I. INTRODUCTION

A motorist appeals the superior court's dismissal of his claim that the Division of Motor Vehicles (DMV) failed to properly transfer a motorcycle endorsement from his California driver's license to his new Alaska license in 1992. The court decided that the motorist's claim, filed in 2017, was barred by the statute of limitations, the doctrines of laches and exhaustion of administrative remedies, and the governing DMV regulations. The court also awarded the DMV attorney's fees calculated pursuant to the Alaska Civil Rule 82(b)(2) schedule. The motorist appeals.

We affirm the superior court's decision primarily on laches grounds. The motorist filed his claim 25 years after the DMV's alleged mistake, long past the time the DMV could reasonably be expected to have retained any evidence relevant to its defense. We also affirm the award of attorney's fees, which the motorist did not oppose in the superior court, because the scheduled award is not plainly erroneous.

II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

This case was decided on the pleadings; we therefore take as true the following allegations of the complaint.1 Thomas I. Anderson Sr. completed a "Motorcycle Safety Rider's Course" at Fort Ord, California, in 1983, while he was serving in the military. As a result he "[w]as certified through the Motorcycle Safety Foundation" and was "informed ... that the certification was good in all 50" states. He moved to Alaska in 1987, and his California driver's license, with its motorcycle endorsement, allowed him to continue operating his motorcycle legally on Alaska's roads as long as he continued on active military duty.

Anderson was discharged in 1992 and acquired an Alaska driver's license. Although he did not notice at the time, his Alaska license "did not reflect the motorcycle endorsement *219that was on the California [l]icense," and the DMV failed to inform him that the endorsement was not transferred "or that there were other requirements to continue to operate his motorcycle on Alaska['s] highways and/or roads." Anderson nonetheless continued driving his motorcycle until 2007, when he registered a new "motorcycle/scooter" with the DMV and, at about the same time, learned that his license lacked a valid motorcycle endorsement.2 When he asked for one, the DMV informed him that he needed first "to take a written and road test[ ] and complete a motorcycle safety rider's course." Anderson took and passed the written test "involuntar[il]y" in 2007, but since then he has declined to take the road test and safety course on the ground that his 1983 training in California, along with the DMV's failure to transfer the California endorsement in 1992, entitles him to an Alaska endorsement without further proof of his competence. Several times over the past decade he has asked the governor's office to help him resolve the matter, though without success.

On March 31, 2017, Anderson again renewed his driver's license and again asked the DMV to give him a motorcycle endorsement. This time he showed a photocopy of his decades-old, expired California driver's license, but the DMV again "failed to reinstate" his motorcycle endorsement.

In May 2017, proceeding pro se, Anderson filed a complaint in which he "respectfully ask[ed] the court to mandate that [the DMV] restore [his] motorcycle endorsement ... as it should have been done" in 1992 when he first surrendered his California license in exchange for an Alaska one. The DMV filed an answer and a few months later moved for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Alaska Civil Rule 12(c). The DMV argued that Anderson's claim accrued in 1992, when he transferred his license, and was now barred by a 10-year statute of limitations. The DMV also argued that "forc[ing it] to address an alleged error that occurred decades ago" would violate due process, because "[t]he records related to this transaction are long gone and it would likely be impossible to reconstruct what occurred through witness testimony." The DMV also relied on the doctrine of laches and Anderson's failure to exhaust his administrative remedies. Finally, the DMV relied on its regulations to contend that it lacked authority to transfer an endorsement from a license that had expired so long ago.3

Anderson did not file an opposition to the motion, and the superior court granted it, relying "on the legal analysis in ... the DMV's motion." The court awarded the DMV attorney's fees of $ 809.67 pursuant to the schedule of Alaska Civil Rule 82(b)(2) for cases resolved short of trial and without a money judgment.

Anderson now appeals.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

"We review the grant of a motion for judgment on the pleadings de novo."4 "The application of laches may raise three issues for review."5 The first - whether the equitable defense of laches may be applied to the plaintiff's claim - presents a question of law we review de novo.6 The second - "whether the facts demonstrate an unreasonable delay and a resulting prejudice" - presents questions of fact we review for clear error.7 And the third issue - whether, based *220on the facts, it was appropriate to apply the laches doctrine - is a question reserved to the superior court's discretion, and we review it to determine whether that discretion has been abused.8 "The trial court has broad discretion to sustain or deny a defense based on laches."9

The interpretation of a regulation is a question we review de novo.10 We review issues not properly raised in the trial court for plain error.11 "A plain error involves an 'obvious mistake' that is 'obviously prejudicial.' "12

IV. DISCUSSION

A. The Superior Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion By Applying The Laches Defense To Anderson's Claim For Injunctive Relief.

The specific relief Anderson seeks by his complaint is a "mandate that the Alaska Division of Motor Vehicles restore [his] motorcycle endorsement ... as it should have been done at the time of [transference], at no cost to [him]." Traditionally, a suit asking the court to order a government official to act in a certain way is an action for mandamus.13 The writ of mandamus was abolished in Alaska many decades ago by court rule, but the type of relief once provided by the writ may still be "obtained by appropriate action or by appropriate motion under the practice prescribed in" the Alaska Civil Rules.14 One appropriate action in the nature of mandamus that is recognized by the Civil Rules is an action for a mandatory or reparative injunction.15 Claims for injunctive relief are equitable in nature,16 and the equitable doctrine of laches is therefore available as a defense to them.17

The defense of laches requires that the defendant "show two 'independent' elements": "(1) that the plaintiff has unreasonably delayed in bringing the action, and *221(2) that this unreasonable delay has caused undue harm or prejudice to the defendant."18 Both elements are plainly met in this case on the undisputed facts. The crux of Anderson's complaint is that the DMV acted unlawfully in 1992, when it failed to transfer the motorcycle endorsement from his California license to his replacement Alaska license. He claims he was surprised 15 years later when, in 2007, a friend informed him that his license lacked the proper endorsement. Even assuming it was reasonable for Anderson to be unaware of this himself for 15 years,19 it was not reasonable for him to wait yet another ten years to file suit complaining of alleged DMV misfeasance that by then was 25 years in the past. Many courts have found delays of this length and even much shorter to be unreasonable as a matter of law for laches purposes.20

Prejudice is also apparent on the undisputed facts. As the DMV points out, its document retention policy is required by statute and set out in regulation, 2 AAC 90.475. The regulation requires that records of non-commercial driver's license applications, denials, suspensions, revocations, cancellations, and disqualifications "will be retained by the department for a period of 15 years following the entry into the department's database," after which the DMV "will destroy" the records "with no further activity" pursuant to the public records maintenance requirements of AS 40.21.21 Anderson has not disputed - either here or in the superior court - the DMV's claim that it would no longer have records of a 1992 licensure. And we agree with the DMV that it is highly unlikely to find witnesses who, especially in the absence of any documentary record, can testify about the circumstances of Anderson's 1992 application.

We have approved use of the laches doctrine in circumstances where the delay was less obviously unreasonable and prejudicial. In Kollander v. Kollander we reviewed a superior court's finding that a former wife unreasonably delayed in bringing a claim for pension benefits under a 1992 qualified domestic relations order.22 The pension administrator had paid the former wife her "share of her former spouse's pension in accelerated lump sum payments from 2007 to 2008," but in 2012 she brought a claim asserting that she was entitled to lifetime monthly payments *222instead.23 The superior court found that her claim was barred by laches, and we affirmed.24 With regard to the element of unreasonable delay, we noted that the former wife had received a letter explaining the accelerated payout in 2007, had accepted payments thereafter, and yet had taken no action for five years "other than attempted communication with [the pension administrator] and consultation with several attorneys, none of whom took any action on her behalf."25 As for prejudice, we affirmed the trial court's finding based primarily on the "dissipation and reasonably expected loss of evidentiary materials" over the years since the parties' property division.26

In Laverty v. Alaska Railroad Corp. , we reviewed the superior court's decision to apply laches to a citizen-taxpayer's suit to enjoin enforcement of a contract for the extraction of gravel near a residential neighborhood.27 The citizen-taxpayer filed suit a little over a year after learning of the contract, but we noted that he had exhausted his "attempts to resolve his grievances without litigation ... more than four months before he brought suit" and in the meantime knew that the contractor "had undertaken an expensive rezoning and conditional use permit application process."28 We concluded that under the circumstances we were "left with no definite and firm conviction that the superior court abused its discretion in applying laches as a defense to [the plaintiff's] request to enjoin performance of the gravel contract."29

We conclude that, on the undisputed facts, the superior court did not abuse its discretion by applying the doctrine of laches to bar Anderson's claim that the DMV acted improperly in 1992 when it allegedly failed to transfer his California motorcycle endorsement to his Alaska license.

B. The DMV's Regulations Did Not Require It To Issue Anderson A Motorcycle Endorsement In 2007 Or 2017.

Anderson appears to allege that the DMV compounded its 1992 mistake on two subsequent occasions: in 2007, when it "allowed [Anderson's] registration and collection of fees for a motorcycle/scooter" while denying him a motorcycle endorsement; and again in 2017, when it once more refused to issue the endorsement despite the fact that Anderson showed DMV personnel a photocopy of the California driver's license he had surrendered in 1992. But the action Anderson demanded of the DMV was not required by its governing regulations.30

First, the regulations do not provide for transfer of an out-of-state motorcycle endorsement that expired many years ago. Renewal of expired endorsements does not appear to be separately addressed, but 2 AAC 90.420(h) provides that the "renewal of a license that has expired for more than one year" (emphasis added) must involve a road test "[u]nless the applicant is eligible for a waiver under (j), (l ), or (n) of this section." Subsection (j) - the only one of the three waiver sections relevant here31 -allows waiver of the road test only if the applicant's driver's license expired "less than five years from the current date of application." As of 2007, when Anderson first sought waiver of the road test, his motorcycle endorsement had been expired for at least 15 years.

Second, while the regulations do provide for waiver of the motorcycle skills test in some circumstances, they do not require it here. 2 AAC 90.420(k) provides that the *223DMV "may waive the motorcycle skills test for an applicant who submits to the department proof of the applicant's successful completion of a Motorcycle Safety Foundation Course or another motorcycle safety program or course acceptable to the department." "[T]he term 'may' generally denotes permissive or discretionary authority."32 The DMV's regulations do not further define the limits to its discretion, but its manual informs the public that waiver based on a safety course completion certificate "is valid to waive the road test for one year."33 According to Anderson, he completed his safety course in 1983, 24 years before he asked the DMV to give him credit for it. The DMV's refusal to do so is consistent with its regulatory authority, as well as with the State's "compelling interest in maintaining highway safety by ensuring that only qualified drivers operate motor vehicles."34

We conclude that, in light of the DMV's governing regulations, the superior court did not err by dismissing Anderson's claims based on his 2007 and 2017 requests that the DMV transfer his long-expired California motorcycle endorsement.

C. There Is No Plain Error In The Superior Court's Award Of Attorney's Fees Pursuant To The Rule 82(b)(2) Schedule.

Finally, Anderson challenges the superior court's award of attorney's fees, arguing that he cannot afford to pay them. He did not oppose the DMV's attorney's fees motion in the superior court, however, so we review his challenge only for plain error.35

Alaska Civil Rule 82(b)(2) provides that for cases involving no money judgment and resolved short of trial, "the court shall award the prevailing party ... 20 percent of its actual attorney's fees which were necessarily incurred." The superior court adhered to the schedule in this case when it awarded the DMV $809.67, calculated as 20 percent of the DMV's reasonable and actual attorney's fees. We have repeatedly held that "awards of attorney's fees made pursuant to the schedule set out in Rule 82 are presumptively correct, and the superior court need not make any findings in support of the award."36 Besides citing his alleged inability to pay - which he did not argue below and was therefore never developed as a factual matter - Anderson does not explain how the court abused its discretion. We see no plain error in the presumptively correct award.

V. CONCLUSION

The judgment of the superior court is AFFIRMED.