Liberty National Life Insurance Company ("Liberty National") appeals from the denial of its posttrial motions for a judgment as a matter of law and for a new trial in an action brought by Charles Ingram alleging, among other things, fraud and suppression. Liberty National also appeals the trial court's remittitur of the compensatory damages and the punitive damages, arguing that the trial court erred when it failed to remit the jury's $200,000 compensatory-damages award to an amount less than $60,000, and when it failed to reduce the jury's $3,000,000 punitive-damages award to an amount less than $180,000. We hold that Ingram's claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations, and that even if they were not Ingram failed to demonstrate that he reasonably relied on Liberty National's alleged representations to him regarding the insurance policy or that Liberty National suppressed a material fact; therefore, we reverse the trial court's judgment and render a judgment as a matter of law in favor of Liberty National.

The case went to trial on September 9, 2002. Liberty National moved for a judgment as a matter of law both at the close of Ingram's case and at the close of all the evidence. The trial court denied both motions. The jury returned a verdict for Ingram, awarding him $200,000 in compensatory damages and $3,000,000 in punitive damages. Liberty National renewed its motion for a judgment as a matter of law, and alternatively moved for a new trial or for a remittitur. The trial court denied Liberty National's motion for a judgment as a matter of law or a new trial, but remitted the compensatory-damages award to $60,000 and the punitive-damages award to $180,000. Liberty National appeals. Ingram cross-appeals, requesting that this Court reinstate the jury's $3,200,000 verdict.

"`We must decide whether there was substantial evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, to warrant a jury determination. City of Birmingham v. Sutherland, 834 So.2d 755 (Ala. 2002). In Fleetwood Enters., Inc. v. Hutcheson, 791 So.2d 920, 923 (Ala. 2000), this Court stated that "`[s]ubstantial evidence is evidence of such weight and quality that fair-minded persons in the exercise of impartial judgment can reasonably infer the existence of the fact sought to be proved.'" 791 So.2d at 923 (quoting West v. Founders Life Assurance Co. of Florida, 547 So.2d 870, 871 (Ala. 1989)).'"

"Q. Okay. Mr. Cook, when he sold you this Life Plus policy, didn't guarantee you that the 9.75 percent interest would stay at 9.75, did he?

"A. No, sir. He didn't guarantee that it would stay there.

"Q. Right. And, in fact, he told you that the interest rate, that current interest rate could change, didn't he?

"A. I don't — He could have. More, right. You're right. He said 9.75 or more.

"Q. Yes, sir. He also could have told you — Are you denying that he told you that it could also be less that 9.75?

"A. I don't remember him ever saying less.

"Q. But he could have told you less, couldn't he?

"A. Well, he could have. But I said I don't remember him telling me that.

"Q. I understand that. All right, sir. But we know he didn't guarantee it would stay that much?

"A. I didn't say he did."

Ingram also testified that he knew that the illustrations of the value of the policy were dependent upon the 9.75% interest rate.¹ Ingram also admits that he did not read the policy and that he would not have purchased the policy if he had read it. Ingram, since July 1985, has paid, and continues to pay, a monthly premium of $14.55.

Liberty National mailed Ingram yearly reports regarding his policy. The first report indicated that the interest rate had dropped from 9.75% to 7%. The reports Ingram received in 1987, 1988, 1989, and 1990 reflected an interest rate for those years of 8%. Ingram received a report every year thereafter, and the interest rates reflected in those reports varied from 5% to 8%.² In August 1995, Ingram received the yearly report on his policy from Liberty National. Liberty National had changed the form of the report; it now included a statement that the premiums were payable for the life of the policy. After reading this statement, Ingram telephoned Liberty National. In response to Ingram's telephone call, Liberty National sent two agents to Ingram's house to discuss the policy with him. Ingram alleges that the agents represented to him that they would "take care of it" and that Ingram did not have to continue paying premiums on the policy. Ingram did not hear from the Liberty National agents again.

In March 1996, Ingram sued Liberty National. He claims that the situation with the policy has made him nervous and caused him to lose sleep. He has not sought professional help for those problems, although he has taken aspirin to alleviate them.

Ingram has the equivalent of a seventh-grade education. He has worked in a mill for 47 years. When Ingram purchased the policy, he was 52 years old. At the time of trial, Ingram had been a Liberty National policyholder for approximately 37 years; he has owned numerous policies. Although Ingram alleges in his brief to this Court that he is illiterate, he admitted during the course of this litigation that he can read and write.

The life insurance policy at issue is an excess-interest whole-life policy. This policy was not designed to be a vanishing-premium policy; instead, it was designed to provide the same benefits as an ordinary whole-life policy. The policy is interest sensitive; however, it guarantees a rate of at least 4%. It reflected guaranteed and projected cash values. The guaranteed cash value was based on the 4% guaranteed *Page 226 accumulation interest rate; the projected value was based on a 9.75% accumulation interest rate. The insured has the option of purchasing paid-up insurance with the cash value of the policy. If the insured does not choose this option, the policy matures when the insured reaches age 100. The first page of the policy clearly states, in bold capital letters: "READ YOUR POLICYCAREFULLY." The first page also provides that an insured may cancel the policy and receive a full refund of any premiums paid within 10 days of receipt of the policy. Page 3 contains a benefit and premium schedule. The word "life" is written under the "years payable" column. Also, page 3-A contains a table of interest rates, which provides that the guaranteed accumulation interest rate on the LifePlus policy is 4%. The policy also contains a table of guaranteed and projected values. This table indicates that when the insured reaches age 62, the monthly income from the policy based on the 4% guaranteed accumulation interest rate is $19.92, and the projected monthly income from the policy based on the 9.75% accumulation interest rate is $250.69.

This action was filed before this Court decided Foremost; however, Ingram requested that the trial court charge the jury on the reasonable-reliance standard.³ Because Ingram did not object to — indeed, he requested — the reasonable-reliance jury instruction, the reasonable-reliance standard became the law of the case before us. See Rule 51, Ala. R. Civ. P., providing, in pertinent part:

"No party may assign as error the giving or failing to give a written instruction, or the giving of an erroneous, misleading, incomplete, or otherwise improper oral charge unless the party objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating the matter objected to and the grounds of the objection."

"This Court cannot undertake to review the propriety of a trial court's oral charge unless that charge has been timely objected to and the objection has been overruled by the trial court. . . . There is no ruling by the trial court for us to review on the issue of the constitutionality vel non of punitive damages, and the trial court's oral charge became the law of the case."

Therefore, the post-Foremost standard applies. *Page 227

Liberty National also requested and received a jury instruction on the post-Foremost standard for determining when the statute of limitations began to run.⁴ Ingram did not object to this charge. Therefore, the post-Foremost standard for determining when the statute of limitation began to run became the law of the case.

This Court in Foremost stated:

"If we were to apply the objective standard for determining the statute of limitations issue in fraud cases that existed before Hicks [v. Globe Life Accident Insurance Co., 584 So.2d 458 (Ala. 1991),] and that has been readopted today, we would hold that the plaintiffs should have discovered [the sales agent's] misrepresentation concerning the first year's premiums when they signed and received their sales documents. Because they each received their sales documents more than two years before filing this action, their misrepresentation claims would be barred by the two-year statute of limitations."

693 So.2d at 422.

Liberty National argues that Ingram's fraud and suppression claims were barred by the statute of limitations. "Claims of fraudulent misrepresentation and suppression are subject to a two-year statute of limitations." Foremost, 693 So.2d at 417, citing § 6-2-38(l), Ala. Code 1975. Ingram signed the application for the insurance policy on July 10, 1985. The agent delivered the policy on August 1, 1985. Therefore, the statute of limitations began to run, at the latest, on August 1, 1985, when Ingram "received [his] . . . document," Foremost, 693 So.2d at 422; therefore, when Ingram filed the underlying action on March 19, 1996, his claim was more than 10 years old and was barred by the two-year statute of limitations.

Moreover, in order to recover for fraud, Ingram must establish (1) that Liberty National made a false representation, (2) that the misrepresentation involved a material fact, (3) that Ingram relied on the misrepresentation, and (4) that the misrepresentation damaged Ingram. See § 6-5-101, Ala. Code 1975, and Foremost, 693 So.2d at 422.

This Court in Foremost stated:

"[W]e conclude that the `justifiable reliance' standard adopted in Hickox [v. Stover, 551 So.2d 259 (Ala. 1989)], which eliminated the general duty on the part of a person to read the documents received in connection with a particular transaction (consumer or commercial), should be replaced with the `reasonable *Page 228 reliance' standard most closely associated with Torres v. State Farm Fire Casualty Co., 438 So.2d 757 (Ala. 1983). The `reasonable reliance' standard is, in our view, a more practicable standard that will allow the factfinder greater flexibility in determining the issue of reliance based on all of the circumstances surrounding a transaction, including the mental capacity, educational background, relative sophistication, and bargaining power of the parties. In addition, a return to the `reasonable reliance' standard will once again provide a mechanism . . . whereby the trial court can enter a judgment as a matter of law in a fraud case where the undisputed evidence indicates that the party or parties claiming fraud in a particular transaction were fully capable of reading and understanding their documents, but nonetheless made a deliberate decision to ignore written contract terms."

693 So.2d at 421.

In the present case, it appears that Ingram was capable of reading the policy and the yearly reports he received regarding the policy. Ingram alleges in his brief to this Court that he would not have understood the policy if he had read it, and he cites a page of the record as support for that allegation. (Ingram's brief in case no. 1021032, p. 8.) However, the record does not support this allegation. The policy indicates both that premiums were payable for the life of the policy and that the guaranteed accumulation interest rate was 4%, not 9.75%. Ingram also received at least nine yearly reports, each of which indicated that the interest rate used to calculate the value of the policy was below 9.75%.

Both of the plaintiffs in Foremost had the equivalent of a high-school education or better, and both plaintiffs testified that they would have discovered the alleged fraud if they had read their sales documents and insurance policies. This Court stated in that case that "[i]f we were to apply the objective standard for determining the statute of limitations issue in fraud cases . . . that has been adopted today, we would hold that the plaintiffs should have discovered [the agent's] misrepresentation when they signed and received their sales documents." 693 So.2d at 422. Ingram similarly testified that he would not have purchased the policy if he had read it.

In Green, supra, the plaintiffs, Bonnie and Andy Green, had an eleventh-grade education and a high-school education, respectively. Both Greens were 47 years old at the time they purchased the policy. Andy had owned a tire business for 20 years and a hay business for 10 years, and he had employed lawyers and other professionals to assist him with those businesses. Bonnie worked as a bookkeeper. The Greens alleged that the Alfa agent misrepresented or suppressed information regarding an insurance policy the Greens purchased insuring Bonnie's life. Specifically, the Greens alleged that the agent indicated that the Greens would not have to pay premiums "after either the seventh or ninth year, but in no case beyond the ninth year." Green, 881 So.2d at 988-89. At the time the agent allegedly made the misrepresentations, the Greens were shown a document that indicated that "the policy they were presented with was an `Interest Sensitive Plan'; that the column of the policy headed `Guaranteed' showed that the Greens would have to pay $8,115 annual premiums until Ms. Green was 75 years of age or for 28 years; and that the policy would be paid up in nine years only if the interest rates remained at 8.5%, as indicated in the column headed `Projected Vanish — 8.500%.'" 881 So.2d at 992. This Court held "that the Greens have not shown any reasonable reliance by them on *Page 229 anything [the agent] said before the Greens paid the partial premium." 881 So.2d at 992. See also Oakwood Mobile Homes, Inc.v. Barger, 773 So.2d 454 (Ala. 2000).⁵

In the present case, Cook allegedly represented to Ingram that the policy he was purchasing would accumulate value based on a fixed interest rate of 9.75% or more, and that if Ingram paid the premiums for 10 years he would no longer have to pay premiums; however, the policy indicates both that premiums were payable for the life of the policy and that the guaranteed accumulation interest rate was 4%, not 9.75%. Ingram also received nine yearly reports that indicated that the actual interest rate earned during the term of the report was below 9.75%. Ingram was capable of reading the policy and the yearly reports. Ingram did not reasonably rely on Cook's representation.

Liberty National appeals the trial court's denial of its motion for a judgment as a matter of law not only as to Ingram's fraud claim, but also as to Ingram's fraudulent-suppression claim. In order to establish fraudulent suppression, Ingram had to present substantial evidence indicating (1) that Liberty National suppressed a material fact (2) that Liberty National had a duty to disclose (3) because of a confidential relationship between Liberty National and Ingram or because of the circumstances of the case, and (4) that Ingram was damaged as a proximate result of the suppression. § 6-5-102, Ala. Code 1975, and Richardson v.Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 750 So.2d 575, 578 (Ala.Civ.App. 1999). However, in Richardson, the Court of Civil Appeals stated: "If one receives from a defendant documents that put him on notice of the very facts alleged to have been suppressed, then that defendant cannot have suppressed those facts." Id., citingRobinson v. JMIC Life Ins. Co., 697 So.2d 461 (Ala. 1997);Henson v. Celtic Life Ins. Co., 621 So.2d 1268 (Ala. 1993);Hardy v. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 585 So.2d 29 (Ala. 1991); and Tillery v. Security Pac. Fin. Servs., Inc., 703 So.2d 402 (Ala.Civ.App. 1997). Ingram received several documents from Liberty National that contained the allegedly suppressed information. Therefore, we conclude that Ingram has not established that Liberty National suppressed a material fact.

1020911 — REVERSED AND JUDGMENT RENDERED.

1021032 — DISMISSED AS MOOT.

LYONS, BROWN, and STUART, JJ., concur.

HARWOOD, J., concurs in the rationale in part and concurs in the judgment.

I concur fully in that portion of the opinion holding that Charles Ingram's claims alleging fraud by misrepresentation and fraudulent suppression of material fact were time-barred under the applicable statute of limitations. The main opinion notes the contents of the policy delivered to Ingram and the explicit statement of the applicable interest rate in each of the yearly reports for the five years 1986 through 1990, which were all less than the 9.75 percent interest rate Ingram alleges was guaranteed. Therefore, whether the statute of limitations began to run as of the date of the delivery of the policy on August 1, 1985, or at some later point in time when the yearly reports would have clearly demonstrated to Ingram that the interest rate on which cash value accumulated was not 9.75 percent, is not controlling; Ingram had been clearly, and repeatedly, advised of the applicable interest rates much more than two years before he filed his action. Therefore, I agree that the judgment in this case should be reversed and a judgment rendered for Liberty National on that basis, as stated in the concluding paragraph of the opinion. Consequently, I need not reach, or comment upon, the alternative rationale that Ingram did not reasonably rely on the misrepresentation or the suppression of a material fact.