concurring specially.

I agree with the majority that McCor-kle’s contact with Alabama is such that it does not offend the “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice” to require him to come to Alabama to defend this claim.

The United States Supreme Court has interpreted the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution to require that a nonresident defendant have “certain minimum contacts” with the state before that state can subject the nonresident to a lawsuit in the courts of that state. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945). These contacts must be established by the defendant’s purposeful acts. Id. Two kinds of contacts give rise to personal jurisdiction: general contacts and specific contacts. Leventhal v. Harrelson, 723 So.2d 566 (Ala. 1998), citing Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 104 S.Ct. 1868, 80 L.Ed.2d 404 (1984).

“General contacts, which give rise to general personal jurisdiction, consist of the defendant’s contacts with the forum state that are unrelated to the cause of action and that are both ‘continuous and systematic.’ Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 n. 9, 415, 104 S.Ct. 1868, 80 L.Ed.2d 404 (1984); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 100 S.Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980); Ex parte Kamilewicz, 700 So.2d 340 (Ala. 1997); Ex parte Newco Mfg. Co., 481 So.2d 867 (Ala. 1985). Specific contacts, which give rise to specific personal jurisdiction, consist of the defendant’s contacts with the forum state that are related to the cause of action. Burger King Co. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472-75, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985). Although the related contacts need not be continuous and systematic, they must rise to such a level as to cause the defendant to anticipate being haled into court in the forum state. Id.”

Ex parte Phase III Constr., Inc., 723 So.2d 1263, 1266 (Ala. 1998) (Lyons, J., concurring in the result).

In the present case, the evidence indicates that McCorkle initiated contact with United Machine & Supply and asked to lease equipment. McCorkle then sent a driver to pick up that equipment and gave him the authority to execute a lease on his behalf. Rather than keep the equipment for one week, as he had originally stated he would, McCorkle kept that equipment for several weeks and did not return it until Hagood, the president of United Machine, pursued legal action. Accordingly, I believe McCorkle’s contact gives rise to specific personal jurisdiction.

Don Hagood and United Machinery & Supply Company, Inc., sued Dan McCor-kle and Professional Homes, L.L.C., alleging that McCorkle owed him money on an open account or an account stated and that McCorkle had converted his property. McCorkle, as a principal of Professional Homes, answered and moved to dismiss Hagood’s action, alleging that no Alabama court had personal jurisdiction over him. The trial court dismissed Hagood’s action. Hagood appealed to the supreme court, which transferred the case to this court, pursuant to Ala.Code 1975, § 12-2-7(6).

Our supreme court has discussed the principles relating to personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants, such as McCorkle and Professional Homes, as follows:

“The requirements for personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant are set out in Rule 4.2(a)(2), Ala.R.Civ.P.:

“ ‘(2) Sufficient Contacts. A person has sufficient contacts with the state when that person, acting directly or by agent, is or may be legally responsible as a consequence of that person’s:

“ ‘(A) transacting any business in this state;

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“ ‘(I) otherwise having some minimum contacts with this state, and under the circumstances, it is fair and reasonable to require the person to come to this state to defend an action. The minimum contacts referred to in this subdivision (I) shall be deemed sufficient, notwithstanding a failure to satisfy the requirement of subdivisions (A)-(H) of this subsection (2), so long as the prosecution of the action against a person in this state is not inconsistent with the constitution of *1072this state or the Constitution of the United States.’

“Service of process under Rule 4.2(a)(2) has been held to be as far-reaching as due process permits. However, the constitutional guaranty of due process precludes a court from asserting jurisdiction over a defendant unless the defendant has sufficient contacts with the forum state. Murray v. Alfab, Inc., 601 So.2d 878 (Ala. 1992).”

Ex parte Kamilewicz, 700 So.2d 340, 341-42 (Ala. 1997). See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 471-76, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528" (1985), for a discussion of the United States Constitution’s due-process requirements for the exercise of personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants.

The record reveals the following facts: Hagood is the president of United Machinery & Supply Company, Inc., an Alabama corporation. McCorkle operates Professional Homes, L.L.C., in Ocean Springs, Mississippi. McCorkle telephoned Hagood in June 1999 to discuss leasing some equipment. McCorkle telephoned Hagood about twice a month until October 1999, when he told Hagood that he was sending a driver to pick up the equipment. The driver presented to Hagood documents authorizing the driver to pick up the equipment and to execute a lease for McCorkle. McCorkle had told Hagood that he would lease the equipment for approximately one week or perhaps somewhat longer than a week. McCorkle did not return the equipment until the end of November 1999, after Hagood had hired a lawyer to pursue legal action against McCorkle.

Hagood argues that McCorkle’s contacts with Alabama are sufficient to allow Alabama to exercise personal jurisdiction over McCorkle, because McCorkle, through an agent, executed a lease in Alabama. McCorkle did not file a brief with this court, but argued in the trial court that the execution of the lease was not a sufficient contact to support the exercise of personal jurisdiction. We agree with Hagood.

Our • supreme court has held that the execution of a promissory note is a sufficient contact to allow a state to constitutionally exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. Gladbach v. Sparks, 468 So.2d 143 (Ala. 1985). The court utilized the following reasoning of the Georgia Court of Appeals to determine whether one act can be a sufficient contact:

“ ‘(1) The nonresident must purposefully avail himself of the privilege of doing some act or consummating some transaction with or in the forum[.] ... A single event may be a sufficient basis if its effects within the forum are substantial enough to qualify under Rule 3 [below];

“ ‘(2) The plaintiff must have a legal cause of action against the nonresident which arises out of, or results from, the activity or activities of the defendant within the forum; and

“ ‘(3) If (and only if) the requirements of Rule 1 and 2 [above] are established, a “minimum contact” between the nonresident and the forum exists; the assumption of jurisdiction must be found to be consonant with the due process notions of “fair play” and “substantial justice.” ’ ”

Georgia R.R. Bank & Trust Co. v. Barton, 169 Ga.App. 821, 822-23, 315 S.E.2d 17, 19 (1984) (quoting Shellenberger v. Tanner, 138 Ga.App. 399, 404-05, 227 S.E.2d 266, 272 (1976)).

We conclude that the requirements of Barton adopted by the Gladbach court are met in this case. McCorkle initiated contact with Hagood regarding the rental of the equipment, and he sent an agent to Alabama to execute a lease and pick up the equipment. Hagood has several causes of action that he can pursue against McCor-*1073kle, including breach of the lease, conversion, and actions upon an open account or an account stated. The record indicates McCorkle’s action had a substantial impact upon Hagood’s business in Alabama and that Alabama’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over him would comport with the due-process requirements of “fair play” and “substantial justice.”

Therefore, the trial court’s judgment dismissing Hagood’s action is reversed. The trial court is instructed to allow Ha-good’s action to proceed.

REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.