Hithcock v. Smith
Opinion of the Court
The question presented by this record is, whether, under our statute of distributions, the brothers and sisters of the half blood, or the nephews and nieces of the whole blood/áre to be preferred.
The statute is, as follows: — “When any person shall die sjezed of any estate or inheritance, in lands, tenements, or hereditaments, not devised,'the same shall descend to his or her children, and their descendants, in equal parts; the descendants of the dé-ceased child or grand child to take the share of their deceased parent,.in equal parts among them; and
It would be improper, in this case, to enter upon a discussion and decision of the.questions which may hereafter arise under the statute, with regard to who shall take per capita, and who per stirpes. Although the argument of the counsel for the defendant in error has embraced this subject, we do not deem its consideration necessary to the determination of the point before us. There is a clear distinction maintained in the books, with regard to the place which descendants of preferred kindred, among whom the law recognizes the right of representation, shall occupy, as respects other kindred,-and as respects each, other. -By the common and civil law, in those lines
Blackstone, in his Commentaries, (vnl. 2, p 223,) says, “a sixth rule, or canon, is, that the collateral heir of the person last seized, must be his next collateral kinsman, of the whole blood.:’ Apart from the right of representation, this is not true — for, we have seen, that the great-nephew will inherit before the uncle; therefore, the commentator proceeds, in his next sentence, to say, 11 he must be his next, collateral kinsman, either personally or jure represen latio-nis” — thereby plainly showing, that if he comes in by right of representation, ihe law views him as next of kin, no matter how many there may be nearer than him, in fact. Again, the same author says, (page 225,)the issue or descendants o'f John Sides’ brother, are, all of ibero, in the first degree of kindred, with respect to inheritances; those of his uncle, in the second; and those of his great-uncle, in the third, as their respective ancestors, if living, would have been; and are severally called to the succession, in right of such their representative prox-imity.”
In Cooper's Justinian, (page 400, it is said, '“we ,have so far allowed the right- of representation to brothers and sisters’ children, that being, only in the third degree,'they are called to inherit with those
The argument that it is by positive provision of the civil law that brother’s and sister’s children are preferred to uncles and aunts, and'that this excludes the idea of their coming in by the right of representation, has no weight in it, because the object is, not to show that the descendants of a brother, &c , are entitled by implication,* but that when the express provision declares they shall take, they take as their ancestor would have done. Our statute directly recognizes,the right of the descendants of brothers and sisters, to inherit in preference to those of kin, more remote than brothers and sisters, but nearer than those descendants.
It appears then, that by our law, the descendants of brothers and sisters, as to all other kindred,’ occupy precisely the situation which their parents did; and, of course, in this case, the children of the deceased brother of the whole blood, are preferred to the brothers and sisters of the half blood.
The authorities cited by 1 be counsel for the defendant in error, n is believed, do not, conflict, with this opinion. Those were cases in which the courts were determining what, portions the descendants of the same ancestor, in different degrees, were entitled to; for instance, whelher, if ihere were no brother living, the descendants of ihe deceased, brothers took jper capita or per stirpes, or if the iuheri-
The judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded, that, the county court may proceed to order the distribution in accordance with this opinion.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.