Greil Bros. v. Mabson
Cases that cite this one
25 later published cases cite this decision.
- Mayo v. Andress (Ala. 1979)
- Kahn v. Wilhelm (Ark. 1915)
- Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co. v. Seattle Brewing & Malting Co. (Wash. 1917)
- Stratford, Inc. v. Seattle Brewing & Malting Co. (Wash. 1916)
- Madison Cnty. v. Evanston Ins. Co. (United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama 2018)
- Peppertree Apts., Ltd. v. Peppertree Apts. (Ala. 1993)
- City of Albertville, Alabama v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company (5th Cir. 1960)
- Tennessee Coal, Iron & Railroad Co. v. Sizemore (Ala. 1952)
- Wood v. Bartolino (N.M. 1944)
- Colonial Operating Corp. v. Hannan Sales & Service, Inc. (City of New York Municipal Court 1942)
- Slaughter v. C. I. T. Corporation (Ala. 1934)
- Slaughter v. C. I. T. Corporation (Ala. Ct. App. 1934)
- Pizitz-Smolian Co-Operative Stores v. Randolph (Ala. 1930)
- Thomas v. Pavletich (N.M. 1925)
- City of Montpelier v. National Surety Co. (Vt. 1923)
- Levy v. Hunt (Ill. App. Ct. 1922)
- Jersey Ice Cream Co. v. Banner Cone Co. (Ala. 1920)
- Christopher v. Charles Blum Co. (Fla. 1919)
- Halloran v. Jacob Schmidt Brewing Co. (Minn. 1917)
- Advertiser Co. v. State ex rel. Attorney General (Ala. 1915)
- In re Bradley (United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama 1915)
- Hoffmann v. City of Syracuse (New York Supreme Court 1956)
- Virginian Export Coal Co. v. Rowland Land Co. (W. Va. 1926)
- Doherty v. Monroe Eckstein Brewing Co. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1921)
- Kaiser v. Zeigler (Appellate Terms of the Supreme Court of New York 1921)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
The lease, as entered into by the parties, says “that the parties of the first part have this day leased to the parties of the second part the following premises in the city of Montgomery, Ala., viz.: The barroom and fixtures known as the Windsor Hotel bar, and located in the Windsor Hotel building on Commerce street, for occupation as a bar, and not otherwise.” It will be noted that the lease includes the barroom and fixtures inseparably, and provides that the room is to be occupied “as a bar, and not otherwise.” Appellee was bound, under this contract, to have permitted the use of the property as a bar, and the appellant was prohibited from using it for any other purpose. — 24 Cyc. 1062-1064, and note 6; Parkman v. Aicardi 34 Ala. 393, 73 Am. Dec. 457; McDaniel v. Calian, 75 Ala. 327.
“Bar” and “barroom” seem to have a more restrictive meaning than “saloon,” and by the great weight of authority mean a place from which intoxicating liquors are to be sold. — Words and Phrases, vol. 1, p. 704; Town of Leesburg v. Putman, 103 Ga. 110, 29 S. E. 602, 68 Am. St. Rep. 80; City of Spokane v. Baughman, 54 Wash. 315, 103 Pac. 14. It is therefore evident that the main, and, indeed, the sole, purpose for which the property was leased was that it should be used as a place for selling intoxicating liquors. Therefore, did the said business become totally prohibited by the subsequently enacted state prohibition law? We think that such was the result, and that the said prohibition law forbade the very business and purpose for which the property was leased. The general rule is that, where the performance of a contract becomes impossible subsequent to the making of same, the promisor is not thereby discharged.-9 Cyc. 627. But this rule has its exceptions, and these exceptions are where the
We therefore hold, that, as the property was leased for the sole purpose of conducting a barroom, or a place for selling intoxicating liquors, the business was destroyed or prohibited by the enactment of the prohibition law, and the defendant was thereby relieved from performance of the contract after the law became effective, and was not liable for rent after January 1, 1909, if it vacated the premises and surrendered the property, as set out in the special pleas.
This holding is different from the result in the O’Byrne Case, supra, as the court there held that the lease was not terminated by the prohibition law, as the business for which the place was rented was not necessarily prevented by said law. There the lease was for
The case of Goodrum Co. v. Potts-Thompson Co., 133 Ga. 776, 66 S. E. 1081, 26 L. R. A. (N. S.) 498, is not only opposed to the present holding, but' is contrary to the overwhelming weight of authority.
The case of Houston Ice Co. v. Keenan, 99 Tex. 79, 88 S. W. 197, is not opposed to the present holding. The court in said case recognized the correct exception to the general rule that performance of a contract Avill not be enforced when made impossible by a change in the law, but held that there Avas no change in the laAV making the performance impossible; that prohibition resulted from a local option election held under a law which Avas in existence Avhen the lease Avas made; and that the lessee should have protected himself by a clause in the lease against a contingency then authorized by law. Here the pleas do not set up prohibition under an election held under a local option law existing Avhen the lease was made, but an act of the Legislature passed after the lease was made.
As this case seems to have been tried upon a misconception of the law, which, if applied upon the next trial as above indicated, should eliminate many of the questions involved in the present appeal, we do not deem it necessary to consider all of the assignments of error. It is sufficient to say that the trial court erred in sustaining the plaintiff’s demurrers to defendant’s special pleas 3, 4, 5, and 6, and the judgment is reversed, and the cause is remanded.
Eeversed and remanded.
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.