Oden-Elliott Lumber Co. v. Louisville & N. R.
Cases that cite this one
2 later published cases cite this decision.
- W. L. Shepherd Lumber Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line R. (Ala. 1927)
- United States v. Bethke (United States District Court for the District of Colorado 1955)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
The Oden-Elliott Lumber Company sued the Louisville
Nashville Railroad Company to recover $168.63, overcharge in freight exacted and collected by the railroad company. The trial court, without jury, rendered judgment for the defendant. On appeal the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment and remanded the cause. Oden-Elliott Lumber Co. v. L. N. R. R. Co.,
The shipments involved originated at Laurel, Miss., and their destination was Highland Park, Ky., on the defendant railway, within the switching limits of Louisville. The plaintiff bought the several cars of lumber from Eastman, Gardner Co. at Laurel, Miss., and directed Eastman, Gardner Co. to ship to Gamble Bros. at Highland Park, Ky.; the plaintiff, the owner of the lumber, having sold it to Gamble Bros., f. o. b. Highland Park, Ky. Gamble Bros. paid the freight charges exacted by the Louisville Nashville Railroad Company for transportation of the lumber from Laurel to Highland Park, and deducted that sum from the amount they were due the plaintiff for the lumber. The bills of lading for this lumber were issued by the receiving carrier, the Gulf Ship Island Railroad Company, to Eastman, Gardner Co., Gamble Bros., consignee, and destination Highland Park, Ky. Each bill specified the rate of 19 cents per hundred. No route, between Laurel and Louisville or Highland Park. was expressly defined in the bills of lading, except this: "L. N. Dely." — a stipulation to be later considered. These shipments were carried by the Gulf Ship Island Railroad Company from Laurel to Jackson, Miss.; were there delivered to the Illinois Central Railroad, which transported them to Milan, Tenn., where (Milan) they were delivered by the Illinois Central Railroad Company to the Louisville Nashville Railroad Company, which carried them to the consignees, on its line, at Highland Park, Ky., and collected freight charges made up of these established (under authority *Page 668 of the Interstate Commerce Commission) rates: 14 cents per hundred from Laurel, Miss., to Milan, Tenn., "by way of the Gulf Ship Island Railroad Company to Jackson [Mississippi] and the Illinois Central Railroad to Milan, Tenn."; and 12 cents per hundred from Milan, Tenn., to Louisville, Ky., by the Louisville Nashville Railroad — aggregating 26 cents per hundred on the lumber, from Laurel, Miss., to Louisville, Ky., L. N. Dely.," as against the through rate specified in the bills of lading. There was an established tariff authorizing the imposition by the Louisville Nashville Railroad Company of a terminal charge at Louisville of $2 for switching each car "from the tracks of the Illinois Central at Fourteenth street and Ormsby avenue, Louisville, to Gamble Bros." The reference in the bills of lading to "L. N. Dely." was to this switching charge at Louisville — within the switching limits of which Highland Park was located. The specification of the 19-cent through rate defined the route over which these shipments have moved from Laurel to Louisville, viz. the lines of the Gulf Ship Island and the Illinois Central to Louisville. According to this record, to that routing only, between those points only, could the through rate have had reference.
It is the carrier's duty to observe the directions of the shipper as to the routing, especially where a greater freight charge than the lawful charge agreed upon will be incurred if a different route is employed, unless intervening circumstances justify the change. 4 Elliott on Railroads (2d Ed.) § 1440; 1 Hutchinson on Carriers, § 615. Even where the carrier has an option to route the shipment, the exercise thereof must be reasonable in view of the circumstances and the interest of the shipper. 2 Hutchinson, § 615; Blitz v. Union Steamboat Co.,
Writ granted. All the Justices concur.
The rehearing is denied. All the Justices concur. *Page 669
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.