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Digitally signed by Elizabeth ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS Perry Date: 2022.08.03 14:05:57 DIVISION II -05'00' No. CV-19-466 Adobe Acrobat version: 2022.001.20169 Opinion Delivered: October 16, 2019 JESSICA ATWOOD AND VINCENT PEAL APPELLANTS APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, V. ELEVENTH DIVISION [NO. 60JV-18-8] ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES AND MINOR CHILD HONORABLE PATRICIA JAMES, APPELLEES JUDGE AFFIRMED

RAYMOND R. ABRAMSON, Judge

Jessica Atwood and Vincent Peal appeal the Pulaski County Circuit Court order

terminating their parental rights to their child, S.A. (10/30/17). On appeal, they both argue

that the circuit court erred by finding it was in the best interest of the child to terminate

their parental rights because the Arkansas Department of Human Services (DHS) failed to

provide sufficient evidence of adoptability. Peal additionally argues that the circuit court

erred by terminating his parental rights because DHS did not offer him any meaningful

services. We affirm.

On January 4, 2018, DHS filed a petition for emergency custody and dependency-

neglect of S.A. The petition listed Atwood as the mother and Peal as the putative father,

and it stated that Peal was incarcerated at the Jefferson County Detention Center. In the affidavit attached to the petition, DHS alleged that Atwood had been arrested for first-degree

terroristic threatening and endangering the welfare of a minor. On the same day the petition

was filed, the court entered an ex parte order for emergency custody. On January 10, the

court found probable cause for the emergency custody.

On February 15, the court held an adjudication hearing. Both Atwood and Peal were

present. The court adjudicated S.A. dependent-neglected based on Atwood’s unfitness in

that she was “behaving erratically resulting in her arrest, and subsequently [she] has housing

instability.” The court advised Peal to contact DHS upon his release from jail in order to

obtain a DNA test and establish paternity.

The court held a review hearing on June 20. Atwood and Peal did not appear for

the hearing. The court found that Atwood “has done nothing” and that based on a DNA

test, Peal is the father of the child. The court noted that S.A.’s foster mother testified that

she is bonded to the child and that she is interested in being a permanent placement for her.

On December 12, the court held a permanency-planning hearing. Atwood appeared

at the hearing, but Peal did not. The court noted that Peal had gone to the DHS office in

Jefferson County and had been informed of the date and time of the hearing but that DHS

had no other contact with him. The court noted that Atwood was in jail in Pulaski County.

The court found that both Atwood and Peal “have done nothing” and that no progress had

been made by either parent.

2 On January 28, 2019, DHS filed a petition for termination of Atwood’s and Peal’s

parental rights. DHS alleged the abandonment, 1 aggravated-circumstances, 2 and subsequent-

factors 3 grounds against both Atwood and Peal. DHS also alleged the failure-to-remedy

ground 4 as it applies to custodial parents against Atwood and the failure-to-remedy ground 5

as it applies to noncustodial parents against Peal.

The case proceeded to a termination hearing on March 6, 2019. Peal did not appear

for the hearing. Angela Brown testified that she is an adoption specialist and that she ran a

data matching list in this case. She stated that there “a possible 428 resources that meet the

characteristics of the minor child” and that the particular characteristics used in this case

were “race, age, medical, parental condition.”

Atwood testified that she was incarcerated in Pulaski County serving a four-year

sentence for a probation revocation. She stated that she had not completed parenting classes,

a drug-and-alcohol assessment, or a psychological evaluation. She admitted that she had

tested positive for marijuana and cocaine.

Latasha Gause, the family-service-worker supervisor, testified that throughout the

case, DHS had referred Atwood for parenting classes, a drug-and-alcohol assessment, and a

psychological evaluation. As to Peal, she stated that DHS had referred him for only parenting

1

(b)(3)(B)(ix)(a)(5). 2

§ 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(ix)(a)(3)(A). 3 Id. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(vii)(a). 4 Id. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(i)(a). 5 Id. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(i)(b).

3 classes; she did not know whether DHS made referrals for other services. She testified that

Peal informed DHS on June 18, 2018, that he did not want services. She noted, however,

that he submitted a DNA sample on May 11, 2018, and that he completed parenting classes

on January 29, 2019. She stated that he refused drug screenings on June 18 and December

11, 2018. She explained that DHS last had contact with Peal in December 2018 and that he

provided DHS with an address and telephone number. DHS was unable to contact him

using that information.

Thereafter, on March 13, 2019, the circuit court entered an order terminating both

Atwood’s and Peal’s parental rights. The court found that all the grounds pled in the petition

supported termination and that it was in S.A.’s best interest to terminate Atwood’s and Peal’s

parental rights. The court specifically found that S.A. is adoptable. Thereafter, both Atwood

and Peal timely appealed the termination order to this court.

We review termination-of-parental-rights cases de novo but will not reverse the

circuit court’s ruling unless its findings are clearly erroneous. Dade v. Ark. Dep’t of Human

Servs.,

,

. A finding is clearly erroneous when, although

there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with a

definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.

In determining whether a

finding is clearly erroneous, we have noted that in matters involving the welfare of young

children, we will give great weight to the circuit court’s personal observations. Jackson v.

Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs.,

,

.

The termination of parental rights is an extreme remedy and in derogation of the

natural rights of the parents. Fox v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs.,

, 448

. As a result, there is a heavy burden placed on the party seeking to terminate

the relationship.

The termination of parental rights is a two-step process that requires the

circuit court to find that the parent is unfit and that termination is in the best interest of the

child. T.J. v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs.,

,

(1997); Smith v.

Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs.,

,

. The first step requires

proof of one or more of the statutory grounds for termination.

-

341(b)(3)(B). The second step requires consideration of whether the termination of parental

rights is in the child’s best interest.

(b)(3)(A).

On appeal, both Atwood and Peal challenge the circuit court’s best-interest finding

and argue that DHS presented insufficient evidence of adoptability. They acknowledge that

Brown testified that she conducted a data-matching list and that “428 resources” met the

characteristic of the minor child. However, they assert that she did not state that the child

is adoptable. Atwood further points out that Brown did not define “resource” and did not

explain what the results mean.

Adoptability is not an essential element in a termination case; rather, it is merely a

factor that must be considered by the circuit court in determining the best interest of the

child. Tucker v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs.,

,

; see also

(b)(3). There is no requirement that an adoption specialist testify at

the termination hearing or that the process of permanent placement be completed at the

time of the termination hearing. Fortenberry v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs.,

. Additionally, there is no requirement to prove this factor by clear and convincing

5 evidence or to identify an exact family that, upon termination, would be willing to adopt

the child. See Reed v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs.,

,

.

The Juvenile Code does not require “magic words” or a “specific quantum” of

evidence to support a circuit court’s finding regarding adoptability. Sharks v. Ark. Dep’t of

Human Servs.,

,

. It merely requires that if an adoptability

finding is made, then evidence must exist to support it. Haynes v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs.,

. Evidence that adoptive parents have been found is not

required, see McFarland v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs.,

,

(2005), and neither is evidence that proves the child will be adopted. Renfro v. Ark. Dep’t of

Human Servs.,

,

.

In this case, even though Brown did not specifically explain the data analysis, in the

June 20, 2018 review order, which was admitted into evidence at the termination hearing,

the court noted that the child’s foster mother testified that she is bonded to the child and

that she is interested in being a permanent placement for her. Thus, evidence supports the

court’s adoptability finding.

Peal additionally argues that the circuit court erred by finding that a statutory ground

supported termination because DHS did not provide him additional services beyond

parenting classes and a paternity test. He argues that “because the Department failed to offer

other meaningful services, the trial court clearly erred in terminat[ing his] parental rights on

any of the grounds.” However, the circuit court found that the aggravated-circumstances

ground supported termination, and we have held that a finding of aggravated circumstances

does not require DHS to prove meaningful services toward reunification were provided.

6 Willis v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs.,

,

. Because Peal

does not otherwise challenge the evidence supporting the aggravated-circumstances ground,

we hold that he has not established reversible error.

Affirmed.

GLADWIN and WHITEAKER, JJ., agree.

Leah Lanford, Arkansas Public Defender Commission, for appellant Jessica Atwood.

Lightle, Raney, Streit & Streit, LLP, by: Jonathan R. Streit, for appellant Vincent Peal.

Ellen K. Howard, Office of Chief Counsel, for appellee.

Chrestman Group, PLLC, by: Keith L. Chrestman, attorney ad litem for minor child.

7