Appeal from the granting of a summary-judgment in favor of the plaintiff-appellee in a proceeding for foreclosure, attorney’s fees and costs, on a mortgage on real property. The parties will hereinafter be referred to as they appeared below.

The defendants’ answer here admitted that the property which was the subject of the mortgage was in Maricopa County, but denied all other allegations of the complaint. The defendants’ answer contained an allegation that if any interest or principal was due from the defendants to the plaintiff it was usurious.1 In answer to the plaintiff’s interrogatories, the defendants admitted executing a promissory note at 8% interest and a mortgage on the property in question to the Phoenix Mortgage Company; making certain payments on the note; and that the note and mortgage provided for reasonable attorney’s fees and certain costs. The plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment which was supported by an affidavit of the plaintiff, which stated that the plaintiff had purchased the mortgage on the subject property and received the note involved at that time and that he had received no interest payments on the note since June, 1968, with principal of $2400 due from March 15, 1968, and interest due from June 15, 1968.

Copies of the note, mortgage and assignment of mortgage were filed supporting the motion. The defendants took the *102plaintiff’s deposition at which time the plaintiff explained that he had bought the mortgage in question from the Phoenix Mortgage Company, which collected the principal and interest payments and paid the plaintiff these amounts, less collection fees. The Phoenix Mortgage Company had guaranteed the payment of these amounts to the plaintiff, but apparently had gone out of business prior to this litigation. At the deposition, the defendants made the plaintiff’s payment records an exhibit. The plaintiff stated in his deposition that $2400 in principal due March 15, 1968, had not been paid.

The defendants filed no response to the motion for summary judgment, no controverting affidavits and no other depositions. The motion for summary judgment was granted and the defendants filed no objection to the form of the judgment filed by the plaintiff. After entry of the summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff on February 19, 1970, the defendants filed a motion to set aside the judgment on March 24, 1970, stating as grounds for the motion only that the answérs to interrogatories and the deposition here “clearly show that there is a genuine issue of law and fact.”

The single issue here is whether or not the trial court erred in granting the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment in view of the record as described above.

On appeal from the granting of a summary judgment, the record will be viewed in a light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment (defendants here). Pitzen’s Wig Villa v. Pruitt, 11 Ariz.App. 332, 464 P.2d 652 (1970). In considering a motion for summary judgment, the trial court is required to consider the pleadings, interrogatories and answers thereto, admissions, depositions and affidavits in the record. Pitzen’s Wig Villa v. Pruitt, supra. Where facts set forth in an affidavit in support of a motion for summary judgment are not controverted, they are presumed true for purposes of the ruling on the motion. Eastwood Elec. Co. v. R. L. Branaman Contractor, Inc., 102 Ariz. 406, 432 P.2d 139 (1967) ; Pitzen’s Wig Villa v. Pruitt, supra. The Eastwood Elec Co. case holds that under Rule 56(e), Rules of Civil Procedure, 16 A.R.S.,2 summary judgment is mandatory where the party against whom summary judgment is sought fails to properly respond to the motion for summary judgment unless the party seeking summary judgment fails to show he is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. The theory of this last holding in Eastwood Elec. Co. is that the party opposing *103summary j udgment “ 'cannot sit idly by on the presentation of a motion for summary judgment which may well resolve the entire case and fail to urge his defense. [Citation omitted]’” Eastwood Elec. Co. v. R. L. Branaman Contractor, Inc., 102 Ariz. 406, 432 P.2d 139 (1967).

When the party moving for summary judgment makes a prima facie showing that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, the party opposing such a motion has the burden of producing sufficient evidence of such an issue of fact and showing that there is such evidence available “which would justify a trial of the issue. [Citation omitted]” Robbins Investment Co. v. Green Rose Associates, Inc., 8 Ariz. App. 596, 448 P.2d 440 (1968).

In defendants’ brief here, it is contended that a portion of the plaintiff’s deposition (which was taken by defendants) “indicates a dispute of fact as to payments and as to what is owed, if anything * * 3 We have examined the record here and conclude that the portion of the deposition pointed out by defendants did not raise a genuine issue of fact in the court below. The plaintiff’s testimony at that point merely explained what payments he had received from defendants. When this testimony is compared with the defendants’ answers to interrogatories, it becomes clear that the defendants had paid interest and principal substantially as called for by the note to March 15, 1968. The $2400 was due at this point. There was one additional interest payment of $48 made in June, 1968, but this appears to be the one due March 15, 1968. By this testimony, the plaintiff showed what had been paid. The defendants’ answers to interrogatories indicate that they believe that their interest payments should apply against the principal, which, on the basis of the record, is not justified.

Additionally, the defendants’ brief urges that they have shown the existence of a genuine issue of fact as to usury.4 It is true that the payments the defendants state they made in the answers to interrogatories do exceed 8% of the principal balance remaining at the time of the interest payments by small amounts (varying from $.50 to $6.08), but the defendants at no place in this record either explain or urge that these payments are usurious interest payments. It is entirely conceivable that these excesses were collection charges or late fees.5 We do not feel constrained to hold that the indication in the answers to interrogatories of these small excess amounts, without either explanation or allegations that they were usurious interest, constitute specific facts showing the existence of a genuine issue of fact. This is to say that these small amounts in excess of the 8%, which were before the trial court as answers to interrogatories and were not embellished upon in any way by the defendants, will not be allowed to thwart the purposes of Rule 56(e), as amended, supra, and the cases interpreting that rule.6

Here, the plaintiff made at least a prima facie showing of no genuine issue of fact and the defendants failed to properly respond to the plaintiff’s motion for summary *104judgment and, consequently, did not carry their burden of proving the existence of .a genuine issue of material fact. Also, the grounds of the defendants’ motion to set .aside the summary judgment, as set out ; above, fail of the specificity required by Rule 56(e), as amended, supra. The trial «court’s granting of the motion for summary judgment was eminently correct and :that judgment is affirmed.

Note: This cause was decided by the Judges of Division Two as authorized by A.R.S. Sec. 12-120, subsec. E.