Munn v. Lewis
Munn v. Lewis
Opinion of the Court
This is an action of trespass, to try titles; brought by John H. Lewis against Mathias Munn and John Griffin, in the Circuit Court of Madison county, to recover possession of a lot of ground in the town of Huntsville, hi said county. ■
The suit was tried at the October term, 1832, of said Court, and a verdict was had for the plaintiff, for the lot in question, and for one hundred and seventy eight dollars and eighty three cents, for damages; for which a j udgment was rendered, and the case is brought here by writ of error.
At the trial of the cause below, the plaintiff, as part of his chain of title, offered in evidence a deed of trust,
. By various statutes which have been enacted from, time to time, in this state, from 1803 to 1823, Judges of the Circuit Court, Justices of the County Courts, Clerks of the Circuit and County Courts, Notaries Public, and two Justices of the Peace, are respectively authorised to take the acknowledgments of the parties, relinquishments of dower; and proof by subscribing witnesses to deeds and conveyances of lands, tenements and hereditaments, lying within this state; and certificates of acknowledgment or proofs, written upon or under said deeds and conveyances, and signed
By the second section of the act to prevent frauds and fraudulent conveyances,
These are all the statutes we have, relating to the acknowledgment and proof of deeds, in this state. The term good consideration, referred to in the third section of the last recited act, has been uniformly held to be synonimous with the term valuable consideration; and as the provisions of the second section, authorising the acknowledgment of deeds before the County Court, is confined to deeds of goods and •chattels only, and requires them, when they include lands also, though upon consideration not deemed valuable in the law, to be acknowledged or proved, in such manner as conveyances of land are by law directed, it follows, necessarily, that no deed of any kind,
In this case, the acknowledgment was made before the County Court, in open Court, and the entry made on the minutes of the Court, and not on the deed. It does not purport to be the act of the clerk, and the Court as such, could not direct the clerk to make the entry, and the clerk, as such, had no right to transfer the entry to the back of the deed. It cannot, therefore, be regarded as the act of the clerk, for he may not have seen the parties when the acknowledgment was made. It cannot be regarded as the act of the Judge, as he did not sign it, and perhaps does not know that the entry has been transferred to the back of the deed. It is true, that both the Judge and the Clerk are authorised to take the acknowledgment of deeds : but, in the performance of the act, it is done in the exercise of a distinct, independent, and personal authority, upon the individual judgment and responsibility of the person before whom the acknowledgment is made, in which the officer acts ministerially, and not judicially; and when the authority is exercised, and the certificate is made, the authority itself is exhausted, and the act becomes fixed, permanent, and unalterable : it goes with the deed where-ever it goes, and is an indispensable pre-requisite to its being admitted to record. .This is the view taken in a similar case, by the Supreme Court of the United States-Elliott et al. vs. Peirsol et al.
The acts authorising the acknowledgment of deeds, though of great public convenience, are yet in derogation of the common law, taking away the right of a
Whether a certificate, such as this, is made and signed by a person authorised to take the acknowledgment of deeds, would he a sufficient compliance with the statute, in as much as it does not state that the party appeared and acknowledged that he “ signed, sealed, and delivered” the instrument in question, but only, that the deed was produced, and “ being duly acknowledged by the parties thereto,” was, &c. is a question, though suggested in argument, not necessary to the decision of this cause, and therefore, no opinion is expressed.
The recording of the deed, and the certificate of the clerk of such record, on the deed, gives no validity to the act; and it being the opinion of the Court that the acknowledgment is void, it follows that there was error in the .Circuit Court in admitting it as evidence : for which, the judgment must be reversed, and the cause remanded.
Aik. Dig. 88, 8
Aik.Dig.207
1 Peters, 340.
Reference
- Full Case Name
- MUNN AND GRIFFIN versus LEWIS
- Status
- Published