*1261ORDER

This matter comes before the Court on defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. Í3). The Motion has been extensively briefed and is ripe for disposition. Also pending is defendants’ Motion to Strike Affidavit of Faya Rose Toure (doc. 23), as to which plaintiff did not respond within the time allotted by Civil L.R. 7(c).

I. Nature of the Case.

On the afternoon of December 4, 2013, City of Selma Police Officer Desmond Williams' shot and killed- Ananias Shaw, a 74-year old male wielding a hatchet, as he stood outside a residence in Selma, Alabama. Edward Shaw, acting in the capacity of personal representative for Shaw’s estate,1 subsequently filed a Complaint in the Circuit Court of Dallas County, Alabama, on December 4, 2015, against defendants City of Selma, Chief William Riley, and Officer Desmond Williams.2 On January 6, 2016, defendants removed the *1262case to this District Court, with federal subject matter jurisdiction properly being invoked pursuant to the federal question provisions 28 U.S.C. § 1331, inasmuch as the face of the Complaint identifies a federal constitutional claim.3

The Complaint purports to assert 'no fewer than 22 causes of action against defendants, sounding in theories of wrongful death, unreasonable use of force, false arrest (Fourth Amendment violation), false imprisonment (pleaded twice), policy of inadequate training and supervision, custom of police abuse (pleaded twice), custom of deliberate indifference relating to hiring, deliberate indifference to repeated complaints (pleaded twice), civil conspiracy (pleaded twice), assault and battery, false arrest (without mention of Fourth Amendment), invasion of privacy, negligence, wantonness, negligent/careless/unskillful hiring, negligent/careless/ unskillful training or supervision, tort of outrage, and violation of Article 1, Section 1 of the Alabama Constitution. (See doc. 1-1.)

Defendants now move for summary judgment on all claims and causes of action interposed in the Complaint against all defendants.

II. The Motion to Strike.

Antecedent to addressing the Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court pauses to consider defendants’ Motion to Strike (doc. 23). As part of his summary judgment response, plaintiff submitted the “Affidavit *1263of Faya Rose Toure” (doc. 21, Exh. 7), who was plaintiffs co-counsel of record from March 2, 2016 (when she filed a Notice of Appearance (doc. 8)) until she was granted leave to withdraw on February 3, 2017. (See docs. 19, 20.)

In her Affidavit, Toure touts her membership in an organization known as the “Due Process Committee,” which “investigates complaints of due process violations and suspected inequities in the criminal justice system in Selma, Alabama.” (Toure Aff., at l.)4 Toure explains that this committee “led the campaign to release the video” of the Shaw shooting, and indicates that the Selma Police Department ultimately acquiesced “[bjecause of our intervention.” (Id.) Toure then states that she “talked to several witnesses, including Ser-nica Walker and other employees at Church’s Chicken restaurant and Betty Ford, who actually witnessed the shooting.” (Id.) Toure relates that unidentified Church’s employees told her that Shaw “was a regular customer” at the restaurant, that he “was not violent” and that he “did not have a hatchet at Church’s” on the day in question. (Id. at 2.) Toure goes on to write that a witness named Betty Ford told her that Shaw did not raise the hatchet or attempt to do the officers harm. (Id.) Toure then avers that she has experience in “addressing violent suspects with mental or emotional problems,” that the Selma Police Department has requested her assistance with such matters previously, and that they never called her in the Shaw matter even though she was “available to help.” (Id.) Finally, Toure indicates that District Attorney Michael Jackson told the Due Process Committee that he was unaware of Betty Ford’s observations in witnessing the shooting, and that Ford was not called to testify before the grand jury. (Id.)

The Court agrees with defendants that the Toure Affidavit suffers from several significant defects that necessitate its deletion from the summary judgment record. As an initial matter, it is uncontro-verted that plaintiff never disclosed Toure as a witness, whether in his initial disclosures pursuant to Rule 26(a)(1)(A), in discovery responses, or in supplemental disclosures pursuant to Rule 26(e). Of course, Rule 26(a) mandates disclosure of “the name and, if known, the address and telephone number of each individual likely to have discoverable information — along with the subjects of that information — that the disclosing party may use to support its claims or defenses, unless the use would be solely for impeachment.” Rule 26(a)(l)(A)(i), Fed.R.Civ.P. The Rule 16(b) Scheduling Order unambiguously directed that “[t]he initial disclosures required by Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(a)(1) are ORDERED to be made by the parties not later than *1264March 16, 2016.” (Doc. 9, ¶ 4.) Yet plaintiff did not disclose Toure at that time. Similarly, Rule 26(e) calls for supplementation of Rule 26(a) disclosures “in a timely manner if the party learns that in some material respect the disclosure ... is incomplete ... and if the additional or corrective information has not otherwise been made known to the other parties during the discovery process, or in writing.” Rule 26(e)(1)(A), Fed.R.Civ.P. Yet plaintiff never supplemented his Rule 26(a) disclosures to list Toure.

By all appearances, the first notice defendants received that Toure is or might be a witness for plaintiff was. the receipt of her summary judgment affidavit on February 3, 2017. That is simply too late. Under the circumstances, the Court concludes that plaintiff failed timely to disclose Toure as a witness. That omission implicates Rule 37(c)(1), which provides that “[i]f a party fails to provide information or identify a witness as requited by Rule 26(a) or (e), the party is not allowed to use that information or witness to supply evidence on a motion, ... unless the failure was substantially justified or is harmless.” Rule 37(c)(1), Fed.R.Civ.P. Plaintiff has made no argument and no showing that his failure to identify Toure in a timely manner was substantially justified or harmless. Accordingly, the Court finds that striking the Toure Affidavit is an appropriate sanction pursuant to Rule 37(e)(1).5

Even if plaintiffs nondisclosure of Toure as a witness did not warrant striking her affidavit pursuant to Rule 37(c)(1) (which it does), defendants’ Motion to Strike would be properly granted for two independent reasons. First, insofar as Toure’s Affidavit merely parrots back what Toure says witnesses told her, such testimony does , not appear capable of being presented in admissible form at trial.’ See, e.g., Johnson v. Mobile Infirmary Medical Center, 2016 WL 1538774, *1 (S.D. Ala. Apr. 7, 2015) (“It is well settled that exhibits are properly, considered for summary judgment purposes as long as they may be reduced to admissible form at trial.”); Rule 56(c)(2), Fed.R.Civ.P. (“A party may object that the, material cited to support or dispute a, fact cannot be presented in a form that .would be admissible in evidence.”). The summary judgment record is devoid of any ground for concluding that plaintiff could present this evidence,in admissible form at trial. Certainly, it would be impermissible hearsay for-plaintiff to call Toure to the stand to testify to what other people told her as substantive evidence of what actually happened that day. Nor could plaintiff call certain of these witnesses (Sernica Walker and other unnamed employees at Church’s Chicken) to testify, about their observations at trial, because plaintiff never disclosed Walker or those-other individuals as witnesses, pursuant to Rules 26(a)(1) and .26(e). Finally, plaintiff could not call Toure in his case-in-chief to reiterate the words of Betty Ford (who is listed as a plaintiffs witness and whose video interview has been separately *1265filed as plaintiffs Exhibit 8). Such testimony must come in, if at all, through Ford herself.

A second independent reason for striking the Toure Affidavit is that it includes substantial information that is irrelevant to the issues joined in this case for trial. For example, Toure’s role in the Due Process Committee, that Committee’s activities, and the Committee’s discussions with the District Attorney concerning facts and testimony that were or were not known to the grand jury are simply not relevant to the claims and issues joined in the Complaint.

For all of these reasons, the Motion to Strike (doc. 23) is granted. The Affidavit of -Faya Rose Toure (doc. 21, Exh. 7) is stricken from the record,- and will not be considered or weighed in any manner in the adjudication of defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment.

III. Background Facts.6

A. Circumstances Leading to the Dispatch Call.

Shortly after 2:00 p.m. on December 4, 2013, Aninias Shaw attempted to enter the Church’s Chicken restaurant on Broad Street in Selma, Alabama. Shaw was known to the restaurant staff as a longtime customer who “had came in there other times and cursed us out and stuff.” (Lindsey Dep. (doc. 13, Exh. 6), at 5-6, 8.) To the restaurant’s general manager, Ricky Austin, Shaw- was known as a customer who had caused problems necessitating police intervention' in the recent past. (Austin Dep. (doc. 13, Exh. 7), at 5-6, 11.)7 Most notably, just days before the incident in question, Shaw had entered the crowded lobby of the Church’s Chicken restaurant brandishing a pocketknife with its blade extended, and had proceeded to “poke at” customers with the knife. (Lindsey Dep., at 7-8.) A Church’s employee who witnessed Shaw’s behavior called the police. (Id.) Three officers arrived within minutes, prompting Shaw to leave the premises after a brief confrontation in which Shaw “poked at” an officer with his pocketknife, and the officer responded by placing his hand on his service weapon. (Id. at 9-10.)

Back to the afternoon of December 4, Austin observed Shaw approaching the entrance of the Church’s Chicken restaurant armed with a hatchet. (Austin Dep., at 6.) Austin reached the door first, and told Shaw, “[N]o, you cannot come in.” (M)8 In *1266response, Shaw “got kind of name calling,” but eventually walked away when Church’s staff once again called the police. (Id.) At 2:19 p.m., a Dallas County dispatcher directed Selma police officers to the scene with the call “disorderly conduct in progress.” (Doc. 13, Exh. 12.)

B. The Shooting.

One recipient of the dispatch was City of Selma Police Officer Desmond Williams, who was driving his patrol car approximately two minutes away from the Church’s Chicken restaurant. (Williams Dep. (doc. 13, Exh. 2), at 10-11.) Officer Williams had been hired by the Selma Police Department in August 2009, and had completed a 480-hour course at the Alabama Criminal Justice Training Center in November 2009. (Doc. 13, Exh. 11.) He had also completed numerous continuing education courses on topics such as use of force, interviewing individuals with mental illnesses, search and seizure, and firearm safety. (Id.) Upon receiving the dispatch, Officer Williams was contacted via radio by Detective Ronald Jones, who was completing a traffic stop in that area and had spotted Shaw in an alley near the Church’s Chicken hollering and screaming to himself. (Jones Dep. (doc. 13, Exh. 4), at 6,10.) Detective Jones believed that Shaw had gone into an abandoned laundromat building at the corner of Griffin and Washington, and could hear a person who he thought was Shaw being loud and “raising Cain” inside that building. (Id. at 18.) Detective Jones notified Officer Williams by radio that Shaw was in that abandoned laundromat. (Williams Dep., at 11.) Altogether, three Selma Police officers (the third being Officer Daniel Boone) responded to the call and arrived at the laundromat almost contemporaneously.

Officer Boone was familiar with Shaw, having dealt with him several times and having arrested him for public intoxication and disorderly conduct in the past. (Boone Dep. (doc. 13, Exh. 13), at 11-12.) When all three officers had arrived and exited their vehicles, Officer Boone went inside the abandoned building alone “to try to talk to Mr. Shaw and get him out” so that the officers “can talk and see what’s going on,” particularly given that there had been multiple instances of Shaw being disorderly at Church’s Chicken. (Id. at 11, 14, 16.) Officer Boone asked Shaw to come out and talk. (Id. at 18.) In response, Shaw bent down and picked up a hatchet. (Id.) Officer Boone felt threatened, reasoning, “Mr. Shaw had a hatchet in his hand and posed a threat to me. If I would have let him leave, he would have posed a threat to the community as well.” (Id. at 19.) When he saw Shaw pick up the hatchet and begin walking towards him, Officer Boone immediately drew his weapon and backed out of the building. (Id. at 25, 27.) Both Officer Boone and Shaw, still wielding the hatchet, exited the building, coming outside to where Detective Jones and Officer Williams were.9

*1267The tragic events unfolding over the next two-plus minutes are the essence of this lawsuit. They are also captured to a large degree on the recording taken from Officer Williams’ body camera and microphone, found in the record as Defendants’ Exhibit 9. {See doc. 13, Exh. 9.) The audio-video recording at Exhibit 9 is accepted as true for summary judgment purposes, notwithstanding any contrary evidence in the record; provided, however, that other evidence may be considered insofar as it fleshes out events as to which the video is unclear or ambiguous.10 Review of Exhibit 9 establishes the following: The video begins with Officer Williams in his patrol vehicle, stating that he is en route to the area of Church’s Chicken in reference to a subject that is disorderly, whose whereabouts are now near Washington Street and Griffin Avenue. A voice over the radio says, “He is inside the building,” or words to that effect. At approximately the 1:05 mark of the video,11 Officer Williams parks his car, exits and walks over to a dilapidated building reading “Towns Laundramat [sic ].” Two other officers (Detective Jones and Officer Boone) are seen bending down and peering inside through a darkened opening at ground level. At the 1:40 mark, one of the officers (Officer Boone) goes inside through the opening, as the other officer (Detective Jones) says, “He’ll fight you in a minute.”

At the 1:50 mark, Detective Jones says, “You see his shoes right there?” and Officer Williams (who is now bending down to peer into the opening) answers affirmatively, with both officers chuckling. Officer Boone can be heard inside telling Shaw, “I just want to talk to you.” Moments later, at the 1:57 mark, Officer Boone is heard (still inside the building) saying firmly and clearly, “Put the axe down.” Officer Williams loudly repeats the command, “Put the axe down,” approximately five times over the next 10 seconds, by which time Shaw has emerged from the building, still carrying the axe, and is now close by the other officers. At the 2:12 mark, Officer Williams, still loudly and forcefully saying “put the axe down” over and over again, draws his service firearm and points it at Shaw with both hands. Shaw appears on the screen at around 2:14, and commences walking away from the building, cursing and yelling as he does so, and saying, “I ain’t putting a goddamned thing down.” As Officer Williams and the other officers repeat the command to put the axe *1268down, Shaw responds, “F*** you, n*****’’ and says “I ain’t putting shit down,” He then turns and starts walking down the street at the 2:20 mark. Officer Williams continues to point his firearm at Shaw, and one of the other officers is seen holding a long stick (an ASP, or police expandable baton).12 Officer Williams says, “go .in the house, go go go go go,” apparently directed at nearby members of the public who are not visible on the video. By the 2:40 mark, Shaw is walking west on Griffin Avenue — in the direction of the Church’s Chicken, which was less than a block away — -with all three officers walking along with him, still commanding him to put the axe down as Shaw yells back at them, mostly incoherently. Officer Williams calls in on his radio, “Be advised the subject is armed with an axe.” One of the other officers is heard saying, “Mr. Shaw, put the axe down. We won’t hit you, man.”

By the 3:00 mark, Shaw is walking through what appears to be a residential or mixed-use area. Several people can be seen standing outside a house a short distance from where Shaw is. The officers continue to command Shaw to put the axe down and reassure him “we want to talk to you.” However, Shaw keeps walking away; still grasping the weapon in his right hand. At the 3:10 mark, Shaw has slowed down and almost stopped walking. Following from a close distance, Officer Williams raises his firearm with both hands and again commands him to put the axe down. Beginning at the 3:20 mark, the situation escalates at lightning speed. Shaw steps off the street and into a grassy strip in front of a house (where several people are seen sitting on a porch), wheels and yells at the officers. At 3:23, Shaw turns to face Officer Williams, then shouts, “Shoot it! Shoot it!”- Officer Williams responds, “I will pop you,” as Shaw faces him from just a few feet away. At 3:25, Shaw moves suddenly toward Officer Williams; however, Shaw’s right arm and the exact position of the axe are out of the frame. At 3:26, Shaw — still moving toward, and by this time less than five feet away from, Officer Williams — yells, “Shoot it!” again. His right arm and the axe remain outside the frame. Immédiately (and still at the 3:26 mark), Officer Williams fires a single gunshot at Shaw’s chest from very close range. Shaw falls to the ground.13 From the moment Shaw picks up the hatchet inside the laundromat until the fatal shot is fired 90 seconds later, the officers command him to “put the axe down” at least 28 times that can be heard on video.14 Paramedics arrived, and Shaw was pronounced dead at the scene. (Doc. 13, Exh. 1, at 3.)

In his deposition, Officer Williams explained that Shaw “was a threat to myself and to the other people around us.... His intentions were to hurt myself and possibly other people around us.” (Williams Dep., at 34.) When asked why he shot *1269Shaw when he did, Officer Williams answered, “When he raised his axe and came towards me with it.... It was raised above his head and come towards me.” (Id. at 36.) Similarly, Detective Jones testified that Shaw “goes directly at Williams.” (Jones Dep., at 47.) Detective Jones elaborated that Shaw “raised the hatchet above his head ... [a]nd charged,” taking two or three steps toward Officer Williams before the shot was fired. (Id. at 57-58.) Officer Boone’s testimony was that “Mr. Shaw crossed a little ditch and then turned around at Officer Williams and began to raise his axe, and Officer Williams fired one shot.” (Boone Dep., at 41.) Witness Donald Jones similarly testified that Shaw raised the hatchet'before Officer Williams shot him. (D. Jones Dep. (doc. 13, Exh. 5, at 8-9.)15

IV. Summary Judgment Standard.

Summary judgment, should be granted only “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Rule 56(a), Fed.R.Civ.P. The party seeking summary judgment bears “the initial burden to show the district court, by reference to materials on file, that there are no genuine issues of material fact that should be decided at trial.” Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991). Once the moving party has satisfied its responsibility, the burden shifts to the non-movant to show the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. “If the nonmoving party fails to make ‘a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof,’ the moving party is entitled to summary judgment.” Id. (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)) (footnote omitted). “In reviewing whether the nonmoving party has met its burden, the court must stop short of weighing the evidence and making credibility determinations of the truth of the matter. Instead, the evidence of the non-movant is to be .believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn-in his favor.” Tipton v. Bergrohr GMBH-Siegen, 965 F.2d 994, 999 (11th Cir. 1992) (internal citations and quotations omitted). “Summary judgment is justified only for those cases devoid of any need for factual determinations.” Offshore Aviation v. Transcon Lines, Inc., 831 F.2d 1013, 1016 (11th Cir. 1987) (citation omitted).

*1270V. Analysis.

A. Fourth Amendment Excessive Force Cause of Action.

In Count 2 of the Complaint, plaintiff asserts a § 1983 claim for excessive force, alleging that Officer Williams violated Shaw’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. On summary judgment, Officer Williams invokes the doctrine of qualified immunity, which “offers complete protection for government officials sued in their individual capacities if their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1346 (11th Cir. 2002) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “In order to receive qualified immunity, the public official must first prove that he was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority when the allegedly wrongful acts occurred.... Once the defendant establishes that he was acting within his discretionary authority, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that qualified immunity is not appropriate.” Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1194 (11th Cir. 2002) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). In evaluating whether a plaintiff has met that burden, “[t]he threshold inquiry ... is whether [the] plaintiffs allegations, if true, establish a constitutional violation.” Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 736, 122 S.Ct. 2508, 153 L.Ed.2d 666 (2002) (citation omitted).16

“[AJpprehension by the use of deadly force is a seizure subject to the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment.” Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7, 105 S.Ct. 1694, 85 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985). Thus, the critical question for evaluating whether a particular application of force is excessive for Fourth Amendment purposes is whether it was objectively reasonable. See, e.g., Smith v. LePage, 834 F.3d 1285, 1294 (11th Cir. 2016) (“The reasonableness of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, and the inquiry is an objective one.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “Determining whether the force used to effect a particular seizure is ‘reasonable’ under the Fourth Amendment requires a careful balancing of the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the countervailing governmental interests at stake.” Morton v. Kirkwood, 707 F.3d 1276, 1281 (11th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). In performing this balancing exercise, courts must carefully scrutinize the totality of the circumstances, “including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Id. (citation omitted). Recently, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that, even when the first and third factors are absent, the presence of the second factor — whether the suspect poses an immediate threat — may justify entry of summary judgment for the officer on an excessive force claim. See Davidson v. City of Opelika, 675 Fed.Appx. 955, 958-960, 2017 WL 164315, *3-4 (11th Cir. Jan. 17, 2017) (where reasonable officer would have *1271believed that suspect was pointing a gun at him, suspect objectively posed a grave and immediate threat that rendered the use of deadly force not excessive). Simply put, “[wjhere the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or to others, use of deadly force does not violate the Constitution.” Penley v. Eslinger, 605 F.3d 843, 851 (11th Cir. 2010) (citation and internal quotati on marks omitted). “[T]he second factor can be reduced to a single question: whether, given the circumstances, the suspect would have appeared to reasonable police officers to have been gravely dangerous.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

The uncontested summary judgment record establishes that, at the moment Officer Williams fired the fatal gunshot, Shaw would have appeared to reasonable police officers to be gravely dangerous. Shaw was holding a deadly weapon — the hatchet — in his right hand. He had refused to comply with literally dozens of pointed, direct commands by law enforcement officers during the previous 90 seconds to relinquish that deadly weapon. He had displayed open hostility and erratic behavior, including a stream of profanity and often incoherent invective directed at Officer Williams and his colleagues. At the- decisive moment, Shaw abruptly stopped walking away from Officer Williams, wheeled around to face him, screamed “shoot it! shoot it!” and either charged or lunged toward Officer Williams, still holding the hatchet in his right hand at a distance of no more than a couple of feet away from the officer. Both Officer Williams and numerous other witnesses testified that Shaw was raising the hatchet as he did so, as if preparing to strike Officer Williams.17 In that moment, Shaw’s aggressive and unpredictable behavior while armed with a deadly weapon rendered him gravely dangerous to any reasonable observer. In that moment, a reasonable officer would have believed that Shaw posed a grave and immediate threat to Officer Williams’ safety. In that moment, Officer Williams’ use of deadly force against Shaw did not violate the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Martinez v. City of Pembroke Pines, 648 Fed.Appx. 888, 893-*127294 (11th Cir. 2016) (officer’s use of deadly force was in compliance with Fourth Amendment where the suspect was unresponsive to commands and, with loose handcuffs swinging from his wrist as a weapon, suddenly advanced to within a few feet of the officer).18 “This is exactly the type of tense, uncertain and rapidly evolving crisis envisioned by the Supreme Court.” Garczynski v. Bradshaw, 573 F.3d 1158, 1168 (11th Cir. 2009) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

In so concluding, the Court has considered multiple counterarguments raised by plaintiff. First, plaintiff presents a series of arguments second-guessing the police officers’ decisions to confront Shaw in the abandoned laundromat, to follow him down the street, and to point a firearm at him. Those contentions are rejected for the reasons set forth infra, in the context of plaintiffs false arrest / false imprisonment claims.19 Second, plaintiff contends that “[mjost importantly, the decedent was without fault in the encounter.” (Doc. 21, at 11.) This assertion cannot be reconciled with the clear summary judgment record; indeed, the video unambiguously establishes that Shaw refused more than two dozen lawful commands by Selma police officers to “put down the axe,” that he cursed and yelled at the officers, that he behaved in a hostile and erratic manner, and that in the three seconds preceding the fatal shot, Shaw charged or lunged at Officer Williams yelling “shoot it! shoot it!” while Shaw was still holding a deadly weapon in his right hand. Given these un-controverted record facts, plaintiffs portrayal of Shaw as being “without fault in the encounter” is simply counterfactual.20 *1273Third, plaintiff’s arguments that “Williams had no probable cause to believe the decedent was going to attack him with the axe” because Shaw “simply turned around to make a comment” (doc. 21, at 11, 16) fail for precisely the same reasons. Again, .the video evidence unmistakably shows Shaw suddenly screaming and charging at Officer Williams, closing the distance to be within arm’s length of him and still holding the hatchet in his right hand despite dozens of police directives to put it down. Under the circumstances,. it was entirely reasonable for Officer Williams to believe that Shaw was going to attack him with the hatchet, and to employ deadly force to protect himself from such an attack. See Singletary, 804 F.3d at 1181 (“[a]s to deadly force, a police officer may use such force to dispel a threat of serious physical harm to either the officer or'others”); Penley, 605 F.3d at 851 (plaintiffs “do not contest that their son refused to comply with repeated commands to drop his weapon. Non-compliance of this sort supports the conclusion that use of deadly force was reasonable.”); Garczynski, 573 F.3d at 1169 (“At least where orders to drop the weapon have gone unheeded, an officer is not required to wait until an armed and dangerous felon has drawn a bead on the officer or others before using deadly force.”) (citations omitted); Martinez, 648 Fed.Appx. at 893-94 (“Plaintiff claims there was no indication he intended to harm King when he advanced toward him, but it was reasonable for King to conclude otherwise. King was not required to try and divine Plaintiffs subjective intent.”).

Fourth, plaintiffs assertion that Officer Williams “provoked the decedent to turn around; by following him unlawfully with a loaded weapon trained at the back of the decedent’s head” (doc. 21, at 12) is factually and legally misguided. As a factual matter, no reasonable observer watching the video could conclude that Officer Williams provoked Shaw to attack him. Officer Williams was attempting to defuse a tense .and rapidly evolving situation by directing an erratic, hostile, armed suspect to relinquish his deadly weapon. No one will ever know why Shaw refused the officers’ instructions and instead lunged toward Officer Williams while still carrying his axe. But it does not matter. On this record, no reasonable finder of fact could attribute Shaw’s conduct to “provocation” by defendants. Even if plaintiff could make á factual showing of provocation, this argument would fail to overcome Officer Williams’ cloak of qualified immunity because there was no clearly established law declaring it unconstitutional for a police officer to approach a suspect or “provoke” a confrontation. See, e.g., Davidson, 675 Fed.Appx. at 959, 2017 WL 164315, at *3-4 (rejecting argument that “Davidson disputes that there was any rapidly developing, uncertain, and tense situation until Hancock created one,” in light of binding authority forbidding courts from using hindsight to assess reasonableness); Rachel v. City of Mobile, Ala., 112 F.Supp.3d 1263, 1281 (S.D. Ala. 2015) (where plaintiff argued that officers “provoked a violent situation” by approaching an emotionally disturbed person, finding nothing in the language of the Fourth Amendment or Supreme Court or Eleventh Circuit decisions that “speak to the constitutionality of the antecedent act of approaching the suspect or ‘provoking’ a confrontation”). Fifth, plaintiff would rely on other officers’ testimony that he says disapproves of Officer Williams’ actions or establishes that other officers “knew the decedent wouldn’t hurt him.” (Doc. 21, at 12, 15, 16.)21 But the Eleventh Circuit has cautioned against *1274evaluating the reasonableness of one officer’s use of deadly force from the standpoint of another officer whose perspective on the incident was different. See Penley, 605 F.3d at 852 (“The Penleys’ reliance on Sergeant Brubaker’s statement that he did not feel threatened is misplaced. The relevant question is whether a reasonable officer in Lieutenant Weippert’s shoes would have believed that Mr. Penley was gravely dangerous.”).22

The fundamental defect in all of plaintiffs excessive force arguments is that they disregard the Supreme Court’s admonition that “[t]he calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments — in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving — about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.” Penley, 605 F.3d at 850 (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396-97, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989)). Courts “must be careful to evaluate the reasonableness of an officer’s conduct on a case-by-case basis from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Penley, 605 F.3d at 850 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). “Reconsideration will nearly always reveal that something different could have been done if the officer knew the future before it occurred. This is what we mean when we say we refuse to second-guess the officer.” Carr v. Tatangelo, 338 F.3d 1259, 1270 (11th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). Simply put, “[o]ur task is not to evaluate what the officers could or should have done in hindsight.” Garczynski, 573 F.3d at 1167. Viewed from the perspective of a reasonable police officer standing in Officer Williams’ shoes, Shaw appeared gravely dangerous at the moment of the shooting. Therefore, Officer Williams did not violate Shaw’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive force, and the qualified immunity analysis must come to an end.23

*1275 B. False Arrest/False Imprisonment

Counts Three and Four of the Complaint set forth what appear to be § 1983 claims of false arrest and false imprisonment.

1. False Arrest.

As to false arrest, plaintiff asserts that (in addition to the use of deadly force addressed supra) defendants violated Shaw’s rights to be free from false arrest because “[pointing a weapon at a subject is also a seizure under the Fourth Amendment.” (Doc. 21, at 16.) Plaintiff elaborates, with no citations to authority, that Shaw “was unlawfully seized the moment Williams trained his weapon on him ... when Williams first arrived at the laundromat.” (Id. at 17.) The threshold defect in this claim is that a § 1983 false arrest claim requires an arrest. See, e.g., Brown v. City of Huntsville, Ala., 608 F.3d 724, 734 (11th Cir. 2010) (“An arrest without a warrant and lacking probable cause violates the Constitution and can underpin a § 1983 claim .... ”); Jones v. Brown, 649 Fed.Appx. 889, 890 (11th Cir. 2016) (“A claim for false arrest arises when an arrest occurs without a warrant and without probable cause”). Officer Williams’ act of pointing his service firearm at Shaw does not convert an investigatory stop into an arrest, as a matter of settled law. See, e.g., Clark v. City of Atlanta, Ga., 544 Fed.Appx. 848, 854 (11th Cir. 2013) (“the officers’ actions in drawing their guns did not turn the investigatory stop into an arrest”).24 Plaintiff presents no authority to *1276the contrary and fails to distinguish any of these Eleventh Circuit cases. As in those decisions, it was reasonable for the officers here both to initiate contact with Shaw and to draw weapons when Shaw emerged from the abandoned laundromat wielding a hatchet that he refused to set down. In the absence of an arrest, of course, plaintiffs § 1983 false arrest cause of action evaporates.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Court will examine the entirety of the officers’ interaction with Shaw from a Fourth Amendment standpoint, on the off-chance that plaintiff may be asserting a § 1983 claim predicated on an alleged unconstitutional, non-arrest seizure of Shaw preceding the fatal shooting. As an initial matter, plaintiff suggests that the officers violated the Fourth Amendment by merely speaking with Shaw on the day in question. Plaintiff posits that the underlying offense (disorderly , conduct) was a misdemeanor, that the officers did not have authority to arrest Shaw, that they should not have gone into the abandoned laundromat to speak with Shaw, and that they should have left him alone as he walked down Griffin Avenue towards Church’s Chicken wielding a hatchet. All of these assertions are flatly irreconcilable with well-settled Fourth Amendment principles.

“In Terry v. Ohio, the Supreme Court held that an officer does not violate the Fourth Amendment by conducting a brief, investigatory stop when the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.” Moore v. Pederson, 806 F.3d 1036, 1044 (11th Cir. 2015) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Lewis, 674 F.3d 1298, 1303 (11th Cir. 2012) {Terry stops are permissible where “the officers have a reasonable suspicion that the suspect was involved in, or is about to be ‘ involved in, criminal activity”) (citations omitted). Uncontroverted record evidence reflects the following: (i) the Church’s Chicken manager called police to report that Ananias Shaw had attempted to enter his restaurant armed with a hatchet; (ii) a dispatcher called law enforcement to that location for a report of disorderly conduct in progress; and (iii) Detective Jones happened to be in the immediate vicinity when the call was made and observed Shaw in a nearby alleyway “hollering and yelling.” These circumstances gave rise to the requisite reasonable suspicion authorizing the officers to conduct a brief, investigatory stop of Shaw; after all, the totality of the circumstances furnished officers with a particularized basis for suspecting Shaw of having engaged in wrongdoing. See Lewis, 674 F.3d at 1305 (“Based upon that whole picture the detaining officers must have a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.”) (citations omitted).25 As such, the officers’ initial contact with Shaw in the derelict building and their request that he come out to talk to them in no way infringed on Shaw’s Fourth Amendment rights..

*1277Of course, the Fourth Amendment requires not only that a Terry stop be justified in its inception, but also that the stop be “lawful in its scope and duration.” Croom v. Balkwill, 645 F.3d 1240, 1248 (11th Cir. 2011). Plaintiff theorizes that, once Shaw emerged from the laundromat, the officers should have simply disengaged and allowed him to go about his business. In plaintiffs view, then, the officers should have returned to their patrol cars and driven away from the scene, leaving Shaw, agitated and hostile, and walking down the street in the direction of Church’s Chicken (from which he had been involuntarily denied entry just minutes earlier) with a deadly weapon in his hand. The Fourth Amendment did not require the. officers to select such a reckless and irresponsible course of action. See, e.g., Lewis, 674 F.3d at 1309 (“the very rationale underpinning Terry — the protection of officer safety and the safety of others nearby ... is presented by the facts of this case”); United States v. Hastamorir, 881 F.2d 1551, 1556 (11th Cir. 1989) (“police may take reasonable action, based upon the circumstances, to protect themselves during investigative detentions”); United States v. Kapperman, 764 F.2d 786, 790 n.4 (11th Cir. 1985) (“Police may take reasonable action, based upon the circumstances, to protect themselves during these encounters, or to maintain the status quo.”). It was manifestly reasonable under the circumstances for the officers to accompany Shaw has he walked down the street, to direct him to put down the hatchet, and to have their batons or service firearms drawn in order to protect themselves.

In short, nothing about the officers’ conduct in the approximately two-minute interval spanning from Officer Boone’s entrance into the abandoned laundromat until the moment when Shaw turned around and charged at Officer Williams constituted an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment that might support officer liability under § 1983.26

2. False Imprisonment.

Plaintiff also asserts a false imprisonment claim under § 1983 “based on the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment against deprivations of liberty without due process of law.” (Doc. 21, at 16.) The Eleventh Circuit recently set forth the elements of a § 1983 false imprisonment claim as follows:

“A § 1983 claim of false imprisonment requires a showing of common law imprisonment and a due process violation *1278under the Fourteenth Amendment.... The elements of common law false imprisonment are an intent to confine, an act resulting in confinement, and the victim’s awareness of confinement.... A plaintiff must also prove that the defendant acted with deliberate indifference in violating the plaintiffs right to be free from continued detention after the defendant knew or should have known that the detainee was entitled to release.”

May v. City of Nahunta, Georgia, 846 F.3d 1320, 1329 (11th Cir. 2017) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Under the common law, false imprisonment requires “some direct restraint of the person ... by which in fact the other person is deprived of his liberty, compelled to remain where he does not wish to remain, or to go where he does not wish to go.” Perkins v. City of Creola, 713 F.Supp.2d 1326, 1345 (S.D. Ala. 2010) (citation omitted).

The most fundamental problem with plaintiffs false imprisonment claim is that there was no confinement in this case. To be sure, Officer Williams drew his firearm, pointed it at Shaw, and issued certain commands to him. But none of those directives operated as a “direct restraint” on Shaw, compelled him to remain in a specific place or to go to a specific place, or otherwise operated to confine his movement in any form or fashion. The officers never commanded Shaw to stop moving or to go someplace else, but instead simply instructed him to disarm himself. Indeed, the proof is in the pudding. Shaw continued walking down the street as he pleased, without regard to what the officers were telling him. His freedom of movement was untrammelled by anything the officers said or did. Given these circumstances, there was nothing that could rationally be deemed a “confinement” or a “direct restraint;” therefore, plaintiffs false imprisonment claim fails as a matter of law.27

C. “Policy or Custom” Liability for the City of Selma.

In Counts 5 through 9 of the Complaint, plaintiff appears to assert various claims of § 1983 municipal liability against defendant City of Selma, grounded in theories of a policy of inadequate training and supervision, a custom of police abuse, a custom of deliberate indifference in hiring, and deliberate indifference to repeated complaints. With respect to all of these causes of action, plaintiff includes only a grand total of one paragraph in his summary judgment brief, wherein he (i) acknowledges his obligation “to identify a policy or custom of the police department that contributed to his injury,” and (ii) states that the Selma Police Department “never had consistent training in dealing with mentally ill,” and (iii) indicates that Officer Williams “had only an 8 hour workshop on dealing with the mentally ill.” (Doc. 21, at 17.)

The defects in plaintiffs § 1983 municipal liability claims are glaring. As an initial matter, the Court has already found that Officer Williams and his colleagues did not violate Shaw’s Fourth Amendment or Due Process rights in connection with their investigatory stop, their acts of following him down the street with weapons drawn and telling him to put down the hatchet, or the fatal shooting *1279itself. There being no constitutional violation by the individual officers, the City of Selma can have no § 1983 municipal liability based on its policies and training, as a matter of law. See, e.g., Penley, 605 F.3d at 855 (“Because we hold that Lieutenant Weippert did not deprive Mr. Penley of a constitutional right, it is unnecessary for us to evaluate the constitutionality of Sheriff Eslinger’s use of force policy.”); Garczynski, 573 F.3d at 1171 (“Absent a constitutional violation, we need not explore whether PBSO’s policies regarding crisis intervention training violated Garczynski’s constitutional rights.”); Case v. Eslinger, 555 F.3d 1317, 1328 (11th Cir. 2009) (“absent a violation of Case’s constitutional rights by Officer Davis, both Sheriff Es-linger and the City ... are entitled to summary judgment”); Rooney v. Watson, 101 F.3d 1378, 1381 (11th Cir. 1996) (“Since we have determined that Deputy Watson’s conduct did not cause the Rooneys to suffer a constitutional deprivation, we need not inquire into Volusia County’s policy and custom relating to patrol vehicle operation and training.”); Windham v. City of Fairhope, 597 Fed.Appx. 1068, 1073 (11th Cir. 2015) (“because we conclude the officers had actual probable cause to arrest Ms. Windham for disorderly conduct in obstructing vehicular traffic, there is no constitutional violation for which the City could be held responsible”).

Even if plaintiff had shown a constitutional deprivation by Officer Williams, § 1983 liability could not attach to the City under these circumstances. The parties agree that the plaintiff must “identify a municipal policy or custom that caused his injury.” Gold v. City of Miami, 151 F.3d 1346, 1350 (11th Cir. 1998) (citations and internal marks omitted). On summary judgment, the lone municipal policy identified by plaintiff is an alleged lack of “training on dealing with the mentally ill.” (Doc. 21, at 17.) But the evidence does not support a reasonable inference that the City of Selma’s training was deficient in this regard. While plaintiff contends that “SPD never had consistent training” in this area, her lone record citation has no bearing on that allegation.28 Plaintiffs assertion that ‘Williams had only an 8 hour workshop on dealing with the mentally ill” (doc. 21, at 17) appears factually supported; however, plaintiff does not indicate how that training was deficient or why Officer Williams required more than eight hours of training on the subject of mentally ill suspects, particularly when the record establishes that Officer Williams had received, extensive, ongoing training in law enforcement practices and procedures. (Doc. 13, Exh. 11.) Nor does plaintiff point to any evidence that further training in dealing with mentally ill suspects would have made any difference in this case.29 *1280What , does plaintiff contend Officer Williams should or would have known if he had received additional training that might possibly have mattered in this case? We can only guess..

Even if plaintiff could overcome all of these problems, his § 1983 failure-to-train claims against the City of Selma would nonetheless fail as a matter of law. It is well-settled that “under § 1983, a supervisor can be held liable for failing to, train his or her employees only where the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the [officers] come into contact.” Keith v. DeKalb County, Georgia, 749 F.3d 1034, 1052 (11th Cir. 2014) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). “But a pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained employees is ordinarily necessary to demonstrate deliberate indifference for purposes of failure to train.” Weiland v. Palm Beach County Sheriff’s Office, 792 F.3d 1313, 1328 (11th Cir. 2015) (citation and internal marks omitted). The record is devoid of evidence of a pattern of similar constitutional violations by Selma Police Department officers in their dealings with mentally ill suspects.30

For all of these reasons, summary judgment is properly entered in favor of the City of Selma as to all claims seeking § 1983 municipal liability.31

D. State-Law Claims,

What remains of the Complaint is a grab-bag of state-law claims. The only such causes of action that plaintiff identifies in his summary judgment Response as *1281being actively pursued at this time are “state law claims of assault and battery, false arrest, false imprisonment, invasion of privacy, intentional inflection of emotional distress, and civil conspiracy.” (Doc. 21, at 17.) The Court will therefore focus its attention on those enumerated claims as the state-law causes of action that remain in play,32

1. Claims against Officer Williams.

In Count 11, plaintiff asserts a cause of action against Officer Williams for assault and battery, stating that he was “careless and unskillful in shooting the Decedent.” (Complaint, ¶ 56.) Under Alabama law, a police officer may use a reasonable amount of force and may be held liable only if he or she uses more force than is necessary. See Walker v. City of Huntsville, 62 So.3d 474, 494 (Ala. 2010) (“a police officer may use reasonable force and may be held liable only if more force is used than is necessary to effectuate the arrest”) (citation omitted). “The evaluation of whether an assault and battery took place in' regards to an arrest mirrors whether excessive force was used in a federal claim.” Rogers v. City of Selma, 178 F.Supp.3d 1222, 1247 (S.D. Ala. 2016). Both parties concur in their summary judgment briefs that the assault and battery claim stands or falls using precisely the same analysis as plaintiffs Fourth Amendment excessive force claim. The Court has already determined, supra, that Officer Williams’ use of deadly force against- Shaw was reasonable under- the totality of the circumstances for Fourth Amendment purposes. That reasonableness determination conclusively defeats plaintiffs state-law assault and battery claim.

*1282In Counts 12 and 13, plaintiff brings state-law causes of action for false arrest and false imprisonment. Under Alabama law, a claim for false arrest requires an arrest. See, e.g., Ex parte Harris, 216 So.3d 1201, 1213, 2016 WL 4204837, *9 (Ala. July 29, 2016) (“A false arrest requires proof that the defendant caused [him] to be arrested without probable cause.”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). As the Court has already found that Shaw was not arrested, plaintiffs state-law false arrest claim fails as a matter of law. Likewise, a claim under Alabama law for false imprisonment requires “some direct restraint of the person ... by which in fact the other person is deprived of his liberty, compelled to remain where he does not wish to remain, or to go where he was not wish to go.” Sanders v. Shoe Show, Inc., 778 So.2d 820, 823 (Ala.Civ.App. 2000) (citation omitted). Plaintiff insists that “Officer Williams imprisoned the decedent by putting him at gunpoint.” (Doc. 21, at 18.) The video clearly demonstrates, however, that even after Officer Williams drew his firearm, Shaw was in no way restrained. He walked where he wanted, when he wanted. He did not remain in one place at Officer Williams’ command, nor did he go someplace in compliance with Officer Williams’ command. Officer Williams did not direct Shaw to stand still or to go to any specific place while his weapon was drawn and pointed at him. To the contrary, the video establishes that Shaw was not directly restrained in any way by Officer Williams pointing a gun at him. For that reason, plaintiffs false imprisonment claim is not cognizable under Alabama law.

In Count 15 of the Complaint, plaintiff purports to bring a state-law invasion of privacy claim, on the ground that “[t]he Defendant Officers intentionally intruded upon the solitude or seclusion of the Decedent by invading his emotional sanctum.” (Complaint, ¶ 77.) Alabama law requires that a claim for invasion of privacy predicated on a wrongful intrusion requires a showing that “the thing into which there is intrusion or prying is entitled to be private,” after which “the court will consider two primary factors in determining whether an intrusion is actionable: (1) the means used, and (2) the defendant’s purpose for obtaining the information.” Martin v. Patterson, 975 So.2d 984, 994 (Ala.Civ.App. 2007); see also Johnson v. Corporate Special Services, Inc., 602 So.2d 385, 388 (Ala. 1992) (once the court “finds that the purpose of the investigation was legitimate ... the only issue remaining is whether the means used was offensive or objectionable”). It is far from clear in this case that the officers intruded or pried into anything relating to Shaw that was entitled to be private. Even if they had, as discussed at great length supra, the officers were plainly empowered under applicable law to approach Shaw for the purpose of investigating the disorderly-conduct call. When Shaw immediately picked up a hatchet and started walking down the street while cursing the officers and otherwise behaving erratically, it was likewise both lawful and reasonable for the officers to follow him and endeavor to disarm him before he hurt himself or members of the public. In short, the Court finds no genuine issue of material fact that (i) the purpose of the officers’ investigation of Shaw was entirely legitimate, and (ii) the means they used to conduct that investigation were neither offensive nor objectionable. Any intrusion that the officers may have made into Shaw’s emotional sanctum (and the Court is not at all convinced that there was such an intrusion) was not wrongful and, therefore, is not actionable under Alabama law.

Count 21 of the Complaint purports to assert a cause of action for the Alabama tort of outrage, or intentional infliction of emotional distress. To prevail *1283on this claim, plaintiff must prove the following: “(1) that the Defendant either intended to inflict emotional distress, or knew or should [have] known that emotional distress was likely to result from his conduct; (2) that the Defendant’s conduct was extreme and outrageous[;] and (3) that the Defendant’s conduct caused emotional distress so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it.” Hamilton v. City of Jackson, 508 F.Supp.2d 1045, 1060 (S.D. Ala. 2007) (citation omitted). “The tort of outrage is an extremely limited cause of action” and requires conduct “so outrageous in character and so extreme in degree as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized society.” Ex parte Bole, 103 So.3d 40, 53 (Ala. 2012) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). On this record, no reasonable finder of fact could conclude that the conduct of Officer Williams and his colleagues (ie., attempting to speak with Shaw about the disorderly conduct complaint from Church’s Chicken, directing Shaw on dozens of occasions to put down the hatchet, walking alongside an armed and belligerent subject with weapons drawn in a public area with civilians present, and using lethal force when Shaw abruptly turned and charged Officer Williams) was so outrageous in character and so extreme in degree as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency and to be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized society.33 Officer Williams was forced to make split-second decisions in a dangerous and rapidly evolving situation with an erratic, hostile, armed suspect, to protect the safety of the public and himself. The actions he took in those circumstances were lawful, reasonable, and cannot rationally be deemed extreme and outrageous as those terms are defined by Alabama authorities. Plaintiffs outrage claim fails as a matter of law.

In Count 14 of the Complaint, plaintiff purports to assert a claim of civil conspiracy against all defendants, theorizing that they “failed and refused to provide Plaintiffs [sic ] with any facts, reports, information, videos, etc in an attempt to avoid litigation” and “failed to conduct an adequate investigation.” (Complaint, ¶ 68.) Plaintiff further alleges that “[a]s a proximate result of the' defendants’ acts and omissions, Decedent was caused to suffer injuries resulting in death.” (Id., ¶ 69.) As an initial matter, this claim is pleaded in a nonsensical manner because defendants’ post-shooting conduct could not have proximately caused Shaw’s injuries resulting in death. Moreover, any civil conspiracy claim predicated on allegations that these defendants (City of Selma, Chief Riley, Officer Williams) failed to conduct an adequate investigation suffers from an insuperable logical defect because the record unequivocally shows that the Alabama Bureau of Investigation (“ABI”) assumed responsibility for investigating the Shaw shooting *1284from the outset, at Chief Riley and the City of Selma’s express request;34 Finally, plaintiffs claim -that defendants conspired to -withhold investigative information from him misapprehends the mechanics of a civil conspiracy claim. Under Alabama law, “liability for civil- conspiracy rests upon the existence of an underlying wrong and if the underlying wrong provides no cause of action, then neither does the conspiracy.” Freeman v. Holyfield, 179 So.3d 101, 106 (Ala. 2015). In this case, plaintiff contends that defendants wronged him by not providing him" information and investigative materials regarding the Shaw shooting. But he identifies no statute, regulation, case, legal principle or other authority that entitled him to receive full, unfettered, immediate access' to investigative materials upon request. Simply put, plaintiff has made no showing or colorable argument that the temporary withholding of such information and materials was unlawful or wrongful. There being no actionable underlying wrong, any activity by defendants in conspiring to withhold that information from plaintiff cannot be actionable as a civil conspiracy under Alabama law. Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on this claim.

2. Stated-Agent Immunity for Officer Williams.

For any state-law claims not addressed on the merits supra (such as the wrongful death, negligence and wantonness claims), and for any state-law claims asserted against Officer Williams that may be otherwise cognizable and supported by evidence in the record, entry of summary judgment in Officer Williams’ favor .remains appropriate pursuant to the doctrine of. state-agent immunity.

An Alabama statute provides that “[e]very peace officer ... shall have immunity from tort liability arising out of his or her conduct in performance of any discretionary function within the line and scope of his or her law enforcement duties.” Ala. Code § 6-5-338(a). Acts performed within an officer’s discretionary functions are those “as to which there is no hard and fast rule as to the course of conduct that one must or must not take and those acts requiring exercise in judgment and choice and involving what is just and proper under the circumstances:” Sheth v. Webster, 145 F.3d 1231, 1239 (11th Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). “A defendant initially bears the burden of demonstrating that he was acting in a function that would entitle the agent to immunity.” Brown, 608 F.3d at 741. It cannot be seriously disputed that Officer Williams was- performing á discretionary function in the line and scope of his law enforcement duties at all times in his dealings with Shaw on the date in question. He was dispatched on a disorderly conduct call. He attempted to investigate the call by approaching Shaw. And he attempted to protect himself, his fellow officers and the public in a rapidly-evolving, tense and dangerous situation after Shaw emerged from the laundromat with a hatchet, shout*1285ed and cursed at the officers, and refused to put down his deadly weapon as he walked back in the direction of Church’s Chicken. Officer Williams was plainly performing discretionary functions. See, e.g., Grider v. City of Auburn, Ala., 618 F.3d 1240, 1268 (11th Cir. 2010) (“Police investigations and arrests usually are considered discretionary functions within the line and scope of law enforcement duties for the purposes of discretionary-function immunity.”) (citations and internal marks omitted); Swan v. City of Hueytown, 920 So.2d 1075, 1079 (Ala. 2005) (“In choosing which information to relay to the dispatcher ... and, in later deciding to arrest Swan upon confirmation a warrant was outstanding, Officer Williams was ‘exercising judgment in the enforcement of criminal laws’ within the meaning of Cranman”).

Because Officer Williams was performing discretionary acts, he is entitled to state-agent immunity unless plaintiff shows “sufficient ‘bad intent’ — willfulness, malice, fraud, bad faith, actions beyond authority, or actions taken under a mistaken interpretation of law.” Grider, 618 F.3d at 1268; see also Ex parte Mason, 146 So.3d 9, 12 (Ala. 2013) (if state agent shows that claims arise from a function entitling state agent to immunity, “the burden then shifts to the plaintiff to show that the State agent acted willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, in bad faith, or beyond his or her authority”). Plaintiff posits that Officer Williams’ immunity is erased by “his failure to discharge his duties pursuant to detailed rules and regulations, his acting beyond his authority in pursuing a misdemeanor suspect,-' and his acting willfully, maliciously and in bad faith in shooting the decedent.” (Doc. 21, at 20.) None of these assertions can withstand • scrutiny.

Without question, “[a] State agent acts beyond authority and is therefore not immune when he or she fails to discharge duties pursuant to detailed rules or regulations, such as those stated on a checklist.” Mason, 146 So.3d at 12-13 (citations and internal marks omitted). The critical distinction is whether those rules or regulations “must be followed by an officer” or whether they are simply guidelines (in which case immunity remains intact). Ex parte Brown, 182 So.3d 495, 506 (Ala. 2015). The uncontroverted record evidence shows no failure by Officer Williams to abide by detailed rules or regulations. As a matter of the Selma Police Department’s written policy, Officer Williams was authorized to use deadly force “in order to ... protect the officer or others from what is reasonably believed to be an immediate threat of death or serious bodily harm.” (Doc. 13, Exh. 3, § 3.11.19(1)(a).) As analyzed in great detail supra, at the moment he fired his weapon, Officer Williams reasonably believed it was necessary to do so to protect himself from an immediate threat of death or serious bodily harm- lie., Shaw coming after him at close range armed with a hatchet). Thus, his conduct was fully compliant with departmental policy. Any suggestion that Officer Williams violated “detailed rules or regulations, such as those stated on a checklist” in his use of deadly force is devoid of evidentiary support.35

*1286As for malice, plaintiff trumpets Officer Williams’ actions during the shooting as “the epitome of malice.” (Doc. 21, at 21.) Plaintiff says that Officer Williams told Shaw to put down the hatchet, then “walked up on him and then dropped him.... Death for disobedience.” (Id.) According to plaintiff, “It seems that Williams was just intent on using his weapon.” (Id. at 15.) Such a fictional narrative can only be credited if we ignore the events clearly depicted on the video and the testimony of every single witness deposed in this case, including Don Jones (as to whom plaintiffs narrative relies on selected bits and pieces to the exclusion of other testimony by that very witness that Shaw was raising the hatchet as if to throw it when the shooting took place). The operative legal standard for summary judgment does not permit courts to disregard clear video recordings, to ignore sworn deposition accounts, or to indulge a non-movant’s wishful thinking and unsupported inflammatory rhetoric about a bloodthirsty policeman. There is not a scintilla of evidence in the summary judgment record that Officer Williams acted willfully, maliciously or in bad faith when he fired the fatal shot at Shaw, who at that very moment was rushing Officer Williams while armed with a hatchet and screaming “shoot it! shoot it!” after refusing to com*1287ply with dozens of commands to put his weapon down.

In sum, the Court concludes that state-agent immunity protects Officer Williams from liability for all state-law claims and causes of action asserted herein. See Davidson v. City of Opelika, 675 Fed.Appx. 955, 960, 2017 WL 164315, *4 (11th Cir. Jan. 17, 2017) (affirming summary judgment on Alabama-law assault and battery claim in police shooting case where “video evidence demonstrates that Hancock’s actions were neither gratuitous nor in violation of Davidson’s clearly established constitutional rights,” such that the officer was entitled to state-agent immunity under Alabama law).

3. Respondeat Superior Liability against the City.

Finally, plaintiff seeks to hold the City of Selma “liable for the negligent, careless, or unskillful acts of its agent officers” under Alabama law. (Doc. 21, at 21.) By statute, Alabama municipalities may be held liable on a theory of respondeat superior for any “injury or wrong ... done or suffered through the neglect, carelessness, or unskillfulness of some agent, officer, or employee of the municipality engaged in work therefor and while acting in the line of his or her duty.” Ala. Code § 11-47-190. The most immediate defect with this line of reasoning is that the Court has already concluded that Officer Williams is entitled to state-agent immunity pursuant to Alabama Code § 6-5-338(a) for the wrongs that plaintiff contends were the product of Officer Williams’ neglect, carelessness or unskillfulness. Because Officer Williams is immune, the City of Selma is likewise immune. See, e.g., Harris, 216 So.3d at 1216, 2016 WL 4204837, at *12 (“to the extent that we have concluded above that Harris was entitled to State-agent immunity, the Town would also be immune from suit”); Ex parte Dixon, 55 So.3d 1171, 1179 (Ala. 2010) (“It is well established that, if a municipal peace officer is immune pursuant to § 6-5-338(a), then, pursuant to § 6-5-338(b), the city by which he is employed is also immune.”) (citations omitted); Ala. Code § 6-5-338(b) (“This section is intended to extend immunity only to peace officers and governmental units or agencies authorized to appoint peace officers.”). The City of Selma enjoys immunity from plaintiffs state-law claims asserted against it on a theory of respondeat superior for the purported neglect, carelessness or unskill-fulness of Officer Williams.

YI. Conclusion.

For all of the foregoing reasons, it is ordered as follows:

1. Defendants’ Motion to Strike Affidavit of Faya Rose Toure (doc. 23) is granted, and that Affidavit (which is found at Exhibit 7 to docket entry 21) is stricken;

2. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. 13) is granted;

3. There being no genuine issues of material fact as to any claim or cause of action asserted herein, plaintiffs claims against all defendants are dismissed with prejudice; and

4. A separate Judgment will enter.

DONE and ORDERED this 15th day of March, 2017.