(after stating the facts). Counsel for the defendant relies for a reversal of the judgment on the ground that, under the by-laws of the supreme colony, the benefit certificate sued on had lapsed at the time of the death of Henry Thompson, and that there was no liability under the terms of the benefit certificate. In this contention we think counsel is correct. On the 9th day of August, 1924, the supreme colony adopted the rules and by-laws of which § 6, copied in our statement of facts, is a part. The benefit certificate sued on was issued by the supreme colony, and had lapsed for the nonpayment of the assessment for the month of September, 1924. It is true that the insured paid the assessment for September on October 7, 1924, and at the same time paid his assessment for the month of October. It will be noted, however, that, under the provisions of § 6, when a member is in .arrears for one month’s dues he is automatically suspended. Under the provisions of that section the member was entitled to pay up his arrears on the 7th day of October, 1924, and the record shows that he did so. The section further provides that, should the dues be paid, neither the insured nor the beneficiaries shall be entitled to any benefits if sickness or death occurs before the expiration of thirty days thereafter; and also the subsequent payment of such arrears shall not entitle the insured, or beneficiary, to any benefits for sickness or death occurring during the period of such suspension. The record shows that the plaintiff died on October 16, 1924, which was within the thirty-day period.

It is a settled rule of this court that the constitution and by-laws of a- fraternal order become a part of the contract insuring its members, and this is especially so where the certificate, as in the case at bar, provides that the constitution and by-laws of the order shall be a part of the contract of insurance. W. O. W. v. Hall, 104 Ark. 538, 148 S. W. 526; Supreme Royal Circle v. Morrison, 105 Ark. 140, 150 S. W. 561; and Mutual Aid Union v. Lovitt, 170 Ark. 745, 281 S. W. 354.

The benefit certificate in the case at bar especially provides that it is to be governed by the constitution and by-laws of the supreme colony. Again, it provides that the constitution and by-laws of the supreme colony shall be read together as a part of the contract. It is plain, when this is done, that the contract of insurance was not in force when the insured died. He had been automatically suspended for nonpayment of dues, and the thirty days during which, under the by-laws, he was not entitled to any benefit for sickness or death, had not expired when he died.

Counsel for the plaintiff, however, seeks to avoid the force of § 6 by invoking the provisions of § 3, which is also copied in our statement of facts. The record shows that § 3 was adopted as a by-law of the local lodge. As such, it could only govern the rules under which persons were entitled to membership in that lodge. The benefit certificate especially provides that the constitution and by-laws of the supreme colony shall be a part of the contract of insurance. As we have already seen, when the contract of insurance of the benefit certifcate and the constitution and by-laws of the supreme colony are read together, the insured was suspended at the time of his death and was not entitled to any benefit for sickness or death at that time. Besides, there is nothing- in the benefit certificate which makes the rules and by-laws of a subordinate lodge part of the contract of insurance. .

The result.of our views is that the circuit court should have directed a verdict for the defendant, and erred in not doing so. Therefore the judgment will be reversed, and, inasmuch as the plaintiff’s case has been fully developed, her cause of action will be dismissed here.