US Express v. Leland

NOTICE: NOT FOR PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

US EXPRESS LEASING, INC.; CIT TECHNOLOGY FINANCING SERVICES, INC.; BANC OF AMERICA LEASING & CAPITAL, LLC, Plaintiffs/Appellees, v.

LAURA LELAND and BRIAN LELAND wife and husband, Defendants/Appellants.

No. 1 CA-CV 13-0360

FILED 06-24-2014

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County No. CV2008-022375

The Honorable Randall H. Warner, Judge AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Jaburg & Wilk, PC, Phoenix

By Rodger L. Cohen, Kathi M. Sandweiss

Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee US Express

David N. Ingrassia, PC, Phoenix

By David N. Ingrassia

Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee CIT

Poli & Ball, PLC, Phoenix

By Michael N. Poli, Lawrence R. Moon

Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee Banc of America The McBride Law Firm, PC, Scottsdale

By Melanie G. McBride, Keith A. Gernant

Counsel for Defendants/Appellants

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Kenton D. Jones delivered the decision of the Court, in which Judge Margaret H. Downie and Judge Donn Kessler joined.

J O N E S, Judge:

¶1 Laura Leland (Leland) appeals the trial court’s denial of her motion for new trial filed pursuant to Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a). 1 For the reasons stated below, we affirm.

FACTS 2 AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Bryan Bartel (Bartel) and Jane Doe Bartel were the sole owners of All H2, Inc., a corporation authorized to transact business in Arizona under the registered trade name of Copyrite Business Equipment (Copyrite). Leland, a sales agent of Copyrite, received compensation in the form of commissions and salary based upon the value of the equipment she sold or leased for Copyrite.

¶3 From June 2007 through January 2008, Copyrite, Bartel, and Leland (Copyrite defendants) claimed to have sold and delivered to Robert Kubicek Architects and Associates (Kubicek), more than $703,019 in industrial grade copy and printing equipment (new equipment). In fact, the Copyrite defendants entered fictitious serial numbers for new equipment on fraudulent lease agreements which Copyrite then paid a Kubicek employee $55,000 to sign. USXL, Banc America, CIT, and GE, (financing companies) then paid the Copyrite defendants $703,019 for the alleged sales and deliveries to Kubicek. 3 However, Kubicek never received the majority of the equipment reflected on the financing agreements.

¶4 Kubicek only became aware of the transactions between the Copyrite defendants and his employee when the company’s controller discovered the firm’s leased equipment expenses were significantly higher than the historical average, apparently due to Kubicek’s payment of $262,119 on invoices received from the financing companies for the phantom new equipment.

¶5 In September 2011, Kubicek filed a complaint in the Maricopa County Superior Court against the Copyrite defendants and the financing companies. The financing companies brought separate counterclaims against Kubicek and crossclaims against the Copyrite defendants. 4 Prior to trial, Kubicek settled with the financing companies and dismissed claims against the Copyright defendants. The leasing companies and the Copyrite defendants then went to trial on the leasing companies’ crossclaims.

¶6 The jury entered forty-one verdicts in favor of the financing companies. In summary, the jury found: (1) Copyrite liable for breach of contract; (2) Copyrite and Bartel liable for negligent hiring and supervision; (3) Copyrite responsible for Leland’s acts based upon respondeat superior liability; and (4) Bartel and Leland liable for negligent misrepresentation, fraud and unlawful activity in favor of CIT financing company. 5

¶7 The jury awarded damages 6 to the three financing companies in the following amounts: full damages against Copyrite in the amount of $3.00; full damages against Bartel in the amount of $447,737.51;

[financing] Companies, which would simultaneously lease the equipment to Kubicek.”

¶9 In denying the defendants’ motion for new trial, the trial court held the fraud and negligent misrepresentation verdicts were not inconsistent: the evidence supported a finding the Copyrite defendants both intentionally defrauded the financing companies, and failed to exercise reasonable care in communicating information regarding the transaction as required for a negligent misrepresentation claim. The trial court also found the punitive damage instruction was not in error as the instruction clearly informed the jury it could not award punitive damages unless it found the Copyrite defendants acted with an evil mind, and “[o]ne can commit the tort of negligent misrepresentation while acting with an evil mind.” 9 Ruling on the Copyrite defendants’ third assertion, We aggregate the amount of damages awarded to the financing companies.

¶10 Finally, the trial court conceded the jury should have awarded the entire amount of damages against Copyrite, given the jury instructions on respondeat superior liability, but held the defendants waived this argument by failing to raise it at the time of the verdict when the jury’s mistake might have been remedied.

¶11 Leland timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) section 12-2101(A)(1) (2014).

DISCUSSION

¶12 The grant or denial of a motion for new trial is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Rodriguez v. Williams, 107 Ariz. 458, 460, 489 P.2d 268, 270 (1971). We review the denial of a motion for new trial for an abuse of discretion. Hutcherson, 192 Ariz. at 53, ¶ 12, 961 P.2d at 451.

¶13 Leland argues the trial court erred by refusing to order a new trial as the jury’s verdict was contrary to law. Further, Leland contends: (1) she did not have to raise the inconsistency of the amounts of damages under Rule 49(c); and (2) the trial court should have granted her Rule 59 motion because, in denying her motion, the trial court stated the jury incorrectly applied the law of respondeat superior.

¶14 Rule 59(a)(8) allows a trial court to grant a new trial when a verdict is contrary to law. However, a trial court’s grant of a motion for conduct” is necessary for a jury to award punitive damages. Id. In the immediate case, the jury instructions stated that an award of punitive damages might enter if the jury were to find “fraud, negligent supervision or pattern of unlawful activity.” Clearly, both fraud and pattern of illegal activity allow for an award of punitive damages. The jury found for plaintiff in regard to fraud, negligent supervision, and pattern of unlawful activity. Following the jury’s verdict, no objection was interposed to the inclusion of negligent supervision as allowing an award of punitive damages and Leland, therefore, waived her right to object. Ariz. R. Civ. P. 51(a). new trial is premised upon the party’s conformity with Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 49(c), which states in pertinent part: “If the verdict is . . . defective, the court may direct it to be reformed at the bar . . . . If the verdict is not responsive to the issue submitted to the jury, the court shall call the jurors’ attention thereto, and send them back for further deliberation.”

¶15 The purpose of Rule 49(c) is to permit a correction of the verdict before the jury is excused, and thus advance the efficient operation of the courts. See Gonzalez v. Gonzalez, 181 Ariz. 32, 35, 887 P.2d 562, 565 (App. 1994). Furthermore, Rule 49(c) discourages litigants from jury- shopping by “permitting them to decide whether to take their chances on resubmitting the verdict and findings to the then-sitting jury, or remain silent thereby allowing the entry of judgment and moving for a new trial before a new jury.” Id. at 36, 887 P.2d at 566 (quoting Cundiff v. Washburn, 393 F.2d 505, 507 (7th Cir. 1968)).

¶16 Leland concedes failure to object to the jury verdicts at the time the verdicts were rendered, but asserts Rule 59 does not require the party moving for a new trial to raise an objection while the jury remains empanelled. Instead, Leland contends Rule 49(c) places the burden of informing the jury of defective or inconsistent verdicts upon the trial court rather than the aggrieved party. Although Rule 49(c) permits a trial court to reform a defective verdict, the party, not the court, moves for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59; therefore, the party must necessarily raise issues of defective verdicts, including verdicts contrary to law, at the time the verdict is rendered. Trustmark Ins. Co. v. Bank One, Ariz., NA, 202 Ariz. 535, 543, ¶ 39, 48 P.3d 485, 493 (App. 2002) (“If Trustmark believed the jury verdict was inconsistent, defective, or nonresponsive to its negligence claim, Trustmark should have moved, before the jury was excused, for resubmission of the case to the jury pursuant to Rule 49(c). . . . However, Trustmark did not invoke Rule 49(c). By not challenging the verdict when rendered, Trustmark waived its objection to any error.”) (internal citations omitted).

¶17 In support of her position, Leland cites Southern Pacific Railroad Company v. Mitchell, 80 Ariz. 50, 292 P.2d 827 (1956), for the proposition that, “the court has the power to put a manifestly irregular or defective verdict in such form as to make it conform to the intention of the jury, and carry their findings into effect, where the intention can be ascertained with certainty.” In Southern Pacific, after discharging the jury, the trial court amended a defective verdict in conformity with the intention of the jury. Id. at 65-66, 292 P.2d at 837. However, contrary to Leland’s position, the trial court only did so after the aggrieved party moved to amend the verdict, obtained affidavits of each jury member attesting to their intention, and the trial court held a subsequent hearing to determine the jury’s intent. Id. at 65, 292 P.2d at 837. As a result, the Southern Pacific Court concluded the trial court had “jurisdiction to grant the [party’s] motion to amend or correct the verdict.” Id. ¶18 Leland also cites Fornara v. Wolpe, 26 Ariz. 383, 226 P. 203 (1924), and Flanders v. Maricopa County, 203 Ariz. 368, 54 P.3d 837 (App. 2002), for her assertion the trial court, rather than the aggrieved party, should bring unresponsive verdicts to the jury’s attention and send the jury back for further deliberation. Leland’s reliance upon these cases is unavailing as well. In Fornara, the trial court properly disregarded a defective verdict after a party objected to the verdict when rendered. 26 Ariz. at 385, 388-89, 226 P. at 204-05 (“[T]he court granted appellee’s motion for judgment for $1,050 notwithstanding the verdict, and in so doing did not commit error.”).

¶19 In Flanders, the jury returned two verdict forms indicating a different amount of compensatory damages for each claim. 203 Ariz. at 374, ¶ 41, 54 P.3d at 843. “After consulting with counsel, the court instructed the jury that the amount on each verdict form must be the same.” Id. at 374-75, ¶ 41, 54 P.3d 843-44. This Court affirmed the trial court’s actions, noting that the trial court properly complied with Rule 49(c) by calling the “jurors’ attention to a defect in the verdict and ‘send[ing] them back for further deliberation.’” Id. at 375, ¶ 45, 54 P.3d at 844. Although Flanders teaches a trial court may reform a jury verdict under Rule 49(c) after consulting with counsel, an aggrieved party must object to the verdict at the time it is rendered if that party later moves for a new trial. See Trustmark, 202 Ariz. at 543, ¶ 39, 48 P.3d at 493.

¶20 Thus, by failing to challenge the verdict when rendered, Leland waived her ability to object on the ground the jury’s assignment of damages to her, rather than to Copyrite, was contrary to law. Id. (“By not challenging the verdict when rendered, [the party] waived its objection to any error.”). 10

10As Leland waived her claim that the verdict was contrary to law, we need not reach the question whether the doctrine of respondeat superior precludes the assignment of damages against Leland.

CONCLUSION

¶21 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s denial of Leland’s motion for new trial. Appellee CIT requests attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-2314.04(A) (2014) as the action involved a pattern of racketeering activity. In the exercise of our discretion, we grant CIT reasonable attorneys’ fees on appeal and costs in an amount to be determined upon compliance with ARCAP 21(c).

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