Brown v. State
Cases that cite this one
6 later published cases cite this decision.
- Pruitt v. State (Ala. Crim. App. 2006)
- Ex parte Christopher Sandon Ramirez PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS (In re: Christopher Sandon Ramirez v. State of Alabama) (Montgomery Circuit Court: CC-20-35; Court of Criminal Appeals: CR-2023-0282). (Ala. 2025)
- Christopher Sandon Ramirez v. State of Alabama (Appeal from Montgomery Circuit Court: CC-20-35) (Ala. Crim. App. 2024)
- Magruder v. Com. (Va. 2008)
- Snowden v. State (Ala. Crim. App. 2006)
- Roderick Earl Jackson v. State of Alabama. (Ala. Crim. App. 2010)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
On May 14, 2003, officers with the drug task force for the Twelfth Judicial Circuit *Page 958
executed a search warrant at the house of Mark Lynn Brown and found the following items: weapons; a two-liter bottle containing a bi-layered liquid; a casserole dish containing a razor blade and a white flaky powder; a second casserole dish also containing a white flaky powder; a bottle of charcoal lighter fluid; a bottle containing "matches that ha[d] been soaked to extract the phosphorous out of the striker plates" (R. 36); a container of Red Devil brand lye; a glass jar containing acetone; several coffee filters; and a set of digital scales. Forensic testing revealed that both layers of the bi-layered liquid contained methamphetamine and that the powdery substance in both casserole dishes was methamphetamine.1 Brown was charged with, and convicted of, trafficking in methamphetamine, a violation of §
On appeal, Brown contends that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence a certificate of analysis from the Alabama Department of Forensic Sciences regarding the nature of the substances found in his house, because, he says, admission of the certificate violated his right to confrontation.2 The issue raised presents two questions for this Court. First, did Brown properly preserve the issue of the admissibility of the certificate of analysis? Second, if the issue was preserved, does the admission of a certificate of analysis pursuant to §
Section
*Page 959"(a) In any criminal case, or juvenile or family court case which is of a criminal nature, the prosecuting authority may offer a certificate of analysis as described below, in lieu of direct testimony. The court shall receive as evidence the certificate of analysis from any of the following:
"(1) A person performing an analysis or examination in any laboratory operated by the Alabama Department of Forensic Sciences or authorized by the department to conduct an analysis or examination of the type performed.
"(2) A person performing an analysis or examination in any criminalistics laboratory established pursuant to federal law.
"(b) To be admissible pursuant to this section, a certificate of analysis shall contain all of the following:
"(1) The date and time the evidence was delivered to the facility.
"(2) The name of the person making the delivery, and the name of the person receiving the delivery.
"(3) A brief description of the evidence.
"(4) The type of examination or analysis requested.
"(5) The name of the person making the examination or analysis."(6) The date or dates of the examination or analysis.
"(7) The results of the examination or analysis.
"The certificate of analysis shall give the name and address of the facility in which the examination or analysis was made, and it shall be signed by and sworn to as true and correct, under penalty of law, by the person making the examination or analysis."
Section
"The party seeking to introduce a certificate of analysis shall not less than 40 days prior to the commencement of the hearing or trial, give written notice to all parties of intent to offer proof by a certificate of analysis. The notice shall include a copy of the certificate of analysis."
Section
"(a) The party against whom the certificate is offered may request, not later than 30 days prior to the commencement of the hearing or trial, a hearing to show cause why a subpoena should be issued for cross-examination of the person who performed the examination or analysis.
"(b) The request shall be in writing and shall contain a certification that the requesting party intends in good faith to conduct the cross-examination. The request shall also include a statement of the basis upon which the requesting party intends to challenge the findings contained in the certificate of analysis. The court shall grant the request for subpoena only for good cause shown. Good cause shall not include a challenge to the findings contained in the certificate of analysis, unless the requesting party first establishes a legitimate basis for the challenge. If the request for subpoena is granted, and the requesting party subsequently fails to conduct the cross-examination previously certified to, the court shall assess against the requesting party, all necessary and reasonable expenses incurred for the attendance in court of the certifying witness."3
The statutory scheme found in §
The record reflects that on October 28, 2003, over five months before Brown's trial began, the State, in compliance with §
Although Brown does not directly challenge the constitutionality of §
In Crawford, the United States Supreme Court held that the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment prohibits the admission of testimonial hearsay statements in a criminal trial unless the hearsay declarant is unavailable to testify and the accused has had an opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.
In adopting §
Because Brown did not comply with §
Based on the foregoing, we affirm Brown's convictions for trafficking in methamphetamine and unlawful manufacture of methamphetamine as well as his sentence for the manufacturing conviction. We must, however, remand this case for resentencing on the trafficking conviction. "Matters concerning unauthorized sentences are jurisdictional,"Hunt v. State,
AFFIRMED IN PART; AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.*
McMILLAN, P.J., and COBB and WISE, JJ., concur. BASCHAB, J., concurs in part and dissents in part, with opinion.
Dissenting Opinion
I concur with the majority's conclusion that the issue of the admissibility of the certificate of analysis is not properly before this court for review. However, I dissent because I believe the majority should also analyze whether the appellant's convictions for both first-degree unlawful manufacture of a controlled substance (methamphetamine) and trafficking in methamphetamine violate double jeopardy principles.
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.