Lieberman v. Target Corporation

1 WO 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Lawrence Lieberman, et al., 10 No. CV-24-00450-PHX-DGC Plaintiffs, 11 ORDER v. Target Corporation, et al., Defendants.

17 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c), the parties have filed a stipulated motion for a protective order. Doc. 20. The parties seek protection to facilitate the exchange of the in-store video surveillance of the accident. Id. at 20-1. The Court will deny the motion without prejudice.

21 “It is well-established that the fruits of pretrial discovery are, in the absence of a court order to the contrary, presumptively public.” San Jose Mercury News, Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Ct. – N. Dist. (San Jose), 187 F.3d 1096, 1103 (9th Cir. 1999) (citations omitted).

24 “Rule 26(c) authorizes a district court to override this presumption where ‘good cause’ is shown.” Id.; see Oliner v. Kontrabecki, 745 F.3d 1024, 1026 (9th Cir. 2014) (“[A] ‘good cause’ standard ‘applies to private materials unearthed during discovery[.]’”) (quoting Pintos v. Pac. Creditors Ass’n, 605 F.3d 665, 678 (9th Cir. 2010)); Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 331 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Any [Rule 26(c)] order . . . requires || that the court’s determination ‘identify and discuss the factors it considered in its ‘good 2|| cause’ examination[.]’”) (quoting Phillips ex rel. Ests. of Byrd v. Gen. Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1212 (9th Cir. 2002)).

4 “For good cause to exist, the party seeking protection bears the burden of showing || specific prejudice or harm will result if no protective order is granted.” Phillips, 307 F.3d || at 1210-11 (emphasis added); see Beckman Indus., Inc. v. Int’l Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 470, 476 7\| (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that “broad allegations of harm, unsubstantiated by specific || examples or articulated reasoning, do not satisfy the Rule 26(c) test”). “Ifa court finds particularized harm will result from disclosure of information to the public, then it balances || the public and private interests to decide whether a protective order is necessary.” Phillips, 307 F.3d at 1211; see Kamakana v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1179-80 (9th || Cir. 2006) (“We reasoned in Phillips that when a district court grants a protective order to || seal documents during discovery, ‘it already has determined that ‘good cause’ exists to 14]| protect this information from being disclosed to the public by balancing the needs for || discovery against the need for confidentiality.’”’).

16 The parties’ one-sentence stipulation does not identify specific prejudice or harm □□ that will result from public disclosure of the in-store video surveillance of the accident.

18 || And the order seems to permit the designation of other information as confidential, with || no description of that information or why there is good cause to protect it under Rule 26(c).

20 The Court will deny the stipulation without prejudice to the parties filing a stipulation or motion that makes the required showing. The parties should at a minimum 22|| identify specific categories of information they seek to protect and provide a sufficient || factual basis for the Court to engage in the scrutiny required by Rule 26(c).

24 IT IS ORDERED that the parties’ stipulated motion for entry of protective order || (Doc.20) is denied without prejudice.

26 Dated this 27th day of August, 2024.

28 David G. Campbell Senior United States District Judge _2-