Charlton v. Alabama Great Southern R. Co.
Charlton v. Alabama Great Southern R. Co.
Opinion of the Court
“As the Federal Control Act did not impose any liability upon the companies on any cause of action arising out of the operation of their systems of transportation by the government, the provision in Order No. 50 authorizing the substitution of the Director General as defendant in suits then pending within his power, the application of the Missouri Pacific Railroad Company that it be dismissed from this action should have been granted; and the judgment against it should therefore be reversed.”
Our cases of L. & N. R. R. Co. v. Johnson, 204 Ala. 150, 85 South. 372, and Grim v. L. & N. R. R. Co., 89 South. 376, 1 are not in accord with the ruling of the federal Supreme Court, and on the point in question they must be overruled.
The judgment of the circuit court will be affirmed.
Affirmed.
Ante, p. 110.
Concurring Opinion
(concurring.) Whenever the question has been presented, I have maintained that the. sovereign must be sued for tort by consent, and therefore upon its own terms (Moon v. Hines, 205 Ala. 355, 87 South. 603, 13 A. L. R. 1020); that when the United States took over transportation properties of corporations and persons and operated the same there was no divided control; and that under the Federal Control Transportation System Act (and section 10 thereof) and orders of the Directors General of Railroads, no authority for suit for a tort was given against the corporation or owner, the result of the government’s operation of such transportation properties. See my dissenting opinion in Crim v. L. & N. R. R. Co., 89 South. 376, 2 L. & N. R. R. Co. v. Heidtmueller, 89 South. 191, 3 L. & N. R. R. Co. v. Holmes, ante, p. 304, 89 South. 610, and the opinion of this court in Moon v. Hines, supra.
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