Finch v. State
Finch v. State
Opinion
On January 7, 2004, the appellant, Timothy Joseph Finch, pleaded guilty to one count of felony driving under the influence, a violation of §
At the plea hearing, Finch admitted that he had been convicted of DUI offenses in 1982, 1985, and 1996. He stipulated that a breath test administered when he was arrested for the current offense revealed a blood alcohol level greater than .08 and that the Department of Public Safety suspended his driving privileges for 90 days. He said that he served the suspension, that he applied for and was granted reinstatement, and that he had a valid driving privilege at the time of the plea hearing.
Finch contends that the circuit court erred in ordering him to surrender his driver's license for revocation because he had already received a prior administrative *Page 168
suspension arising from the same arrest. He argues that §
"`When a special statutory procedure has been provided as an exclusive method of review for a particular type case, no other statutory review is available.'" Huggins v. Alabama Dep't ofPublic Safety,
When a person is convicted of driving while intoxicated and the conviction becomes final, the Director of Public Safety must revoke the person's driver's license.
Mechur v. Director, Dep't of Public Safety,"The specific applicable provision of the Alabama Rules of the Road Act in the case at bar is §
32-5A-195 (j), which provides that the Director of Public Safety,"`shall forthwith revoke the license of any driver upon receiving a record of such driver's conviction of any of the following offenses: (3) Upon a second or subsequent conviction within a five-year period, of driving or being in actual physical control of any vehicle while under the influence of alcohol . . . to a degree which renders him incapable of safely driving. . . .' (Emphasis supplied [in Mechur].)
"Alabama case law is commensurate with §
32-5A-195 in holding that the director's duty is mandatory and that in cases of mandatory revocation no administrative hearing or judicial appeal is afforded, but rather a writ of mandamus is the only available remedy."
The sole permissible method of reviewing the mandatory revocation of Finch's driver's license is a petition for a writ of mandamus, which should be filed in Montgomery County where the Department of Public Safety maintains its headquarters. §
APPEAL DISMISSED.
COBB, BASCHAB, SHAW, and WISE, JJ., concur.
"If a license is suspended under this section for having .08 or more by weight of alcohol in the blood of the person and the person is also convicted on criminal charges arising out of the same occurrence for violation of Section
32-5A-191 , the suspension under this section shall be imposed, but no period of suspension or revocation shall be imposed under Section 32-5A-191."
"On a fourth or subsequent conviction [of driving under the influence], a person convicted of violating this section shall be guilty of a Class C felony and . . . [i]n addition to the other penalties authorized, the Director of Public Safety shall revoke the driving privilege or driver's license of the person convicted for a period of five years."
Reference
- Full Case Name
- Timothy Joseph Finch v. State.
- Cited By
- 2 cases
- Status
- Published