Sterling Foster, Jr., sued Mitchell Nissan, Inc., alleging fraudulent suppression, negligent or wanton suppression, reckless misrepresentation, and breach of warranty. Mitchell Nissan moved to compel arbitration of Foster's claims. The trial court denied the motion. Mitchell Nissan appealed the order denying arbitration. We reverse and remand.

"Arbitration Clause: Buyer acknowledges and agrees that the vehicle purchased herein has travelled in interstate commerce. Buyer thus acknowledges that the vehicle and other aspects of the sales transaction are involved in, or have a direct impact upon, interstate commerce.

"Buyer and Dealer agree that all claims, demands, disputes or controversies of every kind or nature that may arise between them concerning any of the negotiations leading to the sale of the vehicle, terms and provisions of the sale, the performance or condition of the vehicle, or any other aspects of the vehicle and its sale shall be settled by binding arbitration conducted pursuant to the provision of 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. and according to the Commercial Rules of the American Arbitration Association. Without limiting the generality of the foregoing, it is the intention of the Buyer and the Dealer to resolve by binding arbitration all disputes between them concerning the vehicle, its sale and its condition, including disputes concerning the terms and conditions of the sale, the condition of the vehicle, any damage to the vehicle, the terms and meaning of any of the documents signed or given in connection with the sale, any representations, promises or omissions made in connection with negotiations for the sale of the vehicle, or any terms, conditions, or representation made in connection with the financing, credit life insurance, disability insurance and vehicle service contract purchased or obtained in connection with the vehicle.

"Either party may demand arbitration by filing with the American Arbitration Association a written demand for arbitration along with a statement of the matter in controversy. A copy of the demand for arbitration shall simultaneously be served upon the other party. The Buyer and the Dealer agree that the arbitration proceeding to resolve all such disputes shall be conducted in the city where the Dealer's facility is located."

In December 1996, Foster's second automobile stopped working. Foster asked Mitchell Nissan to repair the vehicle pursuant to the warranty provision of the contract. Mitchell Nissan told Foster that even with the benefit of the warranty, he would need to pay for one half of the repairs.

In January 1998, Foster sued Mitchell Nissan, alleging fraudulent suppression, negligent or wanton suppression, reckless misrepresentation, and breach of warranty.¹ Mitchell Nissan moved to compel arbitration of Foster's claims. Foster opposed the motion, arguing that he has only a sixth-grade reading level and, therefore, should not be obligated by the arbitration *Page 140 provision. After conducting a hearing on the motion, the trial court denied it, holding that Foster's limited reading ability rendered his assent to the contract (including the arbitration provision) ineffective. Mitchell Nissan filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate the order denying arbitration. The trial court vacated the order. After holding another evidentiary hearing, the court again denied Mitchell Nissan's motion to compel arbitration. Mitchell Nissan appealed from the order denying arbitration.

Foster concedes that he signed the purchase agreement that contains the arbitration provision. Foster does not claim that his purchase of the automobile did not involve interstate commerce. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995) (holding that all arbitration provisions dealing with transactions involving interstate commerce are subject to the FAA). Foster also does not dispute that the arbitration provision is broad enough to cover his claims against Mitchell Nissan. Instead, Foster argues that he should be relieved of this contractual obligation because he has only a sixth-grade reading level. However, this rule has long been established in Alabama:

"[A] person who signs an instrument without reading it, when he can read, can not, in the absence of fraud, deceit or misrepresentation, avoid the effect of his signature, because [he is] not informed of its contents; and the same rule [applies] to one who can not read, if he neglects to have it read, or to enquire as to its contents."

Foster also argues that the arbitration provision in his contract is unconscionable, and, therefore, void. "A court should refuse to enforce an arbitration *Page 141 agreement where the record supports a determination of unconscionability." Ex parte Napier, 723 So.2d 49, 52 (Ala. 1998). The burden of proving unconscionability of an arbitration agreement rests with the party challenging the agreement. See id. Foster asserts, without explanation, that the arbitration provision is unreasonably favorable to Mitchell Nissan, and that his limited reading ability prevented him from having a meaningful choice. However, "agreements to arbitrate are not in themselves unconscionable," Ex parteMcNaughton, 728 So.2d 592, 598 (Ala. 1998), and the fact that a buyer was unaware of an arbitration provision in a contract is not evidence that the buyer could not have obtained the desired product or service, either from this seller or from some other seller, without consenting to the arbitration provision. See Green Tree Fin. Corp. of Alabama v. Vintson,753 So.2d 497, 504 (Ala. 1999). Accordingly, Foster "failed to establish that [he] did not have any meaningful options." Id.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

Hooper, C.J., and Maddox, Houston, Cook, Lyons, and Brown, JJ., concur.

England, J., dissents.

I respectfully dissent. The majority's holding is inconsistent with this Court's decision in Southern Energy Homes,Inc. v. Lee, 732 So.2d 994 (Ala. 1999), which was overruled by this Court in Southern Energy Homes, Inc. v. Ard, 772 So.2d 1131 (Ala. 2000). In Southern Energy Homes, Inc. v. Lee, we held that the Magnuson-Moss Act makes arbitration clauses contained in warranty agreements unenforceable against consumers. Because this case involves a breach-of-warranty claim, inasmuch as Foster claims that Mitchell Nissan failed to make repairs in accordance with the warranty, I would hold that the Magnuson-Moss Act makes the arbitration agreement unenforceable.

My reasons for dissenting are stated in Justice Johnstone's dissent in Southern Energy Homes, Inc. v. Ard, supra, a dissent I joined.