Goodwin v. NIBCO Inc
Trial Court Opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS NORTHERN DIVISION
TERRY GOODWIN PLAINTIFF v. Case No.: 3:18-cv-00022-LPR NIBCO, INC. DEFENDANT
ORDER Plaintiff Terry Goodwin sued Defendant NIBCO, Inc. for discrimination and retaliation under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. 1 NIBCO has filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. 2 On May 5, 2021, the Court held a hearing on the Motion. For the reasons that follow, the Court now GRANTS the Motion for Summary Judgment. 3
Background 4 NIBCO manufactures valves for “oil production [companies], such as ARAMCO (Saudi Arabia American Oil Company), and commercial water treatment systems . . . .” 5 NIBCO has a facility in Blytheville, Arkansas. 6 Mr. Goodwin worked at that facility from 1976 until his termination in December 2017, forty-one years. 7 In 1998, Mr. Goodwin “was promoted to Quality Assurance Manager,” and in 2000, NIBCO assigned to Mr. Goodwin “additional responsibilities for Safety and Environmental Services.” 8 Mr. Goodwin was also a member of NIBCO’s Senior Leadership Team. 9
A. Mr. Cunningham Promoted to Plant Manager In November 2015, Jeffrey Cunningham became the Plant Manager at NIBCO’s Blytheville facility. 10 Among other things, that made him Mr. Goodwin’s direct supervisor. 11 In a letter written to Mr. Cunningham soon after he became Plant Manager, Mr. Goodwin explained that Rob Brooks was Mr. Goodwin’s “right hand” and that Mr. Brooks should “be prepared if possible as a candidate to step in for me when I retire or something unforeseen occurs . . . .” 12
In February or March 2016, Mr. Cunningham asked Mr. Goodwin about Mr. Goodwin’s retirement plans. 13 Mr. Goodwin said that he intended to work for at least five to seven more years. 14 Mr. Cunningham then said to Mr. Goodwin that Rob Brooks could succeed Mr. Goodwin. 15 In response to this statement, Mr. Goodwin said to Mr. Cunningham, “I guess [Mr.] Brooks could.” 16
Shortly after asking Mr. Goodwin about his retirement plans, Mr. Cunningham “made a Power[P]oint presentation in a meeting with the [Senior Leadership Team] members as well as David Goodling, Senior Vice President of NIBCO[,] in attendance.” 17 David Goodling was Mr. Cunningham’s direct boss. 18 A PowerPoint slide showed an organizational chart that highlighted expected dates of retirement for certain managers. 19 The chart showed that Mr. Goodwin was expected to retire within five years. 20
In May 2016, Mr. Goodling expressed concerns to Mr. Cunningham that Mr. Goodwin was “not taking ownership over” accident investigations. 21 Mr. Cunningham, on behalf of Mr. Goodling, went to Mr. Goodwin’s office and asked Mr. Goodwin if he “was still capable of performing accident investigations now.” 22 Mr. Goodwin responded by asking if the question related to Mr. Goodwin’s age. 23 Mr. Cunningham did not respond. 24 Instead, Mr. Cunningham asked Mr. Goodwin if Mr. Goodwin was getting other people to perform the accident reports for Mr. Goodwin. 25 Mr. Goodwin responded by asking Mr. Cunningham if this question referred to Mr. Goodwin’s age. 26 Mr. Cunningham again did not respond to that question. Mr. Cunningham did tell Mr. Goodwin to email his responses regarding the accident-investigation questions to Mr. Cunningham “so that [Mr. Cunningham] could send [them] on to David Goodling.” 27 That is all the record reveals about this in-person interaction.
The rest of 2016 seems uneventful from the record. Mr. Goodwin’s job title did change from Compliance Manager to Compliance Coordinator in the middle of 2016. 28 But Mr. Goodwin testified that this change in title did not result in any change to his responsibilities, pay, or salary level. 29 In January 2017, Mr. Goodwin became responsible for product certifications. 30 So, at this point, Mr. Goodwin’s responsibilities “included: (a) managing safety, quality, and environmental activities to ensure compliance with state, federal, and plant requirements; (b) ensuring the needs of external and internal customers were met on time and accurately; and (c) generating product certifications for third party customers.” 31
B. Mr. Goodwin Requests a Promotion In April 2017, Mr. Goodwin sought a salary level increase. 32 NIBCO uses a salary schedule, “which is determined by the level [an employee] is assigned.” 33 This “level determines the rate of salary increases, the amount of annual increases, and bonuses received.” 34 On April 20, 2017, Mr. Goodwin “requested an increase from Level 4 to Level 5.” 35 On April 25, 2017, Mr. Cunningham informed Mr. Goodwin that a “bachelor’s degree was required to increase his salary level from Level 4 to Level 5.” 36 Mr. Goodwin does not have a bachelor’s degree. 37 After learning that he was ineligible for a level increase, Mr. Goodwin indicated that he was going to resign. 38 Mr. Goodwin later rescinded his intended resignation. 39
At the time, Mr. Goodwin believed Mr. Cunningham when Mr. Cunningham said that such a degree requirement existed. 40 Now, however, Mr. Goodwin generally denies that a bachelor’s degree is required for such an increase. 41 Mr. Goodwin states that Micha Pankey, John Duclos, Rob Brooks, and Danny Yarborough all received level increases “without having college degrees.” 42 Ms. Pankey indicates that she has a bachelor’s degree. 43 Mr. Duclos, a Level 5, and Mr. Brooks, a Level 4, do not have bachelor’s degrees. 44 According to NIBCO, “a bachelor’s degree is generally required for Level 4 employees and above.” 45 There are some times, however, where a Level 4 (like Mr. Goodwin) “may not require a bachelor’s degree, but it is preferred.” 46 Nevertheless, there are Level 5 employees who do not have a college degree. 47 NIBCO explains that these instances are “rare and unique circumstances.” 48 For instance, one such Level 5 “has unique and specialized knowledge of [NIBCO’s] industry and demonstrates superior performance in the execution of his role.” 49
In the aftermath of not raising Mr. Goodwin to a Level 5, Mr. Cunningham asked Mr. Goodwin what else could be done to keep Mr. Goodwin at NIBCO. 50 Mr. Goodwin asked for a 6% salary increase. 51 Mr. Cunningham “look[ed] into a pay increase for [Mr.] Goodwin and
Cunningham Decl. (Doc. 48-2) at 12 (Mr. Goodwin mentioning the degree requirement). reached out to human resources to see if [Mr.] Goodwin could qualify for the requested raise within the Level 4 range.” 52 NIBCO’s human resources department conducted a market review and concluded that “[Mr.] Goodwin’s salary was well-positioned both internally and externally.” 53 On June 7, 2017, Mr. Cunningham learned that he had the discretion, depending on NIBCO’s needs, to increase Mr. Goodwin’s salary by $2,000 to $3,000. 54
Mr. Cunningham asked Mr. Goodwin to “provide written support for an increase and to identify recent accomplishments.” 55 Specifically, Mr. Cunningham directed Mr. Goodwin to “provide a list of training courses, seminars, or any certificates he had taken or received.” 56 On June 28, 2017, Mr. Goodwin responded by email, chronicling his entire time at NIBCO. 57 Mr. Cunningham then asked Mr. Goodwin to “add information about [his] recent accomplishments, . . . focus[ing] on the last 2 years.” 58 Mr. Goodwin said, “really there are no ‘stand out’ accomplishments, other than my jumping in where needed.” 59 Mr. Goodwin also said that he helped out in other areas of the facility due to a manpower shortage, “which caused [him] to get behind on [his] Safety procedures edits and a lot of [his] other work.” 60 Finally, Mr. Goodwin indicated he had been “playing catch-up” and that “[t]he only new addition to [his] job has been 3rd party inspections and [certifications] for ARAMCO . . . .” 61 Mr. Goodwin did not get the salary increase. 62
C. Run-up to Mr. Goodwin’s Termination In May 2017, Mr. Cunningham and Mr. Goodling conducted a “mid-year review of Mr. Goodwin’s performance.” 63 NIBCO says that the review concerned his progress on eight goals.64 Mr. Goodwin self-reported that he was “on track” for six of the goals and behind on two goals.65 NIBCO claims that Mr. Cunningham later learned that Mr. Goodwin “was not making the progress he professed.” 66
On June 20, 2017, an ARAMCO representative emailed NIBCO employees, including Mr. Goodwin, to ask “Why is Nibco submitting certificates that show manufacturing and test dates in the future?” 67 Mr. Goodwin apologetically responded to this email, saying that “this was my mistake.” 68 Mr. Goodwin explained that he knew why it happened and “fully underst[oo]d” why ARAMCO was so concerned. 69 In response, the ARAMCO representative conceded that mistakes happen and said that Mr. Goodwin was “missing the point.” 70 The representative pointed out that “[t]he issue of Nibco employing disingenuous certification practices has been a chronic problem over the years.” 71
On June 23, 2017, Mr. Cunningham emailed Mr. Goodwin and Derek Oldsen, the Engineering Manager, at 8:15 a.m. to express his concern about the ARAMCO situation and to schedule a meeting for 9:00 a.m. that same day. 72 At 10:13 a.m., Mr. Cunningham emailed Mr. Goodwin to ask Mr. Goodwin where he was. 73 Mr. Goodwin arrived late to the meeting because he was on the plant floor and did not see the 8:15 a.m. email to him. 74
Around July 2017, Mr. “Cunningham asked [Mr.] Goodwin to begin leading monthly team quality and safety meetings.” 75 The first meeting was set for July 5, 2017. 76 Mr. Goodwin “followed [Mr.] Cunningham’s directions and prepared an agenda for the meeting and notified his team member[s] to attend.” 77 Mr. Goodwin was ill when he woke up on July 5, 2017. 78 Mr. Goodwin “attempted to email [Mr.] Cunningham, the H.R. manager, and his assistant, Rob Brooks[,] to let the[m] know that he needed paid time off (PTO).” 79 None of the addressees received the email because Mr. Goodwin sent the email to the wrong email addresses. 80 Mr. Goodwin did not attend the meeting. 81
On July 7, 2017, Mr. Cunningham and Micha Pankey, a HR representative, met with Mr. Goodwin “to discuss concerns about [Mr. Goodwin’s] lack of leadership and unprofessional behavior.” 82 Mr. Cunningham “notified [Mr.] Goodwin that he was expected to (a) plan and conduct the monthly department meetings, (b) provide appropriate notice for paid time off, and (c) discuss concerns directly with [Mr.] Cunningham prior to involving human resources.” 83 Mr. Goodwin refused to sign a counseling document and “again tendered [a] verbal notice of resignation.” 84 On July 14, 2017, Mr. Goodwin informed Ms. Pankey that he had “decided to go ahead and not retire at this time.” 85 (For those keeping score at home, that makes two times in 2017 that Mr. Goodwin said he intended to resign and walked that intention back. 86)
On July 17, 2017, Mr. Cunningham told Mr. Goodwin that Mr. Cunningham was planning on assigning Mr. Goodwin’s office to a member of the purchasing department. 87 Mr. Cunningham directed Mr. Goodwin to pack his office before Mr. Goodwin left on a planned vacation. 88 Mr. Cunningham’s stated purpose for the office reassignment was to keep teams centralized. 89 But Mr. Goodwin contends that Mr. Cunningham’s stated purpose for the office change was not the real purpose. 90
Here are the facts for summary judgment purposes. Mr. Cunningham sent Mr. Goodwin a letter on the morning of July 17, 2017. 91 The letter requested that Mr. Goodwin attend a meeting in the conference room. 92 Only Mr. Goodwin and Mr. Cunningham attended the meeting. 93 Mr. Cunningham was irate because Mr. Goodwin was not retiring. 94 Mr. Cunningham said he did not want to work with Mr. Goodwin and “if [Mr. Goodwin] stayed[,] he would not make it, implying that if [Mr. Goodwin] did not quit or retire, [Mr.] Cunningham would find some pretext to fire him or sabotage his ability to get his work done and that a further disciplinary write up would be forthcoming.” 95 Mr. Goodwin says that “[i]mmediately after the meeting, [Mr.] Cunningham sent [Mr.] Goodwin an e-mail that he was reassigning offices . . . .” 96 notice.” Id.
Between July 17 and July 28, 2017, Mr. Goodwin took paid time off for vacation. 97 During that time, NIBCO says it learned that Mr. Goodwin did not complete certifications for a customer’s order before he left on vacation. 98 NIBCO’s documentary evidence shows an email exchange dated July 18, 2017, indicating that a valve shipment bound for Ecuador had already left the Blytheville plant with generic certifications that did not meet the customer’s requirements. 99 A frustrated Paulo Neto (a NIBCO employee) emailed Derek Oldsen (the NIBCO Engineering Manager) to tell Mr. Oldsen that the order for the valves was placed “almost 2 months ago.”100 Mr. Neto explained that he gave the “OK” to pack the valves only after checking with Mr. Goodwin. 101 Mr. Goodwin denies that he failed to provide the proper certifications before taking leave. 102 His denial is unsupported by any citations to the record. In any event, the record is crystal clear that NIBCO believed Mr. Goodwin failed to prepare the proper certifications before taking vacation. No rational juror could conclude otherwise.
During Mr. Goodwin’s vacation, his office possessions were moved to the Distribution Center, “which was approximately 600 feet from Mr. Goodwin’s previous office . . . .” 103 In a July 21, 2017 email, Mr. Cunningham told Mr. Goodwin to “[f]eel free to choose any office” in the Distribution Center. 104 Quite a difference exists between Mr. Goodwin’s old office and his new office. 105 Mr. Goodwin’s old office was well appointed, having a large L-shaped desk, carpet, extra chairs, and cabinetry for storage. 106 Mr. Goodwin’s new office had a tile floor that had seen better days. 107 His desk barely held computer monitors. 108 The new office was otherwise barren. 109 Mr. Goodwin did receive a larger desk on August 9, 2017, which Mr. Goodwin appreciated. 110
On August 2, 2017, Mr. Cunningham held Mr. Goodwin over after a meeting to ask Mr. Goodwin if he was leaving or staying. 111 After Mr. Goodwin said that he was staying, Mr. Cunningham said “I want you to leave.” 112 Mr. Cunningham told Mr. Goodwin to “get some balls.” 113 Mr. Cunningham then told Mr. Goodwin that if Mr. Goodwin stayed, he would not “make it.” 114
At the one-on-one, Mr. Cunningham also said that he had received two complaints from ARAMCO but refused to tell Mr. Goodwin what the complaints were, stating that Mr. Goodwin knew what the complaints were. 115 A few weeks later, Mr. Goodwin emailed an ARAMCO representative to ask about any complaints ARAMCO had against Mr. Goodwin. 116 The representative said, “you know we have complaints regarding Nibco certifications, but I don’t associate that personally with you.” 117
Also on August 2, 2017 (a Wednesday), Mr. Cunningham told Mr. Goodwin and Chris Burfeind, Mr. Goodwin’s subordinate, “that the three of them would begin conducting daily safety inspections” at the plant. 118 Mr. Cunningham cited a high incident rate of work-place injuries as the impetus for these inspections. 119 Mr. Cunningham requested that the inspections begin immediately and that Messrs. Goodwin and Burfeind create a report regarding their daily inspections. 120 On August 4, 2017 (a Friday), Mr. Cunningham followed up with Mr. Goodwin regarding Mr. Goodwin’s inspections. 121 Mr. Goodwin told Mr. Cunningham that Mr. Goodwin “was planning on starting Monday” because he “had some other work to complete.” 122 Mr. Goodwin acknowledged the “the importance” of the inspections and promised to complete them the following week. 123 Mr. Cunningham responded, “[t]hat is disappointing. I requested that walk thru’s start immediately.” 124
Mr. Goodwin speculates that Mr. Cunningham had a nefarious motive for implementing the daily inspections. 125 Mr. Goodwin says that this additional assignment “was merely a pretext on [Mr. Cunningham’s] part” and was punishment for Mr. Goodwin’s refusal “to retire and to further reduce the available time for him to perform his regular duties.” 126 Nothing in the record supports that speculation. Indeed, in sworn testimony in a different matter, 127 Mr. Goodwin said that these daily inspections revealed issues that he would not have detected absent the inspections. 128
On August 3, 2017, Mr. Cunningham and Ms. Pankey again met with Mr. Goodwin. 129 NIBCO documented this meeting on a disciplinary form. 130 The form indicates that Mr. Goodwin received a “First Written Warning.” 131 Mr. Cunningham wrote that Mr. Goodwin’s conduct at the last counseling session (July 7, 2021) failed to demonstrate Mr. Goodwin’s willingness “to accept responsibility for his unprofessional and poor leadership actions as described in [Mr. Goodwin’s] 7-7-17 documented counseling session report.” 132 Mr. Cunningham wrote that Mr. Goodwin’s conduct raised “concerns about [Mr. Goodwin’s] ability to be an effective leader/manager.”133 These concerns, Mr. Cunningham said, led to Mr. Cunningham’s decision to remove Mr. Goodwin from the Senior Leadership Team. 134 Mr. Cunningham wrote that Mr. Goodwin needed “immediate improvement in his leadership and teamwork skills . . . .” 135 To that end, Mr. Cunningham prescribed additional training and required Mr. Goodwin “to enroll in an approved leadership course in the next 30 days.” 136 Mr. Goodwin refused to sign the warning, contending that “the first half of the write up [was] not accurate.” 137 at 6. This appeal was lodged with an administrative law judge for the Arkansas Appeal Tribunal.
After this meeting, but on the same day (August 3, 2017), Mr. Goodwin sent a formal discrimination complaint to Ms. Pankey. 138 The complaint chronicled nearly all of Mr. Goodwin’s conflicts with Mr. Cunningham:
For approximately one year, [Mr. Cunningham] has been engaged in a series of actions that constitute age discrimination . . . . Specifically, [Mr. Cunningham] has refused to increase my management level, taken responsibilities away from me, made unfounded accusations against me, taken away my office and moved me to a work station that does not accommodate my work needs in order to accommodate a younger employee, routinely pushed me to go ahead and retire, taken away my job duties and assigned them to a younger person, questioned whether I was still capable of doing my job (referencing my age), belittled me, unnecessarily increased my job duties, assigned nefarious motives to an honest mistake (emailing him with the wrong email address), accused me of a bad attitude without providing specific actions to support these claims (even when asked), and today he took the grand master key from me and removed me from the leadership team. 139
Mr. Goodwin also referenced NIBCO’s policy of requiring a college degree for a Level 5 promotion, arguing that such a policy has a disparate impact on older employees such as Mr. Goodwin. 140
Around August 9, 2017, Mr. Cunningham learned that a “high number of associates [were] out of compliance, for an extended period of time, on their respirator fit test.” 141 Mr. Cunningham relayed his concern about this issue to Mr. Goodwin, saying that “[t]his testing must be completed every 12 months.” 142 Mr. Cunningham directed Mr. Goodwin “to develop a plan to have everyone fit tested by the end of next week at the latest” and to explain “how this was allowed to happen.” 143 On August 14, 2017, Mr. Cunningham expressed concern with the fit-test schedule Mr. Goodwin sent to Mr. Cunningham. 144 Mr. Cunningham questioned why, after he had directed Mr. Goodwin to have testing completed by August 18, 2017, Mr. Goodwin’s fit-test schedule included dates at the end of August. 145 Mr. Cunningham reiterated the urgent nature of the testing. 146 Mr. Goodwin said to Mr. Cunningham, “it will be completed as you direct.” 147
Around this same time, Mr. Cunningham raised concerns with Mr. Goodwin related to out- of-date training for numerous NIBCO employees. 148 Mr. Cunningham told Mr. Goodwin to “develop a spreadsheet showing the status of employee compliance with certain safety, health and environmental training requirements and a schedule for getting caught up.” 149 On August 24, 2017, Mr. Cunningham emailed Mr. Goodwin to say that “[o]bviously[,] too much training is out of date.” 150 Mr. Cunningham also said that Mr. Goodwin needed to prioritize the trainings and that the dates on the spreadsheet were too far out. 151 In response, Mr. Goodwin emailed Mr. Burfeind and another NIBCO associate to develop a plan to get training “back on track.” 152 Mr. Goodwin stated that the training “all appears to have been missed in 2016.” 153
At about this same time, Mr. Cunningham asked Mr. Goodwin to attend twice monthly Safety Committee meetings. 154 On August 14, 2017, Mr. Cunningham told Mr. Goodwin that “it is good practice for you to be a part of this meeting. It will help you to understand firsthand how Chris [Burfeind] and the Safety [C]ommittee are working through safety concerns.” 155 Mr. Goodwin did not attend these meetings, believing that his presence “would stifle the free exchange of ideas among the members.” 156 Mr. Goodwin also says that Mr. Cunningham only recommended that Mr. Goodwin attend the meetings. 157
Another certification issue arose near the end of August 2017. NIBCO says that Derek Oldsen informed Mr. Cunningham that Mr. Goodwin “had not provided certifications for certain valves to an inspector in a timely manner . . . .” 158 Mr. Goodwin denies that he was supposed to issue the certifications NIBCO references on the date requested. 159 Documentary evidence suggests that an inspector claims to have not received certifications “as promised.” 160 It is not clear whether Mr. Goodwin or NIBCO is correct as to whether Mr. Goodwin did anything wrong here. What is clear, however, is that NIBCO got a complaint about Mr. Goodwin and believed Mr. Goodwin was at fault. asserts that Mr. Goodwin “failed to ensure that his subordinate, Mr. Brooks, had the proper environmental health and safety training for more than one year after the environmental coordinator responsibilities were assigned to him . . . .” Cunningham Decl. (Doc. 48-1) ¶ 29. NIBCO says that Mr. Goodwin failed to “control and store the Spill Prevention Control and Countermeasure (SPCC) manual.” Id. NIBCO also presents evidence that “Mr. Goodwin allowed annual air monitoring to lapse for an extended period of time . . . .” Id.
On September 13, 2017, Mr. Cunningham emailed Mr. Goodwin to explain the remedial leadership training flowing from Mr. Goodwin’s First Written Warning. 161 Mr. Cunningham assigned two books for Mr. Goodwin to read: (1) The 21 Irrefutable Laws of Leadership, and (2) The 21 Indispensable Qualities of a Leader. 162 Mr. Cunningham directed Mr. Goodwin to read the first book and complete all chapter assignments during the next six weeks, with all assignments due on October 30, 2017. 163 Mr. Goodwin was directed to submit completed assignments weekly. 164 Mr. Cunningham tasked Mr. Goodwin with reading the second book over the following six weeks. 165 For this book, Mr. Goodwin was supposed to turn in a one page summary of each chapter on a weekly basis. 166 The deadline for this assignment was November 15, 2017. 167
Mr. Goodwin’s first assignment was “expected” on September 22, 2017, but was not received until October 3, 2017. 168 In the instant litigation, Mr. Goodwin denies that he was late, relying on the September 11, 2017 email to say that the only deadlines he had were the completion dates for the assignments for each book. 169 But in sworn testimony in another matter, Mr. Goodwin admitted that he was two weeks late in starting his assignments. 170 Mr. Goodwin also failed to complete all assignments before the November 15, 2017 deadline. 171
Mr. Goodwin handwrote his responses to the chapter assignments. 172 Many of Mr. Goodwin’s responses said that his answers were personal between himself and the author. 173 Mr. Cunningham says that Mr. Goodwin’s responses were vague, “lacked professionalism (handwritten on notebook paper)[,] and showed little effort.” 174 Mr. Goodwin denies that his responses were vague. 175 Mr. Goodwin also asserts that Mr. Cunningham testified in another matter that Mr. Cunningham did not review any “submission[s] until [Mr.] Goodwin had completed all the assignment[s] and [Mr. Cunningham] had determined to terminate [Mr. Goodwin].” 176 The record supports Mr. Goodwin’s proposition that Mr. Cunningham did not review the assignments until they were all completed. 177
On September 18, 2017 (a Monday), Mr. Cunningham asked Mr. Goodwin “to complete or provide a status on five specific tasks, most of which related to safety and compliance, by September 22, 2017.” 178 On September 22, 2017 (a Friday), Mr. Goodwin emailed Mr. Cunningham to say that Mr. Goodwin and his team were still gathering information for Mr. Cunningham’s September 18 request but that the information would not be available by Monday. 179 On the same day, Mr. Cunningham told Mr. Goodwin, “I want an individual status of each item on the list today.” 180 Mr. Cunningham also “identified specific deadlines for each item.” 181 Mr. Goodwin did not provide any of the requested information on September 22, 2017. 182
Also on September 18, 2017, Mr. Goodwin fell while attempting to cross a drainage ditch. 183 Mr. Goodwin suffered an injury to his knee. 184 Mr. Goodwin immediately sought medical treatment. 185 Mr. Goodwin sprained his right knee, and a doctor prescribed a knee brace for Mr. Goodwin. 186 Mr. Goodwin was also given “restrictions of limited standing and walking until complete healing had taken place.” 187
In response to this accident, Mr. Cunningham asked, “[w]hy did [Mr. Goodwin] step over the ditch instead of going around the ditch?” 188 Mr. Cunningham also said that some of Mr. Goodwin’s suggested corrective actions were “unreasonable” and that being “more aware of where you are stepping while walking thru this area is probably more appropriate.” 189 Mr. Cunningham, Mr. Goodwin, and other NIBCO employees visited the site of the accident on September 25, 2017. 190 At this visit, the decision was made to place a sign saying “danger do not cross ditch.”191 Mr. Cunningham asked Mr. Goodwin “if you walked up here could you read the sign and know not to cross the ditch?” 192 Mr. Goodwin said he could. 193
On October 9, 2017, Mr. Cunningham asked Mr. Goodwin to coordinate with Mr. Goodwin’s team and Engineering to provide information to a NIBCO product manager regarding valves for a NIBCO customer, Valero. 194 Mr. Goodwin did not consult with Engineering and instead provided the information directly to the product manager. 195 Mr. Goodwin acknowledged that he should not have sent the information to the product manager without first consulting Engineering. 196
On October 16, 2017, Mr. Cunningham told Mr. Goodwin that there were concerns with the information Mr. Goodwin sent to the product manager. 197 Mr. Cunningham directed Mr. Goodwin to consult with Engineering and to let Mr. Cunningham know when the issue was resolved. 198 Over two months later, Mr. Cunningham emailed Mr. Goodwin and said that Mr. Goodwin never indicated that the issue was resolved and that Mr. Goodwin never contacted Engineering. 199 The record suggests that Mr. Goodwin did contact Engineering on October 17, 2017, and that Engineering sent Mr. Goodwin and Mr. Cunningham an edited version of the requested information on October 20, 2015. 200 Nevertheless, Mr. Goodwin admitted that he did not follow up with the product manager or with Mr. Cunningham to let Mr. Cunningham “know the concerns were ‘cleared up.’” 201
On October 13, 2017, Mr. Cunningham asked Mr. Goodwin for information about the “certification process to help identify ways to make the process more efficient.” 202 On November 14, 2017 (a Tuesday), Mr. Cunningham requested a status update on this request. 203 Mr. Cunningham specifically requested information pertinent to ARAMCO “by the end of the week.” 204 Mr. Goodwin agreed to provide the requested information. 205 Mr. Goodwin did not do so. 206 The following Monday, Mr. Goodwin sent Mr. Cunningham a flow chart illustrating the ARAMCO certification process. 207 Mr. Goodwin titled the chart, “How to Tie Shoes.” 208 Mr. Cunningham thought the title showed a lack of attention to detail, which was evidence of Mr. Goodwin’s “lack of commitment to improving.” 209 Mr. Goodwin says that “it was understood that [the flow chart] was a draft and he was seeking [Mr. Cunningham’s] approval of the format and would revise once approved.” 210 Mr. Goodwin presents no evidence of this supposed understanding, and the Court has found none in the record. product manager).
On November 6, 2017, Mr. Goodwin filed a formal discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). 211 Mr. Goodwin listed August 1, 2017 through September 5, 2017 as the dates of discrimination. 212 In the formal charge, Mr. Goodwin alleged that, “[i]n early August 2017, I was subjected to disparaging comments because of my age (60).”213 Mr. Goodwin said he filed an internal discrimination complaint on August 3, 2017 and received a written warning on the same day. 214 Mr. Goodwin “believe[d] [he] was disciplined because of [his] age (60) and in retaliation for filing an internal age discrimination complaint . . . .” 215 Mr. Goodwin also said that he believed “that employees in [his] protected category experience disparate impact due to promotion requirements that require a college degree.” 216 On the intake questionnaire, Mr. Goodwin alleged that he was a “victim of a policy that has a disparate impact.” 217
On November 16, 2017, Mr. Cunningham learned that Mr. Goodwin failed to provide a third-party inspector, Truesdail Laboratories, Inc., with information that was requested on October 25, 2017. 218 Truesdail asked Mr. Goodwin for the information “as soon as possible.” 219 Mr. Goodwin initially responded on October 27, 2017, and indicated that he had forwarded the request to Engineering. 220 Derek Oldsen, the Engineering Manager, told Mr. Cunningham that Mr. Oldsen received no such request on or prior to October 27, 2017. 221 Mr. Goodwin asserts, without evidence, that he took a copy of the request to Mr. Oldsen. 222 Documentary evidence first shows Mr. Goodwin asking Mr. Oldsen for guidance on November 16, 2017, over two weeks after the initial request from Truesdail. 223
On December 29, 2017, Mr. Cunningham hand delivered a termination letter to Mr. Goodwin. 224 Mr. Cunningham signed the letter. 225 The letter stated:
On September 5, 2017, you received correspondence from NIBCO’s WHQ HR outlining a series of your performance deficiencies going back to April 20, 2017. This letter concluded with a requirement to complete leadership and performance improvement. I have included a copy of that letter for your reference. To support your leadership development, you were provided with two books to read and discuss. The first was “21 Irrefutable Laws of Leadership” and the second was “21 Indispensable Qualities of a [L]eader.” Your leadership development assignment was to answer the questions and complete the assignments in each book or write a summary of the chapters describing what you had learned and how it could benefit you. Your first two assignments were turned in late. The rest of the assignments showed little effort on your part with vague responses and a weak attempt to describe any benefit from the lessons of the books. My overall impression is that this improvement activity failed due to your own lack of interest or effort.
In addition, your job performance has shown no significant improvement. Your time management skills have no noticeable improvement and your ability to accurately and timely complete the materials and testing certifications for our customers is well below expectations.
As a result, it is the company’s decision to terminate your employment with NIBCO effective December 29, 2017. 226 D. After the Termination NIBCO eliminated Mr. Goodwin’s position (Compliance Coordinator), and Mr. Goodwin’s responsibilities were absorbed by current NIBCO employees. 227 Specifically, Derek Oldsen (about 36 years old at the time) took over the compliance responsibilities, Mr. Brooks (about 48 years old at the time) “began reporting directly to [Mr.] Cunningham regarding environmental responsibilities,” and Mr. Cunningham (about 52 years old at the time) “took over the safety and management responsibilities.” 228
On June 26, 2018, Mr. Goodwin filed a second formal charge with the EEOC. 229 In this charge, Mr. Goodwin alleged that he experienced age discrimination and was terminated in retaliation for his discrimination complaints and for filing the first EEOC charge. 230 Mr. Goodwin also alleged that Mr. Cunningham’s actions constituted “ongoing harassment to force me to retire or set me up for termination.” 231
Discussion A court shall grant summary judgment when there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 232 The moving party has the burden to show that (1) there is an absence of a genuine dispute of material fact on at least one essential element of the nonmoving party’s case and (2) the absence means that a rational juror could not possibly find for the nonmoving party on that essential element of the nonmoving party’s case. 233 Conversely, if the nonmoving party can present specific facts by “affidavit, deposition, or otherwise, showing the existence of a genuine issue for trial,” then summary judgment is not appropriate. 234
Importantly, “[t]he mere existence of a factual dispute is insufficient alone to bar summary judgment . . . .” 235 The dispute of fact must be both genuine and material to prevent summary judgment. 236 A genuine dispute of fact exists where a rational juror could decide the particular question of fact for the nonmoving party. 237 A material dispute of fact exists where the juror’s decision on the particular question of fact determines the outcome of a potentially dispositive issue under the substantive law. 238
A. Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies Mr. Goodwin alleges that NIBCO’s failure to promote him to a Level 5 constituted age discrimination. 239 NIBCO argues that Mr. Goodwin’s failure-to-promote claim fails because he did not administratively exhaust his remedies. 240 NIBCO is right.
The Eighth Circuit says that “[t]he proper exhaustion of administrative remedies gives the plaintiff a green light to bring his or her employment-discrimination claim, along with other allegations that are ‘like or reasonably related’ to that claim, to federal court.” 241 To properly exhaust administrative remedies, the ADEA requires an individual to file an administrative charge of discrimination with the EEOC “within 180 days after the alleged unlawful practice occurred . . . .” 242 The Eighth Circuit directs the Court to “liberally construe an administrative charge for exhaustion of remedies purposes . . . .”243 But “there is a difference between liberally reading a claim which lacks specificity, and inventing, ex nihilo, a claim which simply was not made.” 244 “Accordingly, the sweep of any subsequent judicial complaint may be as broad as the scope of the EEOC ‘investigation which could reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge of discrimination.’” 245
Mr. Goodwin’s November 6, 2017 EEOC complaint does not reasonably relate to NIBCO’s decision to deny Mr. Goodwin a promotion from Level 4 to Level 5. Mr. Goodwin’s EEOC complaint identifies the “dates discrimination took place” as between August 1, 2017 and September 5, 2017. 246 Recall that Mr. Goodwin was denied the promotion from Level 4 to Level 5 in April of 2017. The promotion denial date falls well outside the dates of discrimination listed in the EEOC complaint. Because failure to promote constitutes a discrete adverse employment action, the EEOC complaint does not encompass it.
The August 1, 2017 through September 5, 2017 timeframe matches up incredibly well to the obvious focus of the EEOC complaint. That complaint reads as follows:
I was hired in 1976; my current position is Compliance Manager. In early August 2017, I was subjected to disparaging comments because of my age (60). On August 3, 2017, I filed an internal complaint alleging age discrimination by my immediate supervisor. On the same day, I received a written warning and was placed on a performance improvement plan.
I believe that I was disciplined because of my age (60) and in retaliation for filing an internal age discrimination complaint, in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 as amended. I also believe that employees in my protected category [] experience disparate impact due to promotion requirements that require a college degree. 247
It is clear from the timeframe and foregoing text that Mr. Goodwin was complaining to the EEOC about alleged age-related disparaging comments, alleged inappropriate discipline because of his age, and alleged retaliation for internally reporting age discrimination.
It is true that, in the last line of the EEOC complaint, Mr. Goodwin also said that he believed “that employees in my protected category [] experience disparate impact due to promotion requirements that require a college degree.” 248 But this sentence does not identify a discrete adverse employment action for the EEOC to investigate. 249
B. Age Discrimination Mr. Goodwin alleges that he was demoted and ultimately terminated because of his age. “The ADEA prohibits discrimination against employees, over the age of 40, because of their age.” 250 At a trial, Mr. Goodwin would bear the burden of proving “by a preponderance of the evidence that age was the but-for cause of the challenged employer decision.” 251 On summary judgment, the Court asks whether, on the record before it, a rational juror could conclude that Mr. Goodwin met his burden. A plaintiff can rely on direct evidence of age discrimination or the familiar McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.
“Direct evidence is evidence showing a specific link between the alleged discriminatory animus and the challenged decision, sufficient to support a finding by a reasonable fact finder that an illegitimate criterion actually motivated the adverse employment action.” 252 The closest Mr. Goodwin can come to saying he has direct evidence would be: (1) the conversation between Mr. Cunningham and Mr. Goodwin respecting Mr. Goodwin’s ability to perform accident investigations; (2) Mr. Cunningham’s questioning of Mr. Goodwin about when Mr. Goodwin was planning on retiring; and (3) Mr. Cunningham’s Powerpoint presentation to the Senior Leadership Team showing that Mr. Goodwin was expected to retire in five years. No rational juror could conclude that evidence of these events is evidence “showing a specific link between the alleged discriminatory animus and the challenged decision . . . .” 253 Here’s why.
First, the events described took place back toward the beginning of 2016. There is a long distance temporally between the 2016 events and the alleged August–December 2017 discrimination. 254 There are no allegations of age-related discrimination in the intervening time period. Second, the earliest mention of succession planning in the record is Mr. Goodwin’s voluntary mention to Mr. Cunningham (around the time Mr. Cunningham became Plant Manager) that Rob Brooks would be a good successor to Mr. Goodwin when Mr. Goodwin retired. Given that this succession issue was first raised by Mr. Goodwin, Mr. Cunningham’s later return to that question is not direct evidence of age discrimination. Third, Mr. Cunningham’s candid succession planning was not limited to Mr. Goodwin. Mr. Cunningham asked other leaders about their retirement plans. 255 Engaging in succession planning (including asking when leaders might retire) is not in and of itself evidence of age discrimination. 256 Indeed, the fact that Mr. Cunningham suggested on the 2016 Powerpoint slide that Mr. Goodwin was going to retire in five years is actually evidence that there was no intention to force Mr. Goodwin out earlier due to age. Fourth and finally, Mr. Cunningham’s brief interrogation of Mr. Goodwin about whether Mr. Goodwin could properly perform accident investigations is not direct evidence of age discrimination––even Mr. Goodwin acknowledges that Mr. Cunningham never said the questions had anything to do with age.
So Mr. Goodwin is left with McDonnell Douglas. 257 Under McDonnell Douglas, at trial, “the plaintiff must satisfy a four-part prima facie case of age discrimination: (1) the plaintiff ‘is over 40 years old’; (2) the plaintiff ‘met the applicable job qualifications’; (3) the plaintiff ‘suffered an adverse employment action’; and (4) ‘there is some additional evidence that age was a factor in the employer’s termination decision.’” 258 The Eighth Circuit has noted that the last prong can be “established by demonstrating the plaintiff was replaced by a substantially younger individual.”259 If a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden of production “shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the termination.” 260 If that happens, the onus
Canning, 995 F.3d at 611 (quoting Tramp, 768 F.3d at 800). If I am reading the cases correctly, there appears to be some conflict in the Eighth Circuit precedent with respect to the proper characterization of the prima facie test. Consider two 2021 decisions. In Canning, quoted above, the Eighth Circuit said: the plaintiff must satisfy a four-part prima facie case of age discrimination: (1) the plaintiff “is over 40 years old”; (2) the plaintiff “met the applicable job qualifications”; (3) the plaintiff “suffered an adverse employment action”; and (4) “there is some additional evidence that age was a factor in the employer's termination decision.”
Id. (quoting Tramp, 768 F.3d at 800). In Starkey v. Amber Enterprises, Inc., the Eighth Circuit said:
To establish a prima facie case, a plaintiff must show she “(1) was at least forty years old, (2) suffered an adverse employment action, (3) was meeting [her] employer's legitimate expectations at the time of the adverse employment action, and (4) was replaced by someone substantially younger.”
987 F.3d 758, 763–64 (8th Cir. 2021) (quoting Gibson v. Am. Greetings Corp., 670 F.3d 844, 856 (8th Cir. 2012)). The Eighth Circuit has not expressly explained whether these differing standards apply in different contexts. It may be worth resolving this tension or providing guidance as to what circumstances dictate using one standard over the other. That being said, it appears as though the standard set out in Starkey is the appropriate standard in termination cases. In Halsell v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., the Eighth Circuit cited a First Circuit case where that court modified the failure-to-hire-prima-facie standard to fit a termination claim. 683 F.2d 285, 290 (8th Cir. 1982) (citing Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1013–14 (1st Cir. 1979)). The First Circuit said that a plaintiff must “show that he was ‘qualified’ in the sense that he was doing his job well enough to rule out the possibility that he was fired for inadequate job performance, absolute or relative.” Loeb, 600 F.2d at 1013. The Eighth Circuit seemingly adopted this modification, stating that a plaintiff must show “that he was qualified for the job in the sense that his performance met [the employer’s] legitimate expectations.” Halsell, 683 F.3d at 290. The Eighth Circuit has since applied the “legitimate expectations” test and specifically analyzed a plaintiff’s prima facie showing in light of the plaintiff’s job performance. Calder v. TCI Cablevision of Mo., Inc., 298 F.3d 723, 729 (8th Cir. 2002).
The Canning standard is more plaintiff friendly. So the Court will use it out of an abundance of caution. If the Court applied the Starkey standard, Mr. Goodwin presents no evidence upon which a rational juror could conclude that Mr. Goodwin has met his a prima facie case on the fourth element with respect to his demotion or termination. No one (substantially younger or otherwise) replaced Mr. Goodwin in the role of Compliance Manager when his title changed and no one assumed his role of Compliance Coordinator when he was fired. See Holmes v. Trinity Health, 729 F.3d 817, 822 (8th Cir. 2013) (holding that a plaintiff failed to meet her prima facie case because she presented insufficient evidence that she was replaced by “someone substantially younger”). No rational juror could find for Mr. Goodwin on the “legitimate expectations” prong of the Starkey test given the multiple safety lapses, certification issues, and Mr. Cunningham’s overall belief that Mr. Goodwin was not displaying the leadership qualities Mr. Cunningham expected. In any event, because a rational juror could not conclude that NIBCO’s proffered reasons for terminating Mr. Goodwin were pretext for age discrimination, which prima-facie standard the Court uses does not change the outcome of this case.
Anderson v. Durham D & M, LLC, 606 F.3d 513, 523 (8th Cir. 2010).
Canning, 995 F.3d at 611. returns to the plaintiff “to show that the employer’s reason was pretext for discrimination.” 261
With respect to his alleged demotion (the change in title from Compliance Manager to Compliance Coordinator), no rational juror could find that Mr. Goodwin makes out a prima facie case. Mr. Goodwin meets the first two elements: he was over 40 and he met the job qualifications. But Mr. Goodwin completely fails to provide any evidence that he suffered an adverse employment action. Mr. Goodwin testified that his responsibilities, pay, and benefits did not change with his title. 262 In the Eighth Circuit, “[b]ecause there was no reduction in pay, benefits, or status, [Mr. Goodwin’s] change in title fails to give rise to an adverse employment action.” 263 The Court grants summary judgment in favor of NIBCO on Mr. Goodwin’s demotion claim.
NIBCO argues that Mr. Goodwin cannot meet his summary judgment prima facie burden for the termination claim because the record conclusively shows that Mr. Goodwin was not meeting NIBCO’s “legitimate expectations.” 264 The Court disagrees. Mr. Goodwin worked for NIBCO for over forty years at the time of his termination. He occupied the role of Compliance Coordinator (or Manager) for nearly seventeen of those years. True, 2017 witnessed quite a few hiccups in Mr. Goodwin’s performance, but a rational juror could conclude that Mr. Goodwin “‘met the applicable job qualifications.’” 265 NIBCO does not argue that Mr. Goodwin cannot meet the three other prima-facie prongs. As such, for purposes of summary judgment, the Court assumes that a rational juror could conclude that Mr. Goodwin has carried his initial burden. NIBCO is up next.
Id. Goodwin Depo. (Doc. 48-5) at 73:5–13.
Box v. Principi, 442 F.3d 692, 696 (8th Cir. 2006); see also Curby v. Solutia, Inc., 351 F.3d 868, 873–74 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding that the plaintiff's change in position did not constitute an adverse employment action because there was no reduction in pay or benefits).
Br. in Supp. of Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. (Doc. 49) at 19.
Canning, 995 F.3d at 611.
NIBCO has presented “legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason[s]” for Mr. Goodwin’s termination. 266 Specifically, NIBCO states that Mr. Cunningham lost confidence in Mr. Goodwin’s ability to lead. 267 This loss, NIBCO argues, was brought about by Mr. Goodwin’s poor leadership, poor time-management skills, inability to follow directives, inability to complete certifications, lack of effort on the leadership assignments, and Mr. Goodwin’s failure to improve. 268 These deficiencies were highlighted in Mr. Goodwin’s termination letter. 269
Plenty of undisputed facts support NIBCO’s asserted reasons. It is undisputed that Mr. Goodwin let respirator-fit tests lapse for multiple employees. It is undisputed that Mr. Goodwin allowed other safety trainings to lapse. It is undisputed that Mr. Cunningham highlighted the emergent nature of these lapses and that Mr. Goodwin’s scheduled fixes did not embrace the time- sensitive nature of these failings. It is undisputed that Mr. Goodwin did not begin safety inspections as directed by Mr. Cunningham. It is undisputed that Mr. Goodwin was expected to conduct a safety meeting that he did not himself attend and that he failed to properly alert his superiors that he could not attend. It is undisputed that Mr. Goodwin did not attend Safety Committee meetings after Mr. Cunningham (Mr. Goodwin’s boss) indicated that he thought Mr. Goodwin’s attendance would be helpful.
There’s more. It is undisputed that Mr. Goodwin submitted an incorrect certification to ARAMCO. It is undisputed that Mr. Goodwin played a role in submitting inadequate certifications for a valve shipment bound for Ecuador. It is undisputed that Mr. Goodwin told Truesdail Labs that he would provide them with information as soon as possible and then waited two weeks before
Starkey, 987 F.3d at 764.
Br. in Supp. of Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. (Doc. 49) at 21–22.
Id. at 22.
Ex. 27 to Pl.’s Decl. of Authenticity (Doc. 63-2) at 26. involving Engineering. It is undisputed that Mr. Goodwin did not timely submit his leadership assignments. It is true that a rational juror could conclude that Mr. Goodwin was not responsible for all of the certification issues NIBCO lays at his feet, but that doesn’t negate the mistakes Mr. Goodwin made. In short, NIBCO has satisfied its burden of production by articulating “legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason[s] for [Mr. Goodwin’s] termination.” 270 It’s Mr. Goodwin’s turn again.
“The burden now shifts back to [Mr. Goodwin] to show these reasons offered by [NIBCO] are, in fact, pretext for age discrimination.” 271 The Eighth Circuit requires Mr. Goodwin to “present evidence, that considered in its entirety (1) creates a fact issue as to whether [NIBCO’s] proffered reasons are pretextual and (2) creates a reasonable inference that age was a determinative factor in the adverse employment decision.” 272 Because the ADEA requires but-for causation, “proof that the [reasons are] false is necessary, but not sufficient, to show a pretext for discrimination under the ADEA.” 273 Stated differently, Mr. Goodwin must provide evidence upon which a rational juror could conclude “that [NIBCO’s] stated reason was false and that age discrimination was the real reason.” 274
Mr. Goodwin has not done so at all. At the motion hearing, Mr. Goodwin argued that Mr. Cunningham’s inconsistent discipline-related and discrimination-related statements could evidence pretext. 275 Specifically, Mr. Goodwin points to Mr. Cunningham’s comment regarding complaints from ARAMCO and Mr. Cunningham’s misrepresentation of the email from
Canning, 995 F.3d at 611.
Aulick, 860 F.3d at 621.
Tusing v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 639 F.3d 507, 516 (8th Cir. 2011). Id. Id. May 5, 2021 Hr’g Tr. at 78–81.
ARAMCO where ARAMCO complained of disingenuous certification practices. 276 A rational juror could conclude that Mr. Cunningham’s assertion that Mr. Goodwin received two complaints from ARAMCO is not accurate and that ARAMCO’s “disingenuous” statement referred to NIBCO’s certification process (not Mr. Goodwin). 277 But Mr. Goodwin provides no evidence upon which a rational juror could conclude that “age discrimination was the real reason” for his termination. 278 Perhaps Mr. Cunningham did not like Mr. Goodwin for personal reasons unrelated to his age. Perhaps Mr. Cunningham did not like that Mr. Goodwin kept oscillating between resignation threats and raise requests. The point is that Mr. Goodwin has not presented any evidence of pretext for age discrimination. 279
Let me be clear. This record leaves the impression that Mr. Cunningham was not a particularly good manager or nice colleague, at least with respect to Mr. Goodwin. But the Eighth Circuit has repeatedly stated that “[f]ederal courts do not sit as ‘super personnel departments reviewing the wisdom or fairness of the business judgments made by employers, except to the extent that those judgments involve intentional discrimination.’” 280 And “hostile treatment by a manager based on employee conduct and not motivated by any protected characteristic or conduct,
Id. at 79–80.
See supra note 71 (discussing the “disingenuous” issue).
Tusing, 639 F.3d at 516.
Mr. Goodwin’s best argument here is that Mr. Cunningham’s retirement comments and Mr. Cunningham’s questions regarding Mr. Goodwin’s ability to perform his job (see supra pages 30–31) are enough to allow a rational juror to conclude NIBCO’s proffered legitimate reasons were pretext for age discrimination. Just as no rational juror could conclude that those actions constitute direct evidence of age discrimination, no rational juror could conclude that those actions are any evidence at all of pretext for age discrimination. There is nothing in the record to allow a rational juror to make the causal link between these actions and the discipline and termination in 2017. Id. Edmund v. MidAmerican Energy Co., 299 F.3d 679, 686 (8th Cir. 2002) (Cronquist v. City of Minneapolis, 237 F.3d 920, 928 (8th Cir. 2001)); see also Canning, 995 F.3d at 612 (quoting Elam v. Regions Fin. Corp., 601 F.3d 873, 880–81 (8th Cir. 2010) (“Federal Courts do not sit as a super-personnel department that reexamines an entity’s business decisions.”). even if unreasonable, does not amount to a legally actionable type of discrimination.” 281 The Court grants summary judgment to NIBCO on Mr. Goodwin’s age-discrimination claim as it relates to his termination.
C. Retaliation Mr. Goodwin alleges that NIBCO retaliated against him because of the internal age discrimination complaint he lodged against Mr. Cunningham on August 3, 2017. 282 Specifically, Mr. Goodwin alleges that NIBCO retaliated against him by: (1) requiring him to conduct daily safety inspections of the entire plant; (2) excluding him from the Senior Leadership Team meetings; (3) requiring him to prepare presentations to be delivered by younger staff members; (4) refusing to give him a key to his own office; and (5) terminating him. 283
“The ADEA prohibits an employer from discriminating against an employee because the employee opposed a practice made unlawful by the ADEA.” 284 As with his age-discrimination claim, Mr. Goodwin can rely on direct evidence or the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis to establish retaliatory motive.
As mentioned, “[d]irect evidence is evidence showing a specific link between the alleged discriminatory animus and the challenged decision, sufficient to support a finding by a reasonable fact finder that an illegitimate criterion actually motivated the adverse employment action.” 285 The record is devoid of such evidence. There is not even a whiff of evidence upon which a rational juror could find a specific link between Mr. Goodwin’s internal complaint and any of the alleged
Heisler, 931 F.3d at 796.
Pl.’s Am. Compl. (Doc. 7) ¶¶ 40–46; see also Ex. P (Formal Complaint) to Pankey Decl. (Doc. 48-3) at 99. Pl.’s Am. Compl. (Doc. 7) ¶ 42–43, 46–47.
Kneibert v. Thomson Newspapers, Mich. Inc., 129 F.3d 444, 454 (8th Cir. 1997). Aulick, 860 F.3d at 620. adverse employment actions. 286 Again, Mr. Goodwin must be relying on the McDonnell Douglas framework.
“Under this framework, [at trial] the initial burden is on [Mr. Goodwin] to establish a prima facie case, consisting of evidence: ‘(1) that he . . . engaged in statutorily protected activity; (2) an adverse employment action was taken against him . . .; and (3) a causal connection exists between the two events.’” 287 If Mr. Goodwin does that, then NIBCO must “show a ‘non retaliatory reason for the adverse employment action.’” 288 If NIBCO does so, “the burden returns to [Mr. Goodwin] who is then obliged to present evidence that (1) creates a question of fact as to whether [NIBCO’s] reason was pretextual and (2) creates a reasonable inference that [NIBCO] acted in retaliation.”289 NIBCO argues that Mr. Goodwin cannot show any evidence that would allow a rational juror to find “but-for” causation under McDonnell Douglas. 290
Timing alone clears some of the underbrush on this claim. Mr. Goodwin submitted his complaint to NIBCO after his meeting with Ms. Pankey and Mr. Cunningham on August 3, 2017. 291 That complaint constitutes protected activity. But even if the additional safety inspections, NIBCO’s refusal to give Mr. Goodwin a key to his office, Mr. Goodwin’s removal from the Senior Leadership Team, and Mr. Goodwin’s preparation of presentations for younger
NIBCO’s response to Mr. Goodwin’s internal discrimination complaint references disciplinary actions against Mr. Goodwin (remedial leadership training and putting Mr. Goodwin on a performance improvement plan). Ex. F to DeVous Decl. (Doc. 48-4) at 28–29. However, these actions were taken before Mr. Goodwin made the internal complaint. See id. (stating that these remedial actions were discussed in Mr. Goodwin’s August 3, 2017 counseling session). Recall that Mr. Goodwin made the internal complaint after his August 3, 2017 counseling meeting. See supra note 138.
Stewart v. Independent Sch. Dist. No. 196, 481 F.3d 1034, 1043 (8th Cir. 2007) (quoting Green v. Franklin Nat'l Bank of Minneapolis, 459 F.3d 903, 914 (8th Cir. 2006)).
Id. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
Br. in Supp. of Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. (Doc. 49) at 29–31.
See supra note 138. employees constituted adverse employment actions, Mr. Goodwin is still out of luck because each of these actions predated the protected activity. 292 The Eighth Circuit makes clear that “alleged retaliation which precedes protected conduct cannot logically be used to show causation because a prior event cannot be caused by a later event.” 293 In other words, a rational juror could not find a causal link between Mr. Goodwin’s complaint and these actions.
With respect to Mr. Goodwin’s termination-as-retaliation claim, a rational juror could conclude that he engaged in protected activity (filing the complaint) before suffering an adverse employment action (his termination). Mr. Goodwin therefore meets (for summary judgment purposes) the first two prongs of his prima facie case. NIBCO argues that Mr. Goodwin’s “poor behavior” coupled with the nearly five-month span between Mr. Goodwin filing the internal complaint and his termination prevent a rational juror from finding causation (the third prong). 294
The Eighth Circuit makes clear that “a gap in time between the protected activity and the adverse employment action weakens an inference of retaliatory motive, and that, given a delay of sufficient length, the causal nexus tends to evaporate.” 295 The record does not reveal that NIBCO treated Mr. Goodwin any differently after he filed his internal complaint. Indeed, some of the conduct that Mr. Goodwin says was discriminatory occurred before he made the internal complaint. 296 This lack of changed behavior means that temporal proximity of the internal
See supra note 118 (showing that Mr. Cunningham assigned the safety inspections on August 2, 2017); Ex. P (Formal Complaint) to Pankey Decl. (Doc. 48-3) at 99 (mentioning Mr. Goodwin’s removal from the Senior Leadership Team); supra note 103 (showing that Mr. Goodwin moved into his office before the complaint was filed); Pl.’s Answer to Interrogatories (Doc. 48-6) at 20 (stating that, “[a]s of 8/3/2017,” another NIBCO employee will be presenting the safety portion of a presentation). It is undisputed that all of these actions predated Mr. Goodwin’s internal complaint and his November 6, 2017 EEOC charge.
293 Stewart, 481
Br. in Supp. of Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. (Doc. 49) at 30.
295 Stewart, 481
Additionally, Mr. Goodwin’s conduct after he filed the complaint further removes any indicia of retaliatory motive. Recall that Mr. Goodwin failed to conduct the safety inspections as directed, failed to consult with Engineering respecting the Valero information, allowed significant lapses in safety training and safety compliance, and failed to timely submit his leadership assignments. Mr. Goodwin’s “intervening unprotected conduct eroded any causal connection that was suggested by the temporal proximity of his protected conduct and his termination.” 300 Any causal link has thus evaporated. 301 No rational juror could conclude otherwise.
Even assuming Mr. Goodwin could establish his prima facie case, the result would be the same. NIBCO has offered legitimate, nonretaliatory reasons for Mr. Goodwin’s termination. No rational juror could conclude that those reasons were pretext for retaliation. Again, apart from his termination, Mr. Goodwin’s complained-of actions predate his protected conduct. With respect to
Sisk v. Picture People, Inc., 669 F.3d 896, 900 (8th Cir. 2012) (quoting Hite v. Vermeer Mfg. Co., 446 F.3d 858, 866 (8th Cir. 2006)). Smith v. Allen Health Sys., Inc., 302 F.3d 827, 833 (8th Cir. 2002).
Smith v. Fairview Ridges Hosp., 625 F.3d 1076, 1088 (8th Cir. 2010).
Kiel v. Select Artificials, Inc., 169 F.3d 1131, 1136 (8th Cir. 1999) (analyzing a retaliation claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act).
While it would be a closer call, the same would be true if a rational juror analyzed the facts in light of Mr. Goodwin’s November 6, 2017 EEOC charge. A month and a half passed between that charge and the termination. Without more, as stated above, a month and a half is too long to meet the third prong of Mr. Goodwin’s prima facie case.
Mr. Goodwin’s termination, the Court’s analysis of the discrimination claim applies equally here. Even if one thought there was some evidence of the proffered legitimate reasons being pretext, there is no evidence that they were pretext for retaliation. 302 The Court grants summary judgment to NIBCO on Mr. Goodwin’s retaliation claims.
D. Hostile Work Environment The Court also grants summary judgment to NIBCO on Mr. Goodwin’s hostile-work- environment claim. Mr. Goodwin alleges that Mr. Cunningham engaged in a pattern of harassment designed to force Mr. Goodwin to quit or retire. 303 To survive summary judgment, Mr. Goodwin must present evidence that would allow a rational juror to conclude that: (1) he is over 40, (2) he was subjected to unwelcome harassment, (3) “the harassment resulted from his membership in the protected class, and [(4)] that the harassment was severe enough to affect the terms, conditions, or privileges of his employment.” 304 To meet the fourth element, the harassment must be “‘severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or abusive work environment’ and the victim must subjectively believe [his] working conditions have been altered.” 305 The Supreme Court says that “[t]hese standards for judging hostility are sufficiently demanding to ensure that [the ADEA] does not become a ‘general civility code.’” 306
Mr. Goodwin alleges that Mr. Cunningham added unnecessary responsibilities to his workload, demoted him, isolated him, removed him from the Senior Leadership Team, made false accusations against him, and questioned him about his retirement plans and his ability to do his
See supra pages 35–36.
Pl.’s Am. Compl. (Doc. 7) ¶ 31.
Moses v. Dassault Falcon Jet-Wilmington Corp., 894 F.3d 911, 922 (8th Cir. 2018) (cleaned up). Id. (quoting Sandoval v. Am. Bldg. Maint. Indus., Inc., 578 F.3d 787, 801 (8th Cir. 2009)). Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998) (discussing hostile environment under Title VII). job. 307 The record supports some of these allegations. For instance, Mr. Cunningham did reassign Mr. Goodwin to a markedly inferior office and did not give Mr. Goodwin a key. A rational juror could conclude that Mr. Cunningham fabricated or misinterpreted ARAMCO’s certification complaints. Mr. Cunningham directed Mr. Goodwin to conduct safety inspections. Mr. Cunningham told Mr. Goodwin that he would not make it at NIBCO if he stayed. Mr. Cunningham expressed displeasure with Mr. Goodwin’s decision to rescind his resignation. And Mr. Cunningham inquired into Mr. Goodwin’s capabilities and retirement plans.
Mr. Goodwin was over forty and a rational juror could find that Mr. Cunningham’s conduct could be considered harassment (though that is doubtful). No rational juror could find for Mr. Goodwin on the remaining elements. First, Mr. Goodwin has not presented any evidence upon which a rational juror could “link[] any of these allegedly harassing actions to his age . . . .” 308 He speculates that such is the case, but speculation exits stage left on summary judgment. Second, Mr. Goodwin has presented no evidence upon which a rational juror could conclude that the complained-of conduct rises to the level of objectively hostile.
The Court sympathizes with Mr. Goodwin’s sincere belief that he was put out on an island and not treated with the courtesy one would expect to receive from a reasonable supervisor. The Court also questions whether Mr. Cunningham intentionally increased Mr. Goodwin’s workload in hopes that Mr. Goodwin would submit a third and lasting resignation. But no rational juror could use this record to find any links between Mr. Cunningham’s treatment of Mr. Goodwin and Mr. Goodwin’s age. And the Eighth Circuit sets a “stringent hostile work environment standard[,] designed to ‘filter out complaints attacking the ordinary tribulations of the workplace . . . .’”309
Pl.’s Am. Compl. (Doc. 7) ¶ 31–47; Pl.’s. Answer to Interrogatories (Doc. 48-6) at 15–24. Moses, 894 F.3d at 923.
With that standard in mind, no rational juror could conclude that Mr. Goodwin’s experiences went beyond ordinary workplace tribulations. In sum, no rational juror could conclude Mr. Cunningham created a hostile work environment.
Conclusion
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED in its entirety.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 29th day of September 2021.
________________________________ LEE P. RUDOFSKY UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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