IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS HOT SPRINGS DIVISION

JOSHUA ELLIS RUCKER PLAINTIFF

vs. Civil No. 6:24-cv-06004

MICHELLE KING, DEFENDANT Acting Commissioner, Social Security Administration

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Joshua Ellis Rucker (“Plaintiff”) brings this action pursuant to § 205(g) of Title II of the Social Security Act (“The Act”),

(g) (2010), seeking judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) denying his application for Child’s Insurance Benefits based on disability and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) under Title XVI of the Act. The Parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge to conduct any and all proceedings in this case, including conducting the trial, ordering the entry of a final judgment, and conducting all post-judgment proceedings. ECF No. 5. Pursuant to this authority, the Court issues this memorandum opinion and orders the entry of a final judgment in this matter. 1. Background: Plaintiff filed his disability applications on June 4, 2021. (Tr. 15).1 In his application, 0F Plaintiff alleges being disabled due to autism, poor vison, and Asperger syndrome. (Tr. 326, 362,

1 The docket numbers for this case are referenced by the designation “ECF No. ___.” The transcript pages for this case are referenced by the designation “Tr.” and refer to the document filed at ECF No. 8. These references are to the page number of the transcript itself not the ECF page number. 366). Plaintiff alleged an onset date of November 5, 2020. (Tr. 15). Plaintiff’s applications were denied initially and again upon reconsideration.

Plaintiff requested an administrative hearing on his denied applications, and this hearing request was granted. (Tr. 198-255). This hearing was held on October 27, 2022, and July 12, 2023. (Tr. 36-78, 79-142). At this hearing, Plaintiff was present, and represented by Shannon Carroll.

Plaintiff, his father Larry Rucker, Dr. Beth Ann Maxwell, and Vocational Expert (“VE”), Beth Clem

testified at the hearing.

Following the administrative hearing, on August 23, 2023, the ALJ entered an unfavorable decision. (Tr. 15-29). In this decision, the ALJ determined Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity (“SGA”) since November 5, 2020. (Tr. 17, Finding 2). The ALJ then determined Plaintiff had severe impairments of visual disturbance; attention deficit hyperactivity disorder; generalized anxiety disorder; autism spectrum disorder; history of oppositional defiant disorder; atypical pervasive developmental disorder; and atypical cognitive disorder. (Tr. 17-18, Finding 3). Despite being severe, the ALJ determined those impairments did not meet or medically equal the requirements of any of the Listings of Impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1

(“Listings”). (Tr. 18, Finding 4). The ALJ considered Plaintiff’s subjective complaints and determined his RFC. (Tr. 20-28). The ALJ evaluated Plaintiff’s subjective complaints and found the claimed limitations were not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record.

The ALJ also determined Plaintiff retained the RFC to perform to perform a full range of work at all exertional levels with the following non-exertional limitations: no tasks requiring close visual inspection or assembly of small parts and components; no dangerous moving machinery or exposure to a dangerous work environment that would require ongoing visual awareness of potential dangers; can understand and remember simple instructions; can sustain attention and concentration to complete simple repetitive tasks within customary workplace breaks; can use judgment to make simple work- related decisions; no work that requires a specific production rate, such as assembly line work or work that requires hourly quotas; can have only occasional interaction with supervisors, coworkers and the general public; and can tolerate occasional changes in a routine work setting.

The ALJ then evaluated Plaintiff’s Past Relevant Work (“PRW”). (Tr. 28, Finding 6). The ALJ determined Plaintiff had no PRW.

However, the ALJ found there were jobs in significant

numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could perform. (Tr. 28, Finding 10). With the help of the VE, the ALJ found Plaintiff could perform the representative occupations of (1) laundry worker with approximately 75,000 jobs in the nation and (2) cleaner with approximately 50,000 jobs in the nation.

Based upon this finding, the ALJ determined Plaintiff had not been disabled under the Act from November 5, 2020. (Tr. 29, Finding 11). On January 11, 2024, Plaintiff filed the present appeal. ECF No. 1. Both Parties have filed appeal briefs. ECF Nos. 16, 20. Plaintiff also filed a reply brief. ECF No. 23. This case is now ready for decision. 2. Applicable Law:

In reviewing this case, the Court is required to determine whether the Commissioner’s findings are supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. See

(g) (2010); Ramirez v. Barnhart,

(8th Cir. 2002). Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance of the evidence, but it is enough that a reasonable mind would find it adequate to support the Commissioner’s decision. See Johnson v. Apfel,

(8th Cir. 2001). As long as there is substantial evidence in the record that supports the Commissioner’s decision, the Court may not reverse it simply because substantial evidence exists in the record that would have supported a contrary outcome or because the Court would have decided the case differently. See Haley v. Massanari,

(8th Cir. 2001). If, after reviewing the record, it is possible to draw two inconsistent positions from the evidence and one of those positions represents the findings of the ALJ, the decision of the ALJ must be affirmed. See Young v. Apfel,

(8th Cir. 2000). It is well-established that a claimant for Social Security disability benefits has the burden of proving his or her disability by establishing a physical or mental disability that lasted at least one year and that prevents him or her from engaging in any substantial gainful activity. See Cox v. Apfel,

(8th Cir. 1998);

(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). The Act defines a “physical or mental impairment” as “an impairment that results from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.”

(d)(3), 1382(3)(c). A plaintiff must show that his or her disability, not simply his or her impairment, has lasted for at least twelve consecutive months. See

(d)(1)(A). To determine whether the adult claimant suffers from a disability, the Commissioner uses the familiar five-step sequential evaluation. He determines: (1) whether the claimant is presently engaged in a “substantial gainful activity”; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment that

significantly limits the claimant’s physical or mental ability to perform basic work activities; (3) whether the claimant has an impairment that meets or equals a presumptively disabling impairment listed in the regulations (if so, the claimant is disabled without regard to age, education, and work experience); (4) whether the claimant has the Residual Functional Capacity (RFC) to perform his or her past relevant work; and (5) if the claimant cannot perform the past work, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to prove that there are other jobs in the national economy that the claimant can perform. See Cox,

;

(a)-(f). The fact finder only considers the plaintiff’s age, education, and work experience in light of his or her RFC if the final stage of this analysis is reached. See

, 416.920 (2003). 3. Discussion: In his appeal brief, Plaintiff claims the ALJ’s disability decision is not supported by substantial evidence in the record. ECF No. 16. In making this claim, Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred (1) in failing to find Plaintiff met a Listing and (2) in failing to properly address Plaintiff’s limited vision.

In response, Defendant argues the ALJ did not err in any of his findings. ECF No. 20. This Court's role is to determine whether the Commissioner's findings are supported by

substantial evidence on the record as a whole. Ramirez v. Barnhart,

(8th Cir. 2002). Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance, but it is enough that a reasonable mind would find it adequate to support the Commissioner's decision. The ALJ's decision must be affirmed if the record contains substantial evidence to support it. Edwards v. Barnhart,

(8th Cir. 2003). As long as there is substantial evidence in the record that supports the Commissioner's decision, the Court may not reverse it simply because substantial evidence exists in the record that would have supported a contrary outcome, or because the Court would have decided the case differently. Haley v. Massanari,

(8th Cir. 2001). In other words, if after reviewing the record it is possible to draw two inconsistent positions from the evidence and one of

those positions represents the findings of the ALJ, the decision of the ALJ must be affirmed. Young v. Apfel,

(8th Cir. 2000). The Court has reviewed the entire transcript and the parties’ briefs. For the reasons stated in the ALJ’s well-reasoned opinion and in the Government’s brief, the Court finds Plaintiff’s arguments on appeal to be without merit and finds the record as a whole reflects substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s decision. Accordingly, the ALJ’s decision is hereby summarily affirmed and Plaintiff’s Complaint is dismissed with prejudice. See Sledge v. Astrue,

(8th Cir. 2010) (district court summarily affirmed the ALJ). 4. Conclusion: Based on the foregoing, the undersigned finds that the decision of the ALJ, denying benefits to Plaintiff, is supported by substantial evidence, and should be affirmed. A judgment incorporating these findings will be entered pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 52 and 58. ENTERED this 23rd day of January 2025.

Barry A. Bryant /s/ HON. BARRY A. BRYANT UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE