State v. Ivey
Cases that cite this one
13 later published cases cite this decision.
- State v. Landrum (Ala. Crim. App. 2009)
- State v. R.C. (Ala. Crim. App. 2015)
- City of Montgomery v. Zgouvas (Ala. Crim. App. 2006)
- State v. Hargett (Ala. Crim. App. 2005)
- JTC v. State (Ala. Crim. App. 2008)
- J.T.C. v. State (Ala. Crim. App. 2008)
- Harris v. State (Ala. Crim. App. 2006)
- Washington v. State (Ala. Crim. App. 2005)
- RW v. State (Ala. Crim. App. 2005)
- R.W. v. State (Ala. Crim. App. 2005)
- Washington v. State (Ala. Crim. App. 2005)
- Snavely v. City of Huntsville (Ala. Crim. App. 2000)
- State v. Smith (Ala. Crim. App. 1998)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion
The State of Alabama appeals from the trial court's order granting William Ray Ivey's motion to suppress evidence.
On June 9, 1996, a police officer for the City of Florence was on patrol when he saw a vehicle with a filing cabinet protruding from the trunk. The record varies as to whether this occurred at approximately 2:00 a.m. or 3:00 a.m. The officer followed the vehicle "to see if I could find something to stop it for." The officer testified that it appeared that when the driver realized she was being followed, the vehicle sped away. The officer chased the vehicle for approximately four blocks, activated his lights at some point, and stopped the vehicle at Ivey's driveway. The officer ordered the driver, Freda Compton, out of the car.1 Ivey was in the passenger seat, and an infant was in the backseat. The Officer questioned Ivey and Ms. Compton about the filing cabinet in the trunk, but at the hearing on the motion to suppress he indicated that he was unsure whether he talked to Ivey before or after he searched the filing cabinet. The officer testified that he searched the filing cabinet because 1) the stop was made in the early morning hours, 2) the car sped away after noticing that the officer was following, and 3) Ivey's answers regarding the ownership of the filing cabinet were inconsistent. The officer testified that Ivey told him the filing cabinet was his and that it contained papers pertaining to the infant; Ivey also told him that he had found the filing cabinet on the street. The officer testified that the vehicle was speeding and attempting to elude him, but he did not issue a ticket to the driver. The officer searched the cabinet and found evidence that indicated that it belonged to the TVR Company. Upon making radio inquiry, the officer learned that this business had been burglarized shortly before he stopped the vehicle. He arrested Ivey and Ms. Compton. The officer testified that he did not ask permission to look into the filing cabinet and that before he learned of the *Page 505 burglary, he did not have probable cause to arrest Ivey.
The trial court granted the motion to suppress, holding that while the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle, he had no probable cause to search the contents of the filing cabinet.
The State argues that the court erred in granting the defendant's motion to suppress evidence because Ivey did not have standing to challenge the constitutionality of the search and because the search was lawful. The State also claims that review of this case is de novo because the evidence is not subject to material dispute and the trial court did not make findings of fact.
The State argues that this court should not apply this standard of review to the trial court's findings, but rather should conduct a de novo review because the evidence is not subject to material dispute because there was only one witness at the hearing and because the trial court did not make findings of fact. The State relies on State v. Hill,
In this case, the parties did not stipulate to the facts and they did not adopt the same version of facts in their briefs. Even where the matter rests upon the testimony of only one witness, the trier of fact is free to accept or reject the witness's statements. Where inferences to be drawn from the evidence are susceptible to more than one rational conclusion, the decision is for the factfinder. Willcutt v. State,
In Wright v. State,
In this case, the officer became suspicious merely because there was a filing cabinet in the trunk of an automobile. Unlike Wright, the officer here did not articulate any additional reasons he first thought the situation was suspicious. The police officer's "bare suspicion" in this case never ripened into probable cause. Ivey's inconsistent statements also do not unequivocally support a finding that probable cause existed because the officer could not definitively testify whether Ivey gave the inconsistent explanations before or after the officer conducted the search. The credibility of witnesses and the inferences to be drawn from the evidence, where susceptible of more than one rational conclusion, are for the factfinder which, in this case, was the trial judge. Willcutt v. State,
Although the State appears to have satisfied the first two prongs of the plain view exception to the warrant requirement, because the officer inadvertently observed the filing cabinet protruding from the trunk while seated in his patrol unit, the State has not shown that the officer immediately recognized the cabinet as contraband so as to supply probable cause. The State has shown only that the officer regarded the fact that the filing cabinet as in the trunk as peculiar. Thus, the State failed to satisfy the third prong of the "plain view exception" to a warrantless search. *Page 507
In determining whether there is probable cause to search, the fact that contraband was ultimately discovered can not be considered to supply probable cause. Shipman v. State,
The burden is on the State to show that a warrantless search falls within one of the exceptions. Murray v. State,
AFFIRMED.
All judges concur.
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.