(concurring and dissenting.) I find no support in the record for the conclusion that the complainant is entitled to a decree warding to him *340all of the 40-acre subdivision at one end of which he appears to have made his home for more than the period of limitations. The evidence shows. that his residence was but a short distance across the line from his own land, and that his actual occupation of the 40 did not exceed an area of 5 or 6 acres at most. Conceding, as it seems to be the case, that complainant had by a possessio pedis acquired title to this much of the 40, there is still not a particle of evidence by which the small area in actual occupation can be defined or determined; and hence the chancellor was unable to ascertain its limits or location, and powerless to decree any relief with respect thereto. The proper solution of such a case is, in accordance with well-settled principles, not to award to the claimant a tract bounded by the purely imaginary lines of the sectionai subdivision next surrounding the occupied tract, but to deny to him all of it, in the absence of a valid color of title thus extending his possession.

For these reasons, I think the chancellor’s decree should be affirmed in toto.

The bill in this case was filed by the appellant against the appellees, under the statute, to quiet title to certain lands described in the bill. Without regard to whether the deed from Matilda Norwood to John R. Dailey is genuine or not, yet taking into consideration the fact that said Dailey, according to his *339OAvn testimony, purposely kept the deed off the record to prevent notice from reaching the OAvner of the title, and other evidence before the court, Ave hold that as to all of the land involved, except the S. E. 14 of the S. E. 1/4 of section 3, toAvnship 21, range 7 W., the possessory acts Avere furtive, and not such as to establish adverse possession.

As to said S. E. 14 of S. E. 14, we hold that the complainant established adverse possession, without regard to the said deed. The acts of possession, referred to in the conflicting testimony, since the recording of the deed, are not sufficient to establish title in the complainant, as against the legal title shown by the respondents.

The fact that the note of testimony incorrectly states the date of one of the deeds introduced in evidence is not reversible error. The deed introduced corresponds Avith the allegation of the ansAver, and said deed was introduced in evidence without objection. — Odom, Ex’r, v. Moore, 147 Ala. 568, 41 South. 162.

The decree of the court is reversed, and a decree will be here rendered, declaring that the respondents have no title to the S. E. y^ of the S. E. 14 of section 3, township 21, range 7 W., in Tuscaloosa county, but that they have title to the remainder of said land. The appellant will pay one-half of the costs of the case, and the appellees will pay one-half of- the same.

Reversed and rendered.