McKinstry v. Jefferson County Board of Education

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION RENITTA MCKINSTRY, )

) Plaintiff, )

) v. )

) Case No.: 2:20-cv-00735-JHE

JEFFERSON COUNTY BOARD OF ) EDUCATION, et al., )

) Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION1 On May 26, 2020, Plaintiff Renitta McKinstry (“McKinstry”) filed this employment discrimination action, alleging Defendants Jefferson County Board of Education (the “Board”) and Superintendent Craig Pouncey (“Pouncey”) discriminated against her on the basis of her race and disability and in retaliation for engaging in protected activity by terminating her. (Doc. 1). On July 29, 2020, Defendant Superintendent Craig Pouncey moved to dismiss McKinstry’s claims against him. (Doc. 10). McKinstry has filed a response in opposition, (doc. 21), and Pouncey has replied in support, (doc. 22). For the reasons discussed more fully below, Pouncey’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED.

Legal Standard Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits dismissal when a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must

To that end, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing the pleader is entitled to relief.” “[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Mere “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” are insufficient. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). “Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Further, “[i]n alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.” FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). “[A] plaintiff must plead facts as to time, place, and substance of the defendant's alleged fraud, specifically the details of the defendants' allegedly fraudulent acts, when they occurred, and who engaged in them.” U.S. ex rel. Clausen v. Lab. Corp. of Am., Inc., 290 F.3d 1301, 1310 (11th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Malice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a person's mind may be alleged generally.” FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).

The court accepts all factual allegations as true on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). See, e.g., Grossman v. Nationsbank, N.A., 225 F.3d 1228, 1231 (11th Cir. 2000). However, legal conclusions unsupported by factual allegations are not entitled to that assumption of truth. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

Factual Background McKinstry is a black woman who suffers from major depression and generalized anxiety disorder. (Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 1, 10). McKinstry worked as a teacher for the Board from August 2007 until her termination on July 10, 2018. (Id. at ¶¶ 9, 17). Pouncey is the Superintendent of the Board and was McKinstry’s ultimate supervisor, as well as being responsible for the Board’s administration. (Id. at ¶¶ 13, 15).

Starting in May 2014, McKinstry began complaining to the Board about what she perceived to be race discrimination. (Id. at ¶ 17). After McKinstry’s complaints, Gary Evans, a white male, forced McKinstry to write a letter of resignation. (Id.). However, McKinstry did not resign her employment, nor was she terminated. (Id.).

In August 2016, McKinstry was hired as an Instructional Coach at Chalkville Elementary School. (Id. at ¶ 18). She continued to file complaints of race discrimination and was subsequently transferred to Irondale Community School to work as an Alabama Reading Initiative Specialist. (Id. at ¶ 19).

On October 25, 2016, Board officials called McKinstry into a meeting and informed her that her position was being eliminated. (Id. at ¶ 20). McKinstry filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC the next day alleging race and retaliation. (Id.). McKinstry was demoted from Reading Initiative Specialist to Instructional Coach and assigned the most difficult students. (Id. at ¶ 22). McKinstry received a right to sue letter from the EEOC on November 22, 2016 but did not file suit. (Id. at ¶ 23).

On March 6, 2017, McKinstry was placed on indefinite paid administrative leave. (Id. at ¶ 24). McKinstry filed another charge of discrimination with the EEOC three days later based on race and retaliation. (Id.). McKinstry was notified on March 23, 2017, that she was being placed on administrative leave without pay. (Id. at ¶ 25). On March 31, 2017, McKinstry filed another charge of discrimination with the EEOC, alleging retaliation. (Id.). The Board rescinded the unpaid leave decision on April 14, 2017 and moved McKinstry back to paid leave. (Id. at ¶ 26).

On August 8, 2017, McKinstry requested that a teacher work with her in her classroom as a permanent substitute to accommodate her disability. (Id. at ¶ 27). Pouncey verbally agreed to this request, but no permanent substitute was assigned. (Id.). McKinstry submitted additional requests to Pouncey and Principal Ann Tillman, but these requests were denied. (Id. at ¶ 28). McKinstry filed a charge of disability discrimination based on these denials on August 25, 2017. (Id.). Defendants did not work with McKinstry to determine whether an accommodation was appropriate. (Id. at ¶ 29).

On April 24, 2018, Pouncey provided McKinstry a letter outlining events leading up to the 2017-2018 school year. (Id. at ¶ 30). On April 25, 2018, McKinstry was notified that Pouncey would recommend her termination to the Board. (Id.). Defendants terminated McKinstry’s employment on July 17, 2018, effective July 10, 2018. (Id. at ¶ 31). On September 25, 2018, McKinstry filed another charge of discrimination based on retaliation and disability. (Id. at ¶ 32).

Discussion McKinstry’s complaint raises three causes of action, each of which Pouncey challenges as applied to him:2 (1) Claim A, a disability and retaliation cause of action pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), the Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act of 2008, (“ADAAA”), and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, asserted against Pouncey and the Board, (doc. 1 at ¶¶ 34-41); (2) Claim B, a Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 race discrimination claim, asserted against the Board alone, (id. at ¶¶ 42-48); and (3) Claim C, a race discrimination and retaliation claim under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and § 1983, asserted against Pouncey alone, (id. at ¶¶ 49-52). In her response to the motion to dismiss, McKinstry concedes that the following claims are due to be dismissed: (1) claims against Pouncey in his official capacity; (2) claims against Pouncey for prospective injunctive and equitable relief; (3) ADA, ADAAA, and § 504 claims against Pouncey; and (4) the retaliation claim against Pouncey under the Equal Protection Clause. (Doc. 21 at 2). However, McKinstry maintains that her race-based equal protection claim, Claim C, should survive the motion to dismiss. (Id.). The undersigned addresses only that claim below.3

“[T]he substantive law and proof requirements of Title VII, section 1981, and section 1983 are the same for claims alleging intentional employment discrimination based on race by state

Pouncey argues there are no allegations that connect him to McKinstry’s disparate treatment on the basis of her race. (Doc. 10 at 10). He is correct. Pouncey notes the only specific, factual reference that touches on race-based disparate treatment is paragraph 17 of the complaint, alleging Gary Evans, a white male, forced McKinstry to write a letter of resignation in 2014. (Id.). This does not relate to Pouncey, so it cannot provide any support for McKinstry’s claim against him.4 Pouncey also states that McKinstry’s description of the “Nature of this Action” makes “the generic allegation that the ‘Defendants’ discriminated against her by ‘(1) assigning her the most difficult students within the school system while white teachers received much easier assignments,’” (doc 10 at 10-11, n.4) (citing doc. 1 at ¶ 3), but nowhere in the complaint is this further developed beyond simply reiterating that she was demoted and assigned those difficult students, (doc. 1 at ¶ 22). There is no factual allegation in the complaint that would support the conclusory assertion that this assignment was due to McKinstry’s race, nor that Pouncey had

McKinstry’s response to the motion to dismiss spends several pages discussing the appropriate pleading standard. (Doc. 21 at 2-6). She is correct that she is not required to make out a prima facie case of race discrimination, such as she might have to do at summary judgment. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 515, 122 S.Ct. 992, 999 (2002) (“[A]n employment discrimination plaintiff need not plead a prima facie case of discrimination . . . to survive [a] motion to dismiss.”); Davis, 516 F.3d at 974 (Title VII complaint not required to make out McDonnell Douglas prima facie case); Jackson v. BellSouth Telecomms., 372 F.3d 1250, 1270–71 (11th Cir. 2004) (“McDonnell Douglas [is] an evidentiary rather than a pleading standard ... pleading a McDonnell Douglas prima facie case [is] not necessary to survive a motion to dismiss”) (emphasis in original). Similarly, her complaint is not doomed solely because she does

McKinstry’s only argument that her complaint contains more than conclusory allegations of Pouncey’s race discrimination concerns the EEOC Cause Finding in Charge Number 420-2017- 01528, attached as an exhibit to her complaint. (Doc. 21 at 6-9) (citing doc. 1-1). McKinstry claims that the complaint combines with this document to “sufficiently allege that the Plaintiff was subjected to what appears to be a pattern and/or practice of race discrimination and/or retaliation by Pouncey and others,” (id. at 6-7), and quotes extensively from the EEOC Cause Finding, (id. at 8-9). But the EEOC Cause Finding—and, in fact, McKinstry’s briefing and quotation of the finding—do not support this. First, Pouncey is not the respondent to the EEOC charge; the Board is. (See doc. 1-1 at 2). Second, even if Pouncey were the respondent to the EEOC charge, it would only support McKinstry’s claim that Pouncey retaliated against her by “suspend[ing] her in retaliation for her engagement in protected activity,” (doc. 21 at 9) (quoting doc. 1-1 at 3). McKinstry has conceded that her retaliation claim against Pouncey is due to be dismissed, (doc. 21 at 2), so it is unclear how the EEOC Cause Finding could save her race discrimination claim. And the other exhibit to McKinstry’s complaint is related solely to her claims of disability discrimination, (see doc. 1-2), which she has also conceded should be dismissed, (doc. 21 at 2). Because the complaint contains nothing to support Pouncey’s liability for race discrimination, and because McKinstry has conceded all other claims against him should be dismissed, Pouncey’s motion to dismiss is due to be granted.

IV. Conclusion For the reasons stated above, Pouncey’s motion to dismiss, (doc. 10), is GRANTED. McKinstry’s claims against Pouncey are DISMISSED.

DONE this 11th day of January, 2021.

~~ vo JOHN H. ENGLAND, III UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE