AFFIRMED BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM.

concurring specially.

I concur in the Court’s unpublished memorandum. I write to address James Lomax Wayne’s argument that the trial court erred to reversal in not specifically informing him of his right to withdraw his waiver of counsel. Rule 6.1(b), Ala. R.Crim.P., states: “At the time of accepting a defendant’s waiver of the right to counsel, the court shall inform the defendant that the waiver may be withdrawn and counsel appointed or retained at any stage of the proceedings.” My review of the record indicates that the trial court did not specifically inform Wayne of this right. The Committee Comments to Rule 6.1 state that “[t]he court is required to inform the defendant that the waiver may be withdrawn since under section (c) the defendant has the burden of requesting counsel if he later decides to withdraw the waiver.” However, Rule 6.1(b) also states: “When a defendant waives the right to counsel, the court may appoint an attorney to advise the defendant during any stage of the proceedings.” The record indicates that the trial court did just that in this case. The trial court stated: “However, the court has appointed [an attorney] to sit alongside Mr. Wayne at the counsel table to give him any advice if he so desired to ask her any questions.” (R. 10.) I am satisfied that Wayne understood that he could, at any time, invoke the assistance of the attorney sitting beside him. Therefore, I believe that the trial court complied with the spirit, if, perhaps, not the letter, of Rule 6.1(b).

dissenting.

I respectfully dissent. The record in this case does not indicate that the trial court ever advised the appellant about the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, as required by Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975), and that he had the right to withdraw his waiver of the right to counsel at any time during the proceedings, as required by Rule 6.1(b), Ala.R.Crim.P. Furthermore, I disagree with Judge Shaw’s conclusion that the trial court complied with the spirit of the rule by appointing advisory counsel to sit alongside the appellant during the trial. The mere appointment of advisory counsel is not equivalent to informing a defendant that he has the right to withdraw his waiver of counsel at any time during the proceedings. Accordingly, this court should reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand this case for’ a new trial. See Farid v. State, 720 So.2d 998 (Ala.Crim.App. 1998); Hairgrove v. State, 680 So.2d 946 (Ala.Crim.App. 1995), cert. denied, 680 So.2d 947 (Ala. 1996).