AFFIRMED. NO OPINION.

See Rule 53(a)(1) and (a)(2)(E), Ala. R.App.P.; Hose v. Winn-Dixie Montgomery, Inc., 658 So.2d 403 (Ala. 1995); and Richardson v. Kroger Co., 521 So.2d 934, 936 (Ala. 1988).

The Supreme Court of Alabama transferred the appeal to this court, pursuant to § 12-2-7(6), Ala.Code 1975.

dissenting.

I would reverse the summary judgment entered in favor of Church’s Chicken; therefore, I must respectfully dissent.

A plaintiff is not required to prove notice in cases when the defendant created the hazard. Billings v. K Mart Corp., 654 So.2d 530 (Ala. 1995); Dunklin v. Winn-Dixie of Montgomery, Inc., 595 So.2d 463 (Ala. 1992); and Edwards v. Kroger Co., 681 So.2d 223 (Ala.Civ.App. 1996). “In such a situation, notice of the hazardous condition is imputed to the defendant.” Billings, supra at 532. The evidence in this case tends to show that Foster slipped on a wet mop string on an otherwise clean and dry floor in the fast-food restaurant. Who but a restaurant employee would have recently mopped the floor?

I believe that Foster presented substantial evidence creating a genuine issue of Material fact regarding the creation of the hazard at Church’s Chicken. Therefore, I *450believe that summary judgment was improper in this case.

ROBERTSON, P.J., concurs.