(1) Appellants’ exceptions to the disallowance of his questions to witness Riley Eddins are without merit; it was immaterial whether the person assaulted armed himself after the difficulty; it was not a part of the res gestse.

*173 (2) On cross-examination state’s witness Owens testified that he was not on friendly- terms with appellant, and on redirect examination the solicitor asked the question, “Have you allowed, your ill will or unfriendliness to affect your testimony one way or the other in this case against Lucean Andress ?” to which question exception was duly reserved, and counsel insists is sufficient to work a reversal. We do not agree with this view. Of course, the credibility of witnesses is always a matter for the jury, and any question so framed as to invade their province is objectionable; however, whatever of probative force or effect his testimony might have carried,, it would hardly have been aided by the mere ipse dixit of witness that his testimony was true, and if technically objectionable, the error would be without injury and innocuous under rule of practice 45 (61 South, ix).

(3) Several written requests by appellant for charges were refused, numbered 2, 8, 9, and 10. Charge No. 2 was properly refused; it pretermits all freedom from fault in bringing on the difficulty. — See Dabney’s Case, 113 Ala. 38, 21 South. 211, 59 Am. St. Rep. 92; Kennedy’s Case, 140 Ala. 1, 37 South. 90.

(4) Charge 8 singled out and unduly emphasized the testimony of defendant and predicated an acquittal upon the generation of a reasonable doubt therefrom.

(5) Charge 9: It is not merely a “just apprehension of danger to life or limb” that will authorize the taking of life, but the danger must reasonably appear to be imminent and the belief must be bona fide or honestly entertained. — Gaston’s Case, 161 Ala. 37, 49 South. 876; Underwood’s Case, 179 Ala. 9, 60 South. 842. Hence the trial court properly refused this charge.

(6) ' Charge 10: The criticism of charge 9 may be here repeated as to charge 10. It may also be remarked that reasonable appearances of danger are not created by a mere knowledge on the part of appellant that his antagonist was in the habit of carrying a pistol; appellant would not have been justified in striking with murderous intent in the absence of some overt act to be interpreted in the light of the knowledge that a pistol was being carried.

We find no reversible error in the record, and the judgment must be affirmed.

Affirmed.