Harbison v. Strickland
Harbison v. Strickland
Opinion
Suzy Strickland Harbison appeals from a summary judgment in favor of the defendant, Bonnie Sue Strickland. We reverse and remand.
In accordance with their estate plan, the Stricklands, on December 24, 2000, transferred 83% of the equity shares of the LLC to their daughter Suzy Strickland Harbison.2 The Stricklands retained a 17% interest in the LLC and acted as comanagers of the LLC for the next two years.
On January 17, 2002, Jake Strickland died. Under the operating agreement for the LLC, Bonnie Sue Strickland became the sole manager of the LLC and retained the 17% equity in the LLC she had held in common with Jake. Harbison retained 83% of the equity shares in the LLC.
On December 24, 2002, Strickland conveyed three parcels of real property belonging to the LLC to her son David Strickland. David is not a member of the LLC. Strickland transferred the parcels of real property for an amount Harbison believes was less than fair market value. Harbison sued Strickland, claiming that Strickland had breached her fiduciary duty to the LLC under the ALLCA and that she had violated the terms of the operating agreement when she failed to make managerial decisions based on the best interests of the LLC and the equity owners.
Strickland moved for a summary judgment. After a hearing, the trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of Strickland, stating in pertinent part:
"This Court must look to the four corners of the governing document in determining whether the defendant breached her fiduciary duty to the LLC in selling LLC property to her son. In the present case the governing document is the operating agreement of the Strickland Family, LLC. In interpreting the LLC operating agreement this Court finds that Defendant did not breach her fiduciary duty to the LLC when Defendant sold LLC property to David. . . .
"In interpreting the intent of the operating agreement through a four corners *Page 388 interpretation, this Court finds that the purpose of the LLC operating agreement was for distribution of the assets of the Defendant and Jake Strickland. This Court takes these purposes into account when in [sic] determining fiduciary duty. The Plaintiff applies a fiduciary standard as would be applicable to a for-profit business. However, the operating agreement clearly states that this LLC is not for profit:
"`The managers do not, in any way guarantee . . . a profit for the Equity Owners from the operations of the Company. Decisions with respect to the conduct, dissolution and winding up of the business of the company shall be made in the sole discretion of the Equity Owners and such other matters as the Managers consider relevant. There shall be no obligation on the part of the Managers to maximize financial gain or to make any or all of the Company Property productive.' Strickland Family LLC Operating Agreement, Article VI, Section 6.4.1"3
The trial court further ruled that because the LLC was ostensibly created for a nonprofit purpose, namely, for the distribution of LLC property to the Stricklands' children, Strickland was free to distribute the real property of the LLC as she saw fit. The trial court stated:
"Plaintiff argues that the property should have been sold at fair market value based on the most recent appraisal. However, in accordance with the operating agreement defendant had authorization to dispose of the property in anyway she saw fit. This included disposing of the property by gift. . . . Whether Defendant sold the LLC assets for $1.00 or $1,000,000, or decided to give the property away, Defendant had authority to do so in her capacity as manager of the LLC."
Harbison argues that the trial court erred in referring only to the four corners of the document in interpreting the operating agreement. Harbison contends that the ALLCA imposes upon members and managers of limited liability companies fiduciary duties that cannot be eliminated by the adoption of an operating agreement. Thus, Harbison argues, by failing to incorporate the fiduciary duties mandated by the ALLCA into the operating agreement, the trial court has committed *Page 389 reversible error. This is an issue of first impression in this State.
It is well-settled in Alabama that a corporation is a "creature of statute." Baldwin County Elec. Membership Corp. v. Lee,
The Legislature has imposed on corporations and partnerships fiduciary duties that cannot be waived.4 In Brooks v.Hill,
Like corporations and limited partnerships, limited liability companies are creatures of statute. §§
In 1997 the Legislature added subsections (e) through (l) to §
Section
"(l)The articles of organization or operating agreement may modify the duties contained in subsections (e) through (k) but may not provide for the following:
"(1) Unreasonably restrict a right to information or access to records under Section
10-12-16 ;"(2) Eliminate the duty of loyalty under subsection (f) or subsection (e) of
10-12-36 . . .;"(3) Unreasonably reduce the duty of care under subsection (g) or subsection (e) of Section
10-12-36 ;"(4) Eliminate the obligation of good faith and fair dealing under subsection (h), but the operating agreement may determine the standards by which the performance of the obligation is to be measured, if the standards are not manifestly unreasonable."
Thus, the plain language of § 10-12-21(l), Ala. Code 1975, does not allow an operating agreement for a limited liability company to unreasonably restrict a member's right to information, to eliminate a manager's duty of loyalty, or to unreasonably reduce the duty of care as defined in §
Operating agreements of limited liability companies serve as contracts that set forth the rights, duties, and relationships of the parties to the agreement. See Love v. Fleetway Air Freight Delivery Serv., L.L.C.,
Article III of the operating agreement clearly states that "[t]he company is organized to make a profit, increase wealth and provide a means for the Equity Owners to become knowledgeable of, manage and preserve the Company Property." This language indicates that the trial court's ruling suggesting that the LLC was meant to serve as a "nonprofit" vehicle and that Strickland could therefore dispose of the property as she wished is not supported by the terms of the operating agreement. Indeed, the very provision that the trial court relies upon to support its ruling — Article VI, Section 6.4.1 — authorizes the manager of the LLC to make business decisions for the LLC, "based on the best interest of the LLC, [and] the best interests of the Equity Owners." Article VI, Section 6.3.3, further provides:
"Notwithstanding any other provisions of this section 6.3 to the contrary, neither the Managers nor any Member or Members shall have the authority to amend this Operating Agreement or take any action that would have a Material Adverse Effect on a similarly situated *Page 392 group of Equity Owners . . . without the consent of Equity Owners. . . ."
The trial court's finding that Strickland could dispose of the property of the LLC as she saw fit is irreconcilable with the language of the operating agreement that requires Strickland to consider the best interests of the LLC and the other equity owner, Harbison, before making any business decisions regarding the LLC. Strickland has not produced evidence indicating that she considered the interests of the LLC before she sold the real property. On remand, the trial court is to determine whether Strickland violated her duties as manager of the LLC, under the plain language of the operating agreement.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
NABERS, C.J., and JOHNSTONE, HARWOOD, and STUART, JJ., concur.
"Decisions with respect to the conduct, dissolution and winding up of the business of the Company shall be made in the sole discretion of the Managers based on the best interest of the Company, the best interests of the Equity Owners, and such other matters as the Managers consider relevant."
(Omitted language emphasized.)
See also §"(A) the amount of a financial benefit received by a director to which he or she is not entitled; (B) an intentional infliction of harm on the corporation or the shareholders; (C) a violation of Section
10-2B-8.33 ; (D) an intentional violation of criminal law; or (E) a breach of the director's duty of loyalty to the corporation or its shareholders."
"(b) The partnership agreement may not:
". . . .
"(3) eliminate the duty of loyalty . . .
". . . .
"(4) unreasonably reduce the duty of care. . . ."
"(f) A member's duty of loyalty to a member-managed limited liability company and its members is limited to each of the following:
"(1) To account to the limited liability company and to hold as trustee for it any property, profit, or benefit derived by the member in the conduct or winding up of the limited liability company's business or derived from a use by the member of the limited liability company's property, including the appropriation of the limited liability company's opportunity.
"(2) To refrain from dealing with the limited liability company in the conduct or winding up of the limited liability company's business as or on behalf of a party having an interest adverse to the limited liability company.
"(3) To refrain from competing with the limited liability company in the conduct of the limited liability company's business before the dissolution of the limited liability company.
"(g) A member's duty of care to a member-managed limited liability company and its other members in the conduct or winding up of the limited liability company's business is limited to refraining from engaging in grossly negligent or reckless conduct, intentional misconduct, or a knowing violation of the law.
"(h) A member shall discharge the duties to a member-managed company and its other members under this chapter or under the operating agreement and exercise any rights consistently with the obligation of good faith and fair dealing.
"(i) A member of a member-managed company does not violate a duty or obligation under this chapter or under the operating agreement merely because the member's conduct furthers the member's own interest."
"(1) The only duty a member who is not also a manager owes to the company or to the other members solely by reason of being a member is to not disclose or otherwise use information described in subsection (b) of Section
10-12-16 , whether or not obtained under the authority of subsection (b) of Section10-12-16 , to the detriment of the company or the other members."(2) A manager is held to the same standards prescribed for members in subsection (f) through (i).
"(3) A member who pursuant to the operating agreement exercises some or all of the rights of a manager in the management and conduct of the company's business is held to the standards of conduct in subsections (f) through (i) to the extent that the member exercises the managerial authority vested in a manager by this chapter.
"(4) A manager is relieved of liability by law for violation of the standards prescribed by subsections (f) through (i) to the extent of the managerial authority delegated by the operating agreement."
"An operating agreement may not waive or eliminate the duties or obligation, but may, if not manifestly unreasonable, identify activities and determine standards for measuring the performance of them."
Reference
- Full Case Name
- Suzy Strickland Harbison v. Bonnie Sue Strickland.
- Cited By
- 19 cases
- Status
- Published