LIMESTONE COUNTY WATER AND SEWER v. City of Athens
Cases that cite this one
9 later published cases cite this decision.
- Water & Wastewater Board v. City of Athens (Ala. Civ. App. 2009)
- Dolgencorp, Inc. v. Gibson (Ala. 2008)
- West Morgan-East Lawrence Water and Sewer Authority v. Charles Owens (11th Cir. 2018)
- E. Cent. Baldwin Cnty. Water, Sewer & Fire Prot. Auth. v. Town of Summerdale (Ex parte E. Cent. Baldwin Cnty. Water, Sewer & Fire Prot. Auth.) (Ala. 2017)
- Mills v. Baldwin Transfer Co. (Ala. Civ. App. 2013)
- United States v. State (United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama 2011)
- United States v. Alabama (United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama 2011)
- T.G. v. Houston County Department of Human Resources (Ala. Civ. App. 2009)
- Barney v. State (Ala. Crim. App. 2009)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion
Limestone County Water and Sewer Authority ("the Authority") appeals from an adverse judgment entered by the Limestone Circuit Court on a complaint filed by the City of Athens ("the City") for reimbursement of funds allegedly expended by the City to train a water-treatment operator. We reverse and remand.
The Authority is a public corporation incorporated in 1980 pursuant to §
Training to be a water-treatment operator entails certification at ascending grades of expertise. An employee is required to take certain classes, to spend a certain number of hours working at a water-treatment facility, and to take an exam before he or she is certified at a particular grade level. The State of Alabama requires that a "Grade IV" water-treatment facility be operated by a "Grade IV" water-treatment operator when the facility is filtering more than two gallons of water per minute; when the facility is filtering two or less gallons of water per minute, then a "Grade III" operator may operate the facility without supervision. Ala. Admin. Code (ADEM), r.
In October 1998, while working for the City, Mitchell became certified as a "Grade III" water-treatment operator after having attended required classes, receiving on-the-job training and experience, and passing a required State exam. After reaching this grade level, Mitchell operated the City's facility without supervision on several occasions. Before reaching "Grade III" status, Mitchell had been designated as a water operator "trainee" by the City. Mitchell then continued to receive training and experience necessary toward achieving "Grade IV" status. However, on November 13, 1998, Mitchell began working for the Authority. Almost two years later, in October 2000, Mitchell obtained his "Grade IV" certification while employed by the Authority.
The City filed a complaint against the Authority on June 29, 2000, claiming that the Authority owed it, pursuant to §
The trial court received both written and oral evidence at the March 19, 2003, hearing concerning the appropriate amount of reimbursement to be awarded to the City for its training of Mitchell. The City contended that all of the expenses associated with keeping Mitchell as an employee, including his salary, life insurance matching, and retirement matching, were reimbursable; the Authority contended that only those expenses directly related to training, such as classes and travel to and from those classes, were reimbursable. The trial court entered a judgment on May 12, 2003, awarding the City the total amount of expenses it had incurred as a result of Mitchell's employment: $28,854.77. The Authority filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate the judgment, which the trial court denied on June 13, 2003. The Authority appealed to our Supreme Court, which transferred the case to this court as one properly within the jurisdiction of this court because of the amount in controversy. See §
The Authority's first argument on appeal is that it is not an entity subject to the reimbursement requirements of §
Section
"In those instances in which a water or wastewater operator of any municipality, municipal utility board, county, or the state is employed by the State of Alabama, any county, municipality, or another municipal utility board, within 24 months after completing the certification requirements mandated by this chapter, the total expense paid by the water or wastewater operator's governmental employer to enable the operator to become certified, including, but not limited to, salary paid during training, transportation costs paid to the trainee for travel to and from the training facility, room, board, tuition, overtime paid to other employees who fill in for the trainee during his or her absence, and any other related training expenses, shall be reimbursed to the municipality, municipal utility board, county, or the state which paid for the training. The municipality, municipal utility board, county, or the state which paid for the training shall submit an itemized sworn statement to the new employer of the water or wastewater operator, as the case may be, shall demand payment thereof, and may enforce collection of the obligation through civil remedies and procedures. The terms `water operator' and `wastewater operator' shall have the same meanings as in Section 22-25-1."
The Authority concedes that Mitchell was employed by the Authority as a water-treatment operator within 24 months after receiving his Grade III certification and that Mitchell worked for the City until being hired by the Authority. However, the Authority contends that it is not an entity to which the reimbursement provisions of §
The Authority is a "water authority"; it is undisputed that such entities are created pursuant to §
The City attempts to counter this authority by citing to §
As the City itself observes, this court should not simply look at "isolated phrases or clauses" in ascertaining the meaning and application of a statute. E.g., Darks Dairy, Inc. v. AlabamaDairy Comm'n,
Water Works Sewer Bd. of Selma v. Randolph,"In interpreting a statute, this Court must ascertain and effectuate the intent of the Legislature as expressed by the statute. When determining legislative intent from the language used in a statute, a court may explain the language, but it may not detract from or add to the statute. When the language is clear, there is no room for judicial construction."
It must be admitted that "independent instrumentalities of the state" is not a readily understandable phrase. Indeed, our Supreme Court has previously observed as much. In its opinion on rehearing in Town of Hackleburg v. Northwest Alabama Gas Dist.,
Town of Hackleburg,"This first sentence . . . is self contradictory. There are no `duties' upon the state to supply its citizens with gas. The phrase `by providing appropriate and independent instrumentalities of the state with full and adequate powers to fulfill their functions' is paradoxical, in that an `independent instrumentality of *Page 536 the state' is a free unit within itself, and if independent, is not an agency of the state."
In other words, a public corporation is an "instrumentality of the state" in the sense that it is created pursuant to the laws of the State and for the public benefit, but it is "independent" of the State and "is not an agency of the state" because the State does not own or operate the corporation. "A public corporation is a separate entity from a county, city, or town, and is not a subdivision of the state. Moreover, a public corporation is not the alter ego or agent of the county or the municipality in which it is organized." Dobbs v. Shelby CountyEconomic Indus. Dev. Auth.,
For this court to hold that a public corporation such as the Authority is equivalent to "the State" as it is referenced in §
The phrase "independent instrumentalit[y] of the state" is employed 10 times in the Alabama Code in addition to its use in §
The City also argues that the Authority must be considered part of "the State" for purposes of §
A third and final reason offered by the City as to why the Authority should be considered part of "the State" for purposes of §
While this rule exists, it does not give a court carte blanche to ignore the words of a statute to fit what it may deem to be a wiser result. As we already have noted, in determining legislative intent from the language used in a statute, we may not add or detract from that language and "[w]hen [that] language is clear, there is no room for judicial construction." WaterWorks Sewer Bd. of Selma, 833 So.2d at 607. See also, e.g.,Alabama Indus. Bank v. State ex rel. Avinger,
The only "evidence" that the City offers as to the Legislature's alleged intent to include public corporations such as the Authority within the purview of §
"To amend Section
36-21-7 , Code of Alabama 1975, relating to the reimbursement of mandated training costs when one governmental entity employs certain employees from another governmental entity within a certain period, and to provide similar requirements for the reimbursement of training expenses for certain governmental employees."
Ala. Acts 1996, Act No. 96-626 (emphasis added). The Legislature amended §
The City contends that the Legislature omitted any mention of "governmental" entities in the title to the 2002 amendment because the Legislature did not intend for §
The City's reasoning as to why the term "governmental" was omitted from the title of the 2002 amendment is purely speculative: the City offers no support that its proffered reason for the change was, in fact, the reason for it; nor does common sense mandate such a conclusion. In fact, if the City's speculation was correct, one would expect to find a change in the text of the body of the provision, not just in the *Page 538
title of the amendment. However, the Legislature did not take the opportunity in the 2002 amendment to add language including entities such as the Authority within the purview of §
The rest of the City's arguments concerning the Legislature's intent are composed of policy arguments as to why it allegedly would be unwise or unfair to exclude the Authority and other entities like it from the reimbursement requirements of §
The language of §
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
YATES, P.J., and CRAWLEY, THOMPSON, and PITTMAN, JJ., concur.
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.