(after stating the facts). A specific legacy or devise is a gift by will of a specific article or part of the testator’s estate, which is identified and distinguished from all other parts of the -same kind, and which may be satisfied only by the delivery of the particular thing. 28 R. C. L., pp. 289 and 291; Kenaday v. Sinnott, 179 U. S. 606; case note to 11 L. R. A. ( N. S.) p. 55; and case note to 10 Ann. Cas. p. 490. Tested by the definition just stated, the legacy to Joe Mullin was a specific legacy, and the various devises in the will were specific devises.

This brings us to a consideration of which is entitled to preference over the other, if any, in the payment of the debts of the decedent. Prof. Pomeroy says that whenever it becomes necessary to resort to th© class composed of the specific legacies and devises, all the legacies and devises in that class will abate pro rata. That specific legacies and devises stand upon the same footing, are subject to the same liability, are abated together under the same circumstances, and contribute ratably for the payment of debts and charges. Pomeroy’s Eq. Jur., 3d. ed., vol. 3, § 1137.

In the case of Brant v. Brant, 40 Mo. 266, the testator, by his will, directed his executors to pay off and discharge all of his debts out of his estate as soon as it could conveniently be done after his decease. He then bequeathed and devised his estate by specific leg-aeies and devises to his wife and his children in nearly equal parts. Plis executors paid off the debts from the rents of the real estate. Upon a bill to marshal assets, the court held that, as the testator had designated no specific fund from which the debts .were to be paid, it was his intention that the devisees and legatees should contribute ratably to the abatement of the incumbrance, and that the whole burden of the debts could not be thrown upon the personal estate. The court recognized that, if a man dies intestate, owing debts, payment will be made in the regular order pointed out by the statute, commencing with the personal property.

On the other hand, the court said that if he devises and bequeaths his whole property specifically, both real and personal, it is an indication that the objects or recipients of his bounty shall have the estate in the proportions designated in the will. There, as here, the testator had made specific gifts of personal property and specific devises of real property, and there were debts probated against the estate which could not be paid without using either the specific legacies or specific devises for such purpose. In such case, if the law should step in and make a distinction where the testator had made none, and where he had specifically designated each particular species of personal property and parcel of land, which should go to the various persons named in his will, the rule would make a very different will for the. testator from that prepared by himself.

In this case, as in that, the testator commenced his will with a general direction to the executors to pay his debts as soon as it could conveniently be done after his death. His whole estate was disposed of by specific devises and bequests, and, as no specific fund was designated and set apart for the payment of the debts, the natural presumption is that he intended that the devisees and legatees should contribute ratably to their abatement.

In the case before us the testator made his will one day and died the next day. It may be presumed that he knew about how much money he had in bank and the approximate value of his other personal property. It will also be presumed that he knew approximately, at least, the amount of debts which he owed. So in this case, if he had intended for his personal property to be applied first to the payment of' his debts, he had just as well not have made a specific legacy to Joe Mullin of the money he had in bank, for he knew that his other personal property was not sufficient for the payment of his debts. Therefore the rule is reasonable and just that specific devises of land and specific bequests of personalty must abate ratably in case of a deficiency of assets for the payment of the debts of the testator, because both land and personal property, under our statute, may be liable for such debts; and it was equally the intention of the testator that the legatee should have the money in bank and the devisees the particular tract of land left to each of them. Armstrong’s Appeal, 63 Penn. 312; and O’Day v. O’Day, 193 Mo. 62, 91 S. W. 921, 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 922.

We concur with, the reasoning of those opinions that the just manner of construing the will is to give it such an application that the plans of the testator in the distribution of his estate shall be fairly carried out and no disappointment shall happen to those who appear to have been equally the objects of his bounty Of course this rule applies to specific devises and specific legacies, and not to the residuary clause of a will. Therefore we hold that, in marshaling assets for the payment of the debts of the testator, specific legacies of personal property abate proportionately with specific devises of land.

Another matter must be considered in the premises. The record shows that the testator had a wife living at the time of his death. It is true that he had a divorce suit pending against her, but it had not been disposed of. His widow made demand of the executors for a settlement of her dower.- This court has held that a widow is entitled to dower in kind out of the dioses in action of her deceased husband. Sharp v. Himes, 129 Ark. 327.

Hence the widow was entitled to dower in the specific legacy of Joe Mullin.. There being no children, she was entitled to one-half of this amount. -Crawford & Moses’ Digest, § 3536. The result of our views is that the circuit court erred in rendering judgment against the executors for the whole amount of the legacy of Joe Mullin, and for that error the judgment will be reversed, and the cause remanded with directions to allow one-half of the amount of this legacy as -dower to the widow, and to abate the balance proportionately with the specific devises of land in the payment of the -debts probated against the estate of the decedent and the costs of administration,' and for further proceedings according to law and not inconsistent with this opinion.