Birmingham Ry., Light & Power Co. v. Milbrat
Cases that cite this one
11 later published cases cite this decision.
- Howell v. Howell (Ala. 1923)
- City of Birmingham v. West (Ala. 1938)
- City of Birmingham v. Louisville N. R. Co. (Ala. 1926)
- Jefferson v. Republic Iron & Steel Co. (Ala. 1922)
- Robinson Mining Co. v. Swiney (Ala. 1921)
- Gulf States Steel Co. v. Faires (Ala. 1919)
- Southern Ry. Co. v. Flynt (Ala. 1919)
- Birmingham Ry., Light & Power Co. v. Kyser (Ala. 1919)
- Dowdell v. Beasley (Ala. Ct. App. 1919)
- Pullen v. City of Selma (Ala. Ct. App. 1918)
- Birmingham Ry., Light & Power Co. v. Buff (Ala. 1917)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
“It is no part of the duty of a master to Ms servant, employed in a building properly constructed for ordinary business carried on within it, in the absence of a statute requirement, to provide a means of escape from a fire which is not caused by his negligence.” 26 Cyc. 1114 (B), and cases cited.
Section 7095 of our Code is as follows:
“Any owner, proprietor, or manager of any hotel, office building, school building, store, or manufacturing building, which is more than two stories high, now erected, who shall fail for six months after the adoption of this Code to have securely fixed and conveniently arranged so as to be accessible to persons lodging in, working in, or occupying such building', in case of fire in such building, good and sufficient fire escapes or ladders for each story of said building, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction, shall be fined not less than fifty nor more than five hundred dollars, and may be imprisoned in the county jail, or sentenced to hard labor for the county, for not more than six months, for each day so continued.”
It is insisted for appellant that, being a penal statute, it must be strictly construed, especially with reference to the. classes of persons who are to be subjected to its operation. The argument is that the words “owner, proprietor, or manager,” do not, and under a fair construction cannot, include the mere lessee of a building, and that the statute applies the quoted words to the building only, and not to the business conducted within the building.
Similar statutes are to be found in many of the states, and they have been frequently before the courts for construction Arms v. Ayer, 192 Ill. 601, 61 N. E. 851, 58 L. R. A. 277, 85 Am. St. Rep. 357; Yall v. Suow, 201 Mo. 511, 100 S. W. 1, 10 L. R. A. (N. S.) 177, 119 Am. St. Rep. 781, 9 Ann. Cas. 1161; Johnson v. Snow, 201 Mo. 450, 100 S. W. 5; Schott v. Harvey, 105 Pa. 222, 51 Am. Rep. 201; Lee v. Smith, 42 Ohio St. 458, 51 Am. Rep. 839; Steiert v. Coulter, 54 Ind. App. 653, 102 N. E. 113, 103 N. E. 117; 4 Neg. Comp. Cas. Ann. 561; Landgraf v. Kuh, 188 Ill. 484, 59 N. E. 501. Our statute seems to be materially different from all of the others, especially in its designation of the classes of persons upon whom the duty of provision is visited, and in the classes of buildings included within the provision. While, therefore, some of the reported cases -might be persuasive, none of them supplies an authority directly in point.
So, also, even the word “owner” .is sometimes used in statutes .as including the person in possession and control of the property, though he be not the legal owner. Tompkins v. Augusta, etc., R. Co., 21 S. C. 420, 431; Laflin v. Svoboda, 37 Neb. 368, 55 N. W. 1049, 1050; Hemm v. Williamson, 47 Ohio St. 493, 25 N. E. 1, 2; Shultz v. Griffith, 103 Iowa, 150, 72 N. W. 445, 446, 40 L. R. A. 117; Hartford v. Brady, 114 Mass. 466, 470; 19 Am. Rep. 377; Keith v. McGuire, 170 *372 Mass. 210, 48 N. E. 1090; Hornbein v. Blanchard, 4 Colo. App. 92, 35 Pac. 187, 188; Frazier v. State, 18 Tex. App. 434, 441.
A “manager” is one who directs or controls, and may, of course, include the owner’s managing agent as well as the owner himself.
The foregoing considerations easily lead us to the conclusion, in view of the manifest purpose of the statute quoted, that the Legislature intended to- impose the duty of providing fire escapes for the buildings enumerated, not only upon the general owners of such buildings in the strict legal sense, but also in many cases upon lessees who occupy and control the buildings, and subject them to the uses which bring them within the statutory description and purpose. This accords with the views of Justice Sayre adopted by this court in the case of B. R., L. & P. Co. v. Buff, Adm’r, 77 South. 388, 1 & case growing out of the same fire ' and counting upon substantially the same causes of action.
Counts 2 and 4 are substantially identical with counts 1 and 4 in B. R., L. & P. Co. v. Buff, supra, and, for the reasons there stated, the demurrers to these counts were properly overruled.
Count 5 is identical with count 5 in the Buff Case, as to which we held that the demurrer should have been sustained for that it did not appear either by formal allegation, or by facts alleged, that defendant was the “owner, proprietor, or manager” of the building in the sense intended by the statute. But, in view of the fact that the issues of duty and negligence were the same under counts 1 and 5, and the evidence showing without dispute that defendant was the owner or proprietor of the building in the sense of the statute, the error of overruling the demurrer was without prejudice to defendant.
ANDERSON, C. J., and McCBELLAN, MAYFIELD, SAYRE, and THOMAS, JJ., hold that the refusal to so instruct the jury was error requiring the reversal of the judgment. The writer, with whom GARDNER, J., concurs, is of the opinion that, as the duty in question was nondelegable, and the liability of defendant was exactly the same whether considered directly as in other counts, or through the medium of its superintendent or other servant, and the record clearly shows that defendant was not prejudiced, by the failure of the trial judge to charge out this count as requested, the judgment should not be reversed therefor.
One count of the complaint- — -No. 6 — is framed with reference to a city ordinance of Birmingham, which will be found in the reporter’s statement. This ordinance is attacked as unconstitutional because of its unreasonableness, and as being void on account of alleged inconsistency with the state statutes above referred to.
Under count 2, charging failure to furnish a reasonably safe place to work in, whether with reference to ordinary exits from the fourth floor, or to the statutory provisions for fire escapes, we hold as in the Buff Case, supra, that the issues were properly submitted to the jury.
Charge M was properly refused because the statute and ordinance may apply to tenants as well as owners.
The point is urged by appellant that no proof was made that the ordinance was in force at the time of the fire. Counsel is mistaken in this, as the testimony of the witness Matthews shows.
For the single error noted above the judgment will be reversed and the cause remanded.
Ante, p. 94.
Concurring Opinion
(concurring). My concurrence in the conclusion prevailing on this appeal is explained, and, in a measure, qualified, in the writer’s concurring opinion filed in B. R., L. & P. Co. v. Buff.
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.