These appeals present some difficult questions of first impression, requiring this Court to reconcile the statutorily recognized general principle of the public's right to know about the affairs of government, §§ 36-12-40, Ala. Code 1975, with a statutorily created exception arguably applicable to records of judicial proceedings. See §§ 41-9-590 et seq., Ala. Code 1975.

After a hearing, the circuit court entered an order holding that the municipal court had no authority to expunge its records and entering a permanent injunction prohibiting the court from doing so in the future. However, the circuit court refused to order the municipal court to grant MPR access to previously expunged files, because MPR had not given a good reason for the circuit court to subject the municipal court to what the circuit court described as an "extremely overbroad and cumbersome" process.

MPR has filed in this Court a motion to dismiss the cross-appeal filed by Lackey and Pederson (case no. 1041371) as untimely filed. MPR argues that the cross-appeal is untimely because, it says, the circuit court's order was interlocutory rather than final. However, because MPR refers to the circuit court's order as final in its brief and because the issues raised in the cross-appeal have been fully briefed, we treat the circuit court's order as final, and we deny MPR's motion to dismiss the cross-appeal.

MPR appealed, arguing that the circuit court's refusal to provide it access to the expunged records was inconsistent with the court's holding that the municipal court had no authority to expunge those records. The municipal court cross-appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred in ruling that it had no authority to expunge its own records.

"[A] permanent injunction is reviewed de novo.

". . . .

"To be entitled to a permanent injunction, a plaintiff must demonstrate success on the merits, a substantial threat of irreparable injury if the injunction is not granted, that the threatened injury to the plaintiff outweighs the harm the injunction may cause the defendant, and that granting the injunction will not disserve the public interest."

"All persons in this state in charge of law enforcement and correction agencies shall obtain or cause to be obtained the fingerprints according to the fingerprint system of identification established by the commission, full face and profile photographs, if photo equipment is available, and other identifying data of each person arrested for an offense of a type designated in Section 41-9-622, [Ala. Code 1975,] of all persons arrested or taken into custody as fugitives from justice and of all unidentified human corpses in their jurisdictions, but photographs need not be taken if it is known that photographs of the type listed taken within the previous year are on file. Fingerprints and other identifying data of persons arrested for offenses other than those designated in this article may be taken at the discretion of the agency concerned.

"If any person arrested or taken into custody is subsequently released without charge or cleared of the offense through criminal justice proceedings, such disposition shall be reported by all state, county and municipal criminal justice agencies to ACJIC within 30 days of such action, and all such information shall be eliminated and removed."

(Emphasis added.)

According to §§ 41-9-590, Ala. Code 1975, "criminal justice agencies" include "public agencies at all levels of government which perform as their principal function activities or planning for such activities relating to the identification, apprehension, prosecution,adjudication or rehabilitation of civil, traffic and criminal offenders." (Emphasis added.)

This Court questions whether the legislature clearly intended the ACJIC Act to regulate how courts manage their own records. For example, §§ 41-9-642, Ala. Code 1975, prohibits disclosure of "criminal histories" to entities that do not have the "need to know" or the "right to know" of those criminal histories. Of course, judicial records have historically been considered public records. See, e.g., Exparte Consolidated Publ'g Co., Inc., 601 So.2d 423, 426 (Ala. 1992) (declining "to provide a detailed historical analysis of the progression of the cases involving the public's and the press's access to criminal proceedings," and instead referring to cases that "illustrate the development of the law in this area"). Therefore, §§ 41-9-642 provides some evidence indicating that the legislature, when it promulgated the ACJIC Act, contemplated that the Act would regulate information that was not at that time considered to be public information, i.e., records other than judicial records.

We also note that 42 U.S.C. §§ 14616, an analogous federal statute, explicitly includes "courts" in its definition of "criminal justice agencies," while the definition of that term in the ACJIC Act does not include courts. Further, §§ 41-9-645, Ala. Code 1975, which gives an individual the right to request that a criminal justice *Page 402 agency "purge, modify or supplement" his or her records, provides for judicial review of the agency's decision on the individual's request in the circuit court. If the definition of criminal justice agencies in §§ 41-9-590(1) includes a circuit court, then §§ 41-9-645 confers upon a petitioner the hollow right to ask the circuit court to review its prior adverse ruling. That the right of appeal under §§41-9-645 is to the circuit court is further evidence that the ACJIC Act was not intended to regulate court records.

Nevertheless, consistent with the municipal court's contention on appeal, one might argue that a municipal court engages in "activities or planning for such activities relating to . . . adjudication." §§ 41-9-590(1). In other words, it is arguable that the reference to agencies that engage in "activities or planning for such activities" includes the courts themselves and not simply those agencies discharging functions ancillary to, but separate from, the courts. However, we do not expressly answer that question here because it is unnecessary to the disposition of this case. This is so because, assuming without deciding that the ACJIC Act applies here, we conclude that it in no event countenances the actions of the municipal court in this proceeding.

Based on the assumption that the ACJIC Act applies, under §§ 41-9-625, "[i]f any person arrested or taken into custody is subsequently released without charge or cleared of the offense through criminal justice proceedings" in a municipal court, that court must report, directly or indirectly, such disposition to the ACJIC. As previously noted, once the information that the person has been released without charge or cleared is reported, the second paragraph of §§ 41-9-625 provides that "all such information shallbe eliminated and removed." (Emphasis added.) We conclude that "such information" refers to "fingerprints," "full face and profile photographs," and "other identifying data," which are all mentioned in the preceding paragraph. See also §§41-9-623, Ala. Code 1975 (requiring "[a]ll criminal justice agencies within the state [to] submit to the ACJIC . . . fingerprints, descriptions, photographs . . . and other identifying data on [individuals arrested for certain crimes]"). While "other identifying data" is not defined, "theejusdem generis principle of statutory construction [aids us in determining] the intent of the legislature. Under that principle, where general words follow specific words in a statute, the general words are construed to embrace only objects similar to those objects enumerated by the specific words." Ex parte Cobb, 703 So.2d 871, 875 (Ala. 1996). Therefore, we conclude that "other identifying data" included within the "such information" required to be "eliminated and removed" by §§ 41-9-625 is information that can be used to track down and identify persons in the manner that photographs and fingerprints are used. Examples include an individual's blood type, height, weight, hair color, eye color, scars, physical deformities, etc.

Section 41-9-625 therefore does not authorize (assuming the ACJIC Act applies) the municipal court to expunge entire files. Here, the existence of, and thus all the information contained in, entire files on criminal defendants have been hidden from the public. Accordingly, §§ 41-9-625 does not support the municipal court's position.

1041260 — REVERSED AND REMANDED.

1041371 — MOTION TO DISMISS DENIED; AFFIRMED.

NABERS, C.J., and SEE, HARWOOD, WOODALL, and PARKER, JJ., concur.

STUART, SMITH, and BOLIN, JJ., concur in the result.

I concur in the result reached in the main opinion. As to Part III.A. of that opinion, I join Justice Bolin's writing. With regard to Part IV of the opinion, I express no opinion because it is dicta. "Article III of the Alabama Constitution of 1901 creates the framework for the division of powers between the State's legislative, executive, and judicial branches. Each branch within our tripartite governmental structure has distinct powers and responsibilities, and our Constitution demands that these powers and responsibilities never be shared." Monroe v. Harco, Inc.,762 So.2d 828, 831 (Ala. 2000). Part IV of the main opinion overlooks the legislature's initial responsibility to weigh any benefit of the expungement of court records against the dangers of the loss of the check and balance on judicial power provided when criminal records are subject to public review and appears to advocate for expungement of court records by providing important considerations for expungement procedures. "Great care must be exercised by the courts not to usurp the functions of other departments of government. §§ 43, Constitution 1901. . . . Accordingly . . . courts cannot and will not interfere with the discretion vested in other units or branches of government." Finch v. State,271 Ala. 499, 503, 124 So.2d 825, 829 (1960). It is not this Court's responsibility to express an opinion on whether such legislation should be drafted.

SMITH and BOLIN, JJ., concur.

I concur fully with the result reached by the main opinion. I write specially, however, to address that portion of Part III.A. of the opinion in which the Court expressly declines to answer the question as to whether the ACJIC Act applies to the expungement of any court records because, it reasons, answering that question is unnecessary to a resolution of this appeal. I would have chosen to address this issue, which was raised, briefed, and orally argued by the parties.

The main opinion is correct that in this proceeding it matters not whether the ACJIC Act is applicable, because, "assuming without deciding that the ACJIC Act applies here, we conclude that it in no event countenances the actions of the municipal court in this proceeding." 938 So.2d at 402. However, the issue whether the actions of the municipal court might have been permissible had it attempted to comply with the ACJIC Act is still a viable one, and the ACJIC Act does not, by its own words, apply to courts and court files.

Although certainly not dispositive, it is noteworthy that the entirety of Chapter 9 of Title 41 of the Code of Alabama, in which the ACJIC Act is found, concerns *Page 405 "Boards and Commissions," not courts. Article 23 of Chapter 9 contains the ACJIC Act, and the creation and functions of the Alabama Criminal Justice Information Center are established in §§ 41-9-591, Ala. Code 1975, which provides:

"There is hereby created and established an Alabama Criminal Justice Information Center Commission, which shall establish, develop and continue to operate a center and system for the interstate and intrastate accumulation, storage, retrieval, analysis and dissemination of vital information relating to certain crimes, criminals and criminal activity to be known as the Alabama Criminal Justice Information Center."

(Emphasis added.) The legislature, in crafting the ACJIC Act, nowhere mentions "courts" or "court records" in this general establishment section, although it would have been easy to do so and would have removed all doubt had the legislature intended to include courts within the ACJIC Act. Rather, the ACJIC Act deals with a "system" for accumulating, storing, retrieving, analyzing, and disseminating "information."

In discussing the definition of criminal justice agencies found in §§ 41-9-590(1), Ala. Code 1975, the main opinion recognizes that arguably the use in that definition of the term "adjudication" might bring courts, including municipal courts, within the purview of the ACJIC Act. The entirety of this definitional section, however, states:

"(1) Criminal Justice Agencies. Such term shall include those public agencies at all levels of government which perform as their principal function activities or planning for such activities relating to the identification, apprehension, prosecution, adjudication or rehabilitation of civil, traffic and criminal offenders."

(Emphasis added.) Black's Law Dictionary defines agency as "3. A governmental body with the authority to implement and administer particular legislation" and defines"state agency" as "an executive or regulatory body of a state." Black's Law Dictionary 67-68 (8th ed. 2004). These definitions fully support the concept of a governmental entity's operating a system pertaining to criminal justice information, or, put another way, performing activities relating to adjudication. It does not, however, encompass a "court," which, rather than dealing with "activities relating to . . . adjudication," concerns itself with dispute resolution — the adjudicatory process itself.

Policy questions relating to the expungement of criminal records are for the legislature. The Alabama Legislature well knows how to draft legislation that effectively shows its intent to provide for the expungement of records and how to make it clear that such legislation applies to a court and not an "agency." The same year the ACJIC Act was passed⁴ the legislature also passed the Juvenile Justice Act.⁵ In §§ 12-15-103 of the Juvenile Justice Act as codified,⁶ the legislature set out the procedure, prerequisites, and effects of both a "sealing order" and a "destruction order" concerning juvenile court files in great detail. §§12-15-103(g). It defies logic to presume *Page 406 that the legislature, in the same general legislativesession, intended to include courts and court files in such an oblique manner in the ACJIC Act as "agencies" whose activities "relate" to "adjudication," when it used such explicit language in the Juvenile Justice Act passed almost simultaneously.

The main opinion does not argue that the ACJIC Act does in fact apply to courts, but only assumes arguendo that if it did, the Mobile Municipal Court has not complied with it. Indeed, the main opinion sets out several reasons that indicate that the ACJIC Act does not apply to courts. Most telling of those reasons is that process embodied in §§41-9-645, which allows an individual to request thatinaccurate or incomplete information be purged, modified,or supplemented by the original agency having custody or control of the "detail records." The ability of an individual to pursue this process of having inaccurate or incomplete information purged, modified, or supplemented cannot reasonably or rationally be compared to a procedure for *Page 407 expunging of a complete court file or court record. The second paragraph of §§ 41-9-645 further states:

"Should the agency decline to so act or should the individual believe the agency's decision to be otherwise unsatisfactory, the individual or his attorney may within 30 days of such decision enter an appeal to the circuit court of the county of his residence or to the circuit court in the county where such agency exists. . . ."

Certainly, the distinction between an agency's denial and an appeal to the circuit court from that denial belies any notion that the latter is included in the former. The main opinion correctly points out that this right of appeal would be a "hollow right," because a circuit court would be reviewing its own, or another circuit court's, decision.

I would go one step further than the main opinion and affirmatively state that the ACJIC Act is not applicable to the expungement of court records.

I also join Justice Stuart's special writing insofar as Part IV is concerned.

STUART and SMITH, JJ., concur.