Roegner v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration

1 WO 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Nicole M Roegner, No. CV-20-01974-PHX-DLR 10 Plaintiff, ORDER v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration, Defendant.

15 On April 11, 2022, the Court reversed the Social Security Administration’s non- disability decision and remanded this matter for further proceedings. (Docs. 18, 19.) On remand, the Administration ruled in Plaintiff’s favor. (Doc. 22-2.) The Administration withheld 25% of Plaintiff’s past-due benefits to pay any potential attorney fee award. (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff entered into a contingent-fee agreement under which she agreed to pay her attorney 25% of any past-due benefits awarded. (Doc. 22-4.) Plaintiff’s counsel now moves, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b), for an award of $21,992.00 in fees, representing less than 25% of Plaintiff’s past-due benefits. (Doc. 22 at 3.)

23 Whenever the Court enters a judgment favorable to a disability benefits claimant, the Court can award reasonable attorney fees in an amount not to exceed 25% of the total past-due benefits awarded to the claimant. 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A). Section 406(b) “does not displace contingent-fee agreements as the primary means by which fees are set for successfully representing Social Security benefits claimants in court. Rather, § 406(b) calls for court review of such arrangements as an independent check, to assure that they yield || reasonable results in particular cases.” Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 807 (2002).

2|| Thus, when determining whether a contingency fee request is reasonable, the Court must 3|| first “respect the primacy of lawful attorney-client fee agreements.” Crawford v. Astrue, 586 F.3d 1142, 1150 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (internal quotations omitted). The Court || starts with the contingent-fee agreement and then tests the resulting award for || reasonableness, adjusting downward “if the attorney provided substandard representation || or delayed the case, or if the requested fee would result in a windfall.” /d. at 1149-51. When || assessing whether the requested fee would result in a windfall, the Court considers whether || the benefits were proportionate to the time spent on the case and may, if necessary, use the || lodestar calculation as a non-dispositive aid. Jd. at 1151.

11 Counsel’s contingent-fee request is less than 25% of past-due benefits, there is no || evidence of substandard performance or delay, and neither the Government nor Plaintiff || have raised any objections to the reasonableness of the request. (See Doc. 23.) Although 14|| the fee award reflects a relatively high effective hourly rate of $1,912.35, this rate is not || outside the bounds of effective hourly rates approved by other courts when ruling on applications under § 406(b) (see Doc. 24 at 2-3 (collecting cases approving comparable || effective hourly rates)), and the Court does not find that the fee award would result in a |} windfall in this case. Accordingly, 19 IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiffs counsel’s motion for attorney fees under 42 || U.S.C. § 406(b) (Doc. 22) is GRANTED. Counsel’s fees are approved in the amount of $21,992.00, payable from Plaintiffs past-due benefits in accordance with Administration || policy. Plaintiff shall be refunded the $2,511.14 in attorney fees previously awarded to || counsel under the Equal Access to Justice Act. (See Doc. 21.)

24 Dated this 13th day of December, 2024.

25 - 26 J _—S □□ ee 27 Do . Rayes 38 Senior United States District Judge _2-