a windfall of $70,000 from an employer is a new and onerous burden and should be found only if it is clear that the legislature intended that burden. Neither the express legislative intent nor the language of the statute supports this application of the penalty.

In Alaska, the law tries to avoid double recovery unless it is clearly intended as a policy matter.28 Reading AS 25.27.260 to create joint and several liability for the unpaid WIDs in this case is consistent with that policy in the law. The court believes Inn is lable for unpaid WIDs under the statute. There are now no unpaid WIDs.

D. Limited Case Law from Other Jurisdictions Suggests Reluctance to Impose Inability

The Alaska Supreme Court has not construed AS 25.27.260, and there are very few cases dealing with similar statutes in other jurisdictions. This may be a function of judicial reluctance to recognize this form of statutory liability. In any event, the federal mandate is very broad and the resulting state statutes are widely variant. As noted below, some state statutes provide for Hability to the obligee instead of or in addition to liability to the state. Several provide for a specific fine while others appear to rely on traditional contempt proceedings to enforce the support orders.

In Dunahee v. Chenoa Welding & Fabrication, Inc., the court imposed a statutory $100 per day fine on an employer who failed to timely comply with a withholding order.29 Although the applicable statute required the employer to forward withheld child support "within 10 days of paying the employee,30 " the employer wrote out a check each week but only mailed them once a month to the obligee.31 The obligee sued to impose the statutory penalty.32

The court considered the statute's legislative history and the federal mandate of Title 42 before concluding the imposition of a penalty was appropriate.33 According to the court, "the penalty will serve to compensate the plaintiff for any hardship and will deter future noncompliance by the employer." 34 The court also noted,

without the application of a penalty, employers would have an incentive to mot send in a withheld child support payment in a timely manner. The longer a withheld child support check is not mailed to the obligee, the longer those funds are available for the employer to use to its own advantage.35

*72In Crenshaw v. Refuse Service, Inc.,36 the Missouri Court of Appeals considered a case arising from a contempt prosecution by the county attorney against an employer, Refuse Service, Inc., for failure to comply with an Order to Withhold and Pay Over issued by the Division of Child Support Enforcement. In dicta, the court noted the Missouri statute "imposes liability on an employer who fails or refuses to withhold or pay over the amounts as ordered. Under subsection 8, the employer is liable to the party holding the support rights for the amount which should have been withheld and paid over under the order." 37 The statute authorizes an action by the director of the enforcement department against the employer or "other payor." 38 The Missouri statute provides for a fine, not to exceed $500, in addition to potential liability for "the amounts to be withheld or paid, court costs and reasonable attorney's fees.39

However, the Crenshaw court did not impose either the fine or the liability. Instead it held the contempt order was not a "final judgment" until enforced by actual incareeration or imposition of a per diem fine.40 Therefore, the court found the order was not amenable to appellate review and dismissed the appeal.41

In Burrs v. Burrs,42 the Court of Appeals of Ohio, Second District, affirmed a trial court judgment fining a corporate employer and holding it civilly Hable for failure to obey a notification requirement of a withholding order issued by the Montgomery County Bureau of Support. The Ohio statute required an employer to notify the county enforcement agency of any lump-sum payments over $500 to be paid to an obligor-employee.43 The holding focused on the necessary mental state for the corporate employer, but the court noted a distinction between the fine, which it considered "in the nature of a criminal contempt, since ... it is neither intended to coerce future compliance nor to compensate [the obligee] for [the employer's] past failure to comply." 44 By contrast, the court noted the employer's statutory liability "would appear to be in the nature of a civil contempt." 45 The employer's civil liability was measured by the total amount of the arrearage in child support and alimony.46

<_ Although the court did not directly address the issue, the Ohio notification statute in Burrs appears to impose joint and several liability. The purpose of the notification statute is to prevent disbursements to the obligor-employee which should go to the obli-gee under the support order. In the event the employer does not notify the support enforcement agency and the money is paid to the obligor, the employer is liable to the extent the money disbursed could have satisfied the arrearages. Arguably, the same logic could be applied to the Alaska WID statute.

These cases illustrate the difficult situation courts face when construing statutes like AS 25.27,260. The Alaska legislature provided for a specific penalty amount in addition to other duties in AS 25.27.062(j), the income withholding order statute. If they had wanted to make sure AS 25.27.260 provided for an additional penalty above and beyond joint liability the legislature could have said so. It did not. The lack of guidance from other jurisdictions reinforces this court's conclusion to not find independent lability or allow a double recovery in this case under that statute absent clear legislative direction.

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*73IV. CONCLUSION

An employer or other person, political subdivision, or department of the state is Hable to the state under AS 25.27.260(a) for failure to comply with a WID. Given the lack of a clear legislative intent that the statute should be construed to impose liability independent of the support obligation, the court finds Inn's liability for failure to comply with the WIDs regarding William Cullinane was joint and several with Cullinane's. Summary judgment as to CSRS's claim under AS 25.27.260 is GRANTED. ~

/s/ Larry Weeks

Larry Weeks

Superior Court Judge

joins, concurring.

I agree with the court's decision to affir‘J-rn the summary judgment but would rely on a narrower ground for affirming.

In the present case, counsel for CSRS substituted for the attorney general's office as plaintiff's counsel of record and, contemporaneously, substituted CSRS for CSED as the nominal plaintiff, In so doing, counsel for CSRS made it clear that CSRS was serving in the capacity of a private collection agency representing the obligee parent, Nancy Bowen. And counsel represented that "[the State of Alaska has always been merely a nominal party in this matter, prosecuting on behalf of the custodial parent and the dependant [sic] child. This substitution of parties is intended only to replace the nominal party."

The attorney general's office confirmed the narrow scope of the substitution, indicating that this case was one of "several collection cases" prosecuted by CSED with the attorney general's representation, that CSED had instructed the attorney general's office to cooperate with CSRS and CSRS's attorney "in turning collection of the child support arrearages in this case over to CSRS," and that the attorney general's office agreed, "Itloward that end," that substitution of counsel and of the nominal party was appropriate "in this instance."

By the explicit and unambiguous terms of this substitution agreement, the state authorized CSRS to replace CSED and to assert the agency's legal interests only to the extent that CSED had acted in Bowen's stead to collect her past due child support; the stipulation unequivocally contemplated that CSRS would only assert Bowen's right to collect "child support arrearages."

Assuming, then, that AS 25.27.260(a) goes beyond creating joint and several liability and literally holds noncompliant employers liable for a penalty equivalent to the amount of outstanding child support arrearages, CSRS simply had no authority to prosecute an action to enforce this penalty. Any penalty authorized by AS 25.27.260(a) under joint and several employer liability could not plausibly be characterized as "child support ar-rearages." Under AS 25.27.260(a), this penalty would be payable to the state, and would not be due or owed to Bowen. CSED's right to recover the penalty for the state thus differs markedly from its right to recover past due child support for Bowen. Accordingly, I would affirm on this narrow basis: no matter how broad AS 25.27.260(a)'s penalty might be, the penalty action belonged to the state, the state never assigned it to CSRS, and CSRS had no right to pursue it under the substitution agreement.'1

Interpretation of AS 25.27.260(a) presents a close and difficult question that we need not answer here. In my view, we would best leave the question open for a case in which we must decide it.2