Steffes v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration

1 WO 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Jason Steffes, No. CV-18-02021-PHX-DLR 10 Plaintiff, ORDER v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration, Defendant.

16 On July 23, 2019, the Court reversed the Social Security Administration’s non- disability decision and remanded this matter for further proceedings. (Doc. 14.) On remand, the Administration ruled in Plaintiff’s favor, awarding him $161,319.00 in past- due benefits. (Doc. 18-1 at 1.) Plaintiff previously entered into a contingent-fee agreement under which he agreed to pay his attorney 25% of any past-due benefits awarded. (Doc. 18-5.) Accordingly, Plaintiff now moves for an award of $40,329.75 in attorney’s fees, representing 25% of his past-due benefits. (Doc. 18-1 at 1.)

23 Whenever the Court enters a judgment favorable to a disability benefits claimant, the Court can award reasonable attorney’s fees in an amount not to exceed 25% of the total past-due benefits awarded to the claimant. 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A). Section 406(b) “does not displace contingent-fee agreements as the primary means by which fees are set for successfully representing Social Security benefits claimants in court. Rather, § 406(b) calls for court review of such arrangements as an independent check, to assure that they yield reasonable results in particular cases.” Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 2 789, 807 (2002). Thus, when determining whether a contingency fee request is reasonable, the Court must first “respect the primacy of lawful attorney-client fee agreements.” Crawford v. Astrue, 586 F.3d 1142, 1150 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (internal quotations omitted). The Court starts with the contingent-fee agreement and then tests the resulting award for reasonableness, adjusting downward “if the attorney provided substandard representation or delayed the case, or if the requested fee would result in a windfall.” Id. at 1149-51. When assessing whether the requested fee would result in a windfall, the Court considers whether the benefits were proportionate to the time spent on the case and may, if necessary, use the lodestar calculation as a non-dispositive aid. Id. at 1151.

12 Plaintiff’s contingent-fee request is not greater than 25% of past-due benefits, and there is no evidence of substandard performance or delay by Plaintiff’s counsel. The Administration argues, however, that $40,329.75 is unreasonably high because counsel spent 30.3 hours working on this case, and therefore the award would translate to an effective hourly rate of $1,331.01. Relying on Norden v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., No. CV-19-00373-PHX-JAT, 2020 WL 3472551, at *2 (D. Ariz. June 25, 2020), the Administration argues that the Court should award $36,360.00, representing an effective hourly rate of $1,200.00. (Doc. 20.) Norden reduced a contingent-fee award from an effective hourly rate of $1,295.45 to an effective hourly rate of $1,200, but in doing so explained that “1,295.45 . . . falls slightly outside the range of reasonableness that this Court, and others in this district, have found reasonable in recent cases resolved by a stipulation to remand without full briefing.” Id. (emphasis added). Likewise, this Court recently reduced a contingent-fee award from an effective hourly rate of $1,624.82 to an effectively hourly rate of $1,200 “considering this case resolved through a stipulated remand without full briefing[.]” Demand v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., No. CV-18- 08063-PCT-DLR, 2020 WL 1659898, at *1-2 (D. Ariz. Apr. 3, 2020).

28 Unlike Norden and Demand, this matter was not resolved through a stipulated || remand and instead required full briefing. Under these circumstances, the Court does not 2|| find counsel’s requested fee to be out of proportion to the time spent on the case.

Accordingly, 4 IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff's motion for attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 5|| 406(b) (Doc. 18) is GRANTED. Counsel’s fees are approved in the amount of 6|| $40,329.75, out of which Plaintiff shall be refunded the $6,112.75 already received by || counsel under the Equal Access to Justice Act. (See Doc. 17.) Any fees withheld by the || Administration in anticipation of an order under § 406(b), less an administrative 9|| assessment pursuant to § 406(d), may be paid to Kathryn Dicus, 10645 N. Tatum Blvd., Ste. 329, Phoenix, AZ 85028, consistent with this order.

11 Dated this 24th day of November, 2020.

12 - 13 J □□ a 14 Do . Rayes 5 United States District Judge -3-