In re Riff
Opinion of the Court
(after stating the facts as above). As this is a claim against the bankrupt’s estate, it must be one which could be recovered in an action against the father, if bankruptcy had not intervened, and it must uot be fraudulent against his father’s creditors ; the trustee representing the interests of both the bankrupt and the creditors.
The law is well settled that it is the duty of the parents to provide for the maintenance of their children while under age, and, as a reciprocal duty, the services of the child, during his minority, belong
As there is no express emancipation in this case, but only an implied one, the question is whether that is sufficient to justify a recovery when the services were performed for the parent; the minor at the time living with his parents, but paying for his board out of the wages paid him by the parent. The authorities on this question are conflicting, but an examination of the reasoning upon which the conflicting decisions are based will aid in reaching a 'correct conclusion. As there is no question of rights of -third parties, dependent upon the contract of the minor, involved in this case, it is unnecessary to consider the effect of a revocation of an implied emancipation in a case of that nature.
“It appears to me that if a father, without any consideration, or merely in consideration of natural love and affection, emancipates his son in this way, still retaining him in his house as one of his family, the emancipation is a nullity and may be revoked at pleasure. It would be hard upon the father if it were not so, .since he is legally responsible for his support, and morally responsible for the parental control due to. his son. The father’s*409 promise to give the son his time, or his gift to his son of a portion of the time of his minority, is executory in its very nature until tile time lias fully elapsed, and in the meantime the father may revoke it at pleasure; certainly so, if the son remains in the father’s family. * * * As the father may effectually deprive the son of the fruits of his labor, it would seem to follow that he may take them to himself under his general right to his son’s services.”
In Tuite v. Tuite, 72 N. J. Eq. 740, 66 Atl. 1090, the children claimed that they had been promised by their mother a partnership in the business, in consideration-of their services, and it was held by Vice Chancellor Garrison that:
"If they worked for her [the mother] under her direction * * * they but did their duty to her, and there is therefore no possibility of importing any consideration into any such agreement as they allege was made.”
In Dowell v. Applegate, supra (Sawyer, Circuit Judge; Deady, District Judge, concurring), the same question arose; creditors attacking the conveyance made to his children, -who were minors, for services rendered to the parent, upon the ground that such conveyance was voluntary, and therefore void as against creditors. The court said:
"The only consideration was a promise of a father to his several children that if they would remain at home with him, and work on the farm until they should, respectively, become of age, or marry, he would do by them as he had done by the older brothers — convey to them a part of his lands, putting them all upon an equality, wiihout agreeing to convey any specific tract. Their remaining with him was nothing more than they were bound to do under the law. They therefore neither gave nor promised any consideration.”
In the note to that case by Professor Ewell a number of authorities are cited on the proposition that:
"Services rendered by minor children to parents do not constitute a valuable consideration for a conveyance by the parents to the children.” 15 Fed. 427.
The authorities holding that such contracts are valid and enforceable have been carefully examined, and, although some of them are by courts of the highest standing, the grounds upon which they are based do not appeal to the court as sound or convincing.
The order of the referee disallowing the claim is approved.
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.