IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA SOUTHERN DIVISION

KARLA DAHN, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No.: 1:21-cv-481-SMD ) KILOLO KIJAKAZI, ) Acting Commissioner of Social Security, ) ) Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

On March 17, 2022, the Commissioner filed an Unopposed Motion for Entry of Judgment Under Sentence Four of

(g). Comm’r’s Mot. (Doc. 20). The Commissioner requests that the Court reverse the Commissioner’s decision and remand this case for further consideration and administrative action pursuant to sentence four of

(g).

. The Commissioner avers that, on remand, the Appeals Council will instruct the ALJ to: “(1) further consider [] the prior administrative findings; (2) further consider Plaintiff’s maximum residual functional capacity; (3) if warranted, obtain supplemental evidence from a vocational expert; (4) offer Plaintiff an opportunity for a hearing; (5) take any further action to complete the administrative record; and (5) issue a new decision.” Comm’r’s Br. (Doc. 21) p. 1. Sentence four of

(g) authorizes the district court to “enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing.”

(g). The district court may remand a case to the Commissioner for a rehearing if the court finds “either . . . the decision is not supported by substantial evidence, or . . . the Commissioner or the ALJ incorrectly applied the law relevant to the disability claim.” Jackson v. Chater,

(11th Cir. 1996). In this case, the Court finds reversal and remand necessary as the Commissioner

concedes reconsideration and further administrative actions are necessary. Furthermore, Plaintiff does not oppose the motion. Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the Commissioner’s Unopposed Motion for Entry of Judgment Under Sentence Four (Doc. 20) is GRANTED. It is further ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the decision of the Commissioner is hereby

REVERSED and this case be and is hereby REMANDED to the Commissioner for further proceedings. Finally, it is ORDERED that, in accordance with Bergen v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,

, 1278 n.2 (11th Cir. 2006), Plaintiff shall have ninety (90) days after she receives notice of any amount of past due benefits awarded to seek attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C.§ 406(b).

See also Blitch v. Astrue,

, 241 n.1 (11th Cir. 2008). Done this 18th day of March, 2022.

Stephen M. Doyle CHIEF U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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