On Rehearing.

It seems, there is really nothing of value we could add to what we have said in our original opinion.

But in answer to the vigorous insistence of able counsel filing brief here on appellant’s application for rehearing, that the verdict of the jury rested upon mere conjecture, surmise, or supposition, we have thought it well to set down here a distinction which our Supreme Court has made between these, and legal inference— upon which, of course, a jury may well rest its verdict. That court has well said: “Inference, in legal parlance, as respects evidence, is a very different matter from supposition. The former is a deduction from proven facts * * * ; while the latter requires no such premise for its justification.” Miller-Brent Lumber Co. v. Douglas, 167 Ala. 286, 52 So. 414, 415.

Flere, we have set out the “proven facts,” i.e., what the jury had a right to conclude were “proven facts.” From these, we reaffirm our view that the jury had a perfect right to infer — conclusively—appellant’s guilt.

The application for rehearing is overruled.

Overruled.

PER CURIAM.

Reversed by Supreme Court, 247 Ala. 55, 22 So.2d 548.

Reversed by Supreme Court, 247 Ala. 55, 22 So.2d 548.