Fueling Maritime Middle East FZCO f/k/a Glander International Bunkering DMCC v....

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA SOUTHERN DIVISION FUELING MARITIME MIDDLE EAST FZCO f/k/a ) GLANDER INTERNATIONAL BUNKERING ) DMCC, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:26-00033-JB-M ) M/V CAPELLA (IMO NO. 9518165) with her ) freight, engines, machinery, equipment ) fixtures, appurtenances, etc., in rem, ) ) Defendants. ) ORDER This ma)er is before the Court on the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommenda;on (hereina=er “R&R”), entered on Capella Shipholding, Inc.’s Mo;on for Release of Vessel and Expedited Hearing Pursuant to Supplemental Admiralty Rule E(4). (Docs. 23 and 12). Capella Shipholding, Inc. (“Capella”) filed the Mo;on for Release following the arrest of the M/V CAPELLA on February 4, 2026, pursuant to an Order dated January 30, 2026. (Doc. 6).1 The R&R recommends denial of Capella’s Rule E(4) Mo;on for Release. (Doc. 23). Capella filed Objec;ons to the R&R (Doc. 25), and Plain;ff filed a Response (Doc. 27).2 Upon due considera;on of all Capella filed a limited appearance pursuant to Rule E(8) and a Statement of Interest as Owner of the Vessel. (Doc.

11).

2 ABer entry of the R&R, the Vessel was released based on the parGes’ SGpulaGon for Release of Vessel from Warrant of Arrest. (See Docs. 22 and 24). The SGpulaGon states: The grounds for this joint sGpulaGon are that Owner, through its Underwriter, has issued a LeRer of Undertaking, dated February 6, 2025, to stand as subsGtute security for the Vessel arrested in this proceeding to enable the Vessel to conGnue with its voyage. The parGes hereby sGpulate that the security provided by the Vessel shall be transferred to the LeRer of Undertaking, and PlainGff material filings in the record, and having determined de novo the parts of the Magistrate Judge’s disposi;on to which Defendant objects, the Court adopts R&R with a single modifica;on.

The “Factual and Procedural Background” set out in the R&R are correct in all respects material to the “Legal Conclusion” reached therein. The Court notes Capella’s objec;on to the factual finding, “[t]here is no independent evidence to indicate whether [the Pre-Supply No;ce and Acknowledgment] was provided before, during, or a=er the physical supply of the Bunkers.” (See Docs. 23 (PageID.115 and 116) and 25 (PageID.130). Defendant cites a declara;on of the Master of the MV CAPELLA, sta;ng, “Before commencement of loading, I presented Capt. Vinesh Maharaj, Master of Barge BONGANI with a standard Pre Supply No;ce & Acknowledgement rela;ng to the prospec;ve supply/provision of bunkers, services or goods to the Vessel.” (Doc.

25 at PageID.130 (ci;ng Doc. 20-1, PageID.100)).3 The R&R is due to be modified by dele;on of the following sentence at PageID.116: “There is no independent evidence to indicate whether this No;ce was provided before, during, or a=er the physical supply of the Bunkers.”

Nevertheless, it remains undisputed that no evidence was presented to indicate the No;ce or any other document which would otherwise serve as no;ce of a lien waiver or prohibi;on was delivered to the Plain;ff prior to the supply of the Bunkers. (Doc. 25 at PageID.116). It is likewise undisputed that there was no evidence presented that any such document was delivered to Plain;ff prior to Capella’s appearance and filing of its Mo;on for shall look solely to the LeRer of Undertaking to provide security for its claims in this and any other proceeding against the Vessel. (Doc. 22).

3 Defendant filed this DeclaraGon of its Master some 32 minutes prior to the hearing on its MoGon for Release. The Magistrate Judge denied PlainGff’s oral moGon to strike the declaraGon.

Release. (Id. at PageID.117). Capella’s counsel conceded there was no evidence in the record that Plain;ff received such documents or otherwise had “actual knowledge” of any lien prohibi;on no;ce(s) prior to the supply of the Bunkers. (Id.).

The “Legal Conclusions” set out in the R&R are correct. The Court notes especially, but without limita;on, that the scope of Rule E(4) hearings is limited. The court in Barna Conshipping, S.L. v. 1,800 Metric Tons summarized the standard as follows: “The post-arrest hearing is not intended to resolve defini;vely the dispute between the par;es, but only to make a preliminary determina;on whether there were reasonable grounds for issuing the arrest warrant, and if so, to fix an appropriate bond.” 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36789, *9 (S.D. Ala. April 28, 2009) (quo;ng Salazar v. Atlan?c Sun, 881 F.2d 73, 79 (3d Cir. 1989)). The “plain;ff must prove that the a)achment was, and is, supported by ‘probable cause.’” Id. However, a plain;ff’s burden to prove “probable cause” suppor;ng an arrest is “not onerous.” James v. M/V EAGLE EXPRESS, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105072, *14 (S.D. Ala. July 27, 2012) (ci;ng George v. A 2005 Donzi Motor Yacht, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102186, *1 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 22, 2009)).

Further, the Court’s role in conduc;ng a Rule E(4) hearing is not “to resolve contested factual disputes and complex legal issues that would effec;vely convert the . . . proceeding into the very type of mini-trial the Eleventh Circuit has cau;oned against.” Int’l Ship Repair & Marine Servs., v. Barge B. 15, 418 F. Supp. 3d 1051, 1056 (M.D. Fla. 2019). See PDS Gaming Corp. v. M/V Ocean Jewell of St. Petersburg, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 22407, *4 (11th Cir. Oct. 15, 2007) (vaca;ng a district court’s order vaca;ng an arrest because the court had “improperly turned the Supplemental Rule E(4)(f) hearing into a mini-trial and posed a much higher burden on PDS than is authorized . . ..”). Rather, for purposes of a post-arrest hearing, “it is sufficient that the plain;ff had ‘established a prima facie case for an ac;on in rem, even though the ul;mate result of the case may be different.’” Jaffe v. M/S BREAKING WIND, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91519, *10 (S.D. Fla. June 13, 2017).

Here, Capella concedes “the Plain;ff’s Complaint (and documents in support thereof) establish a prima facie showing of a valid mari;me lien under 46 U.S.C. 31301.” (Doc. 23 at PageID.114). Capella also concedes there is no evidence that Plain;ff had “actual knowledge” of a lien prohibi;on or similar document prior to Plain;ff’s supply of bunkers to the Vessel in this case. (Id. at 117).

The R&R sets out correctly and comprehensively that, in the Eleventh Circuit, a party seeking to enforce a prohibi;on of liens clause or similar mari;me lien waiver must demonstrate the supplier had “actual knowledge” of the clause or waiver prior to its supply of necessaries. (Doc. 23 at PageID.117 – 118). Capella, in the face of its concession to the contrary, argues opinions rendered by courts outside the Eleventh Circuit have produced an evolu;on of the “actual knowledge” standard. However, the Magistrate Judge correctly disposed of these arguments and dis;nguished the cases cited in support. Furthermore, it was not the Court’s role in this Rule E(4) expedited hearing to resolve contested fact-sensi;ve ques;ons concerning mari;me customs and mul;-layered commercial opera;ons and rela;onships in the interna;onal bunkering industry. Further, deciding the legal issue of whether an established Eleventh Circuit standard has been evolved by extra-Circuit decisions is the sort of “complex legal issue[] that would effec;vely convert the” the Rule E(4) “proceeding into the very type of mini-trial the Eleventh Circuit has cau;oned against.” Barge B. 15, 418 F. Supp. 3d at 1056.

CONCLUSION Upon careful review and de novo considera;on of the disposi;ons to which Defendant objects, and for the reasons stated herein, the Court ADOPTS the Report and Recommenda^on (Doc. 23), as modified by dele;on of the following sentence at PageID.116: “There is no independent evidence to indicate whether this No;ce was provided before, during, or a=er the physical supply of the Bunkers.”

DONE and ORDERED this 13th day of February, 2026. /s/ JEFFREY U. BEAVERSTOCK CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE