On Rehearing.

The writ of habeas corpus is “the great key of liberty to unlock the prison doors of *418 tyranny.” Such was the opening sentence of that great jurist, Thomas TI. Watts, in the case of Ex Parte Williams, in the county court of Pike county and quoted with approval by this court in State v. Thurman, 17 Ala.App. 656-658, 88 So. 61. It was written in the blood of freemen and came to us as a part of our inheritance from those who won it and preserved it through the centuries, even antedating Magna Charta. It is a part of the law of this state, preserved to us- under section 17 of the Declaration of Rights, that it ¿nay be used by those who are illegally, restrained of their liberty. It cannot be bound down by the thongs of technical pleading, nor its swift and effective relief hindered by captious objection or finespun theories of procedure. The courts ought not and will not permit this sacred right to be whittled away in such manner as to allow a citizen imprisoned contrary to law to be deprived of his liberty.

At the same time, the processes and judgments of courts must be given that consideration to which they are entitled and rules of procedure must be upheld to guarantee an orderly administration of the law. Habeas corpus, therefore, is not available as a substitute for an appeal or writ of error or other revisory remedy for the correction of errors, either of law or fact, and, after judgment, the petition for the writ will only lie to determine the question of the jurisdiction and lawful power of the custodian to hold petitioner in custody. 29 Corpus Juris, 25 (19). Nor will the writ be granted on account of a mere violation of constitutional provisions, or denial of constitutional right, in the course of proceedings during the trial of á cause. In such cases, the matter becomes res adjudicata and can only be tested on appeal or by writ of error. Such is the effect of the holding in Drinkard v. Oden, 150 Ala. 475, 43 So. 578; Ridgeway v. City of Bessemer, 9 Ala.App. 470, 64 So. 189.

But, where a constitutional defect invalidates the proceeding and that fact appears upon the face of the information or complaint, the writ will be granted and the prisoner discharged, for no person should ever be allowed to remain in prison for the violation of an ordinance which was not and never could be the law, by reason of a constitutional inhibition. As is said in the text, 29 Corpus Juris, 30, "the ultimate question involved in habeas corpus proceedings is generally one of jurisdiction. Want of jurisdiction over person or subject matter is always ground for relief on habeas corpus, for if the court has acted without jurisdiction, its judgment or order is absolutely void, even on collateral attack.” The foregoing statement of the law is supported universally by courts of last resort all over the. United States, as collated in note 15, '29 Corpus Juris, 30.

It may, therefore, be said to be the rule: Where the court had general jurisdiction of the cause and person, error in the determination of questions of law or fact upon which its jurisdiction in the particular case depends is error in the exercise of jurisdiction, and, in accordance with the general rule, affords no ground for habeas corpus; but the unconstitutionality of a statute under which a detention is sought to be sustained is ground for relief on habeas corpus either before or after conviction or commitment for its violation. This rule is sustained by the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States and the courts of last resort in most of the states of the Union, and especially so in the state of Alabama. Ex parte State, 205 Ala. 677, 88 So. 899; State v. Thurman, 17 Ala.App. 656, 88 So. 61; Fourment v. State, 155 Ala. 109, 46 So. 266; Ex parte Burnett, 30 Ala. 461.

It follows from the foregoing that the application for rehearing must be- overruled.

Application overruled.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed on authority of Barton v. City of Bessemer, 234 Ala. 20, 173 So. 626.

Affirmed on authority of Barton v. City of Bessemer, 234 Ala. 20,173 So. 626.