Buzianis v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration

3 WO 8 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

11 Zachary Buzianis, No. 2:22-CV-02106-PHX-SMB 12 Plaintiff, ORDER v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration, Defendant.

17 At issue is the denial of Zachary Buzianis’ Application for disabled adult child’s insurance benefits benefits by the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) under the Social Security Act (the “Act”). Plaintiff filed a Complaint (Doc. 1) and an Opening Brief (Doc.

20 14) seeking judicial review of that denial. Defendant SSA filed an Answering Brief (Doc.

21 17), to which Plaintiff replied (Doc. 18). After reviewing the parties’ briefs, the Administrative Record (Doc. 12), and the Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ’s”) decision, (Doc. 12-3 at 15–24), the Court will affirm the ALJ’s decision for the reasons addressed herein.

25 I. BACKGROUND 26 On November 5, 2018, Plaintiff protectively filed an application for disabled adult child’s insurance benefits, alleging a disability beginning on January 1, 2007. (Doc. 12-3 at 18.) Plaintiff’s claim was initially denied, and he filed a request for reconsideration in February 2019. (See Doc. 12-7.) Upon reconsideration, Plaintiff’s claim was again denied in March 2019. (Doc. 12-3 at 18.) Plaintiff then requested a hearing before an ALJ. (Id.) 3 On July 29, 2021, ALJ Tom Duann conducted an online video hearing. (Id.) After the hearing and consideration of the medical evidence and opinions, the ALJ issued a written decision in which he denied Plaintiff’s application for child insurance benefits and concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled prior to February 2008. (Doc. 12-3 at 18–24.)

7 Thereafter, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s Request for Review of the ALJ’s decision—making it the SSA Commissioner’s (the “Commissioner”) final decision—and this appeal followed. (Id. at 2–5.)

10 II. LEGAL STANDARDS 11 An ALJ’s factual findings “shall be conclusive if supported by substantial evidence.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1153 (2019). The Court may set aside the Commissioner’s disability determination only if it is not supported by substantial evidence or based on legal error. Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007).

15 Substantial evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a conclusion considering the record as a whole. Id. Generally, “[w]here the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, one of which supports the ALJ’s decision, the ALJ’s conclusion must be upheld.” Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 47, 954 (9th Cir. 2002). In determining whether to reverse an ALJ’s decision, the district court reviews only those issues raised by the party challenging the decision. See Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 517 n.13 (9th Cir. 2001).

22 III. DISCUSSION 23 The issue here is whether Plaintiff was disabled under Section 223(d) of the Act prior to reaching the age of twenty-two. (Doc. 12-3 at 18.) Under Section 202(d) of the Act, for Plaintiff to be entitled to disabled adult child’s insurance benefits, he must have a disability that began before he reached the age of twenty-two. 20 C.F.R. § 404.350(a).

27 The ALJ determined that Plaintiff turned twenty-two in February 2008 and therefore had to prove that he was disabled by that time. (Doc. 12-3 at 22–23.) After reviewing the medical evidence, the ALJ concluded that the earliest records indicating Plaintiff’s mental impairments were from September 2008, and therefore found that Plaintiff was not disabled for disabled adult child’s insurance benefits purposes. (Id.) 4 Plaintiff argues that by requiring medical treatments to establish an onset date, the ALJ committed harmful error in evaluating Plaintiff’s case. (Doc. 14 at 3.) The Commissioner argues that the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff was not disabled by age twenty- two is supported by substantial evidence. (Doc. 17 at 4.) The Court has reviewed the medical and administrative records and agrees with the Commissioner.

9 A. ALJ’s Interpretation of Medical Evidence 10 Under the Act, “[t]he findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). In the context of evidentiary sufficiency, this threshold is not high. Biestek, 139 S. Ct. at 1154.

13 Substantial evidence “means—and means only—‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Id. (quoting Consol. Edison Co. of New York v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)).

16 Here, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly believed that Plaintiff was required to have medical records to document the existence of his mental impairments at the time that the disability began. (Doc. 14 at 3–4.) The Commissioner argues that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Act. (Doc. 17 at 4.) The earliest medical record indicating Plaintiff’s mental impairments are from September 2008. (Doc. 12-3 at 22.) Dr. Jorge Salas, who treated Plaintiff at that time, indicated that “the symptoms began approximately three months ago[.]” (Doc. 12-8 at 3.) After being under the care of Dr. Salas, Plaintiff went on to be under the care of Dr. Wendy Wells in November 2008. (Id. at 299.) Dr. Wells asserted that Plaintiff’s symptoms “began in January 2007 and possibly earlier.” (Id.) 26 In finding Dr. Well’s opinion unpersuasive, the ALJ pointed out that Dr. Wells’ assessment was based on reports by Plaintiff’s mother about his symptoms, and that those reports were not corroborated by any other medical records. (Doc. 12-3 at 22.) The ALJ || concluded that Dr. Wells opinion is “without a valid basis and these notes from Dr. Wells || are unpersuasive regarding the onset date of [Plaintiff's] mental impairments.” (/d.) || Furthermore, the ALJ considered the reports provided by psychological consultants U.

4|| Jacobs, Ph.D. and H. Patterson, Ph.D. which both noted insufficient evidence of mental || impairments in the relevant time frame prior to the Plaintiff reaching the age of twenty- || two. Cd.)

7 In summary, the ALJ’s analysis considered Dr. Wells’ conclusion that □□□□□□□□□□□ || symptoms existed prior to his attainment of age twenty-two but found it unpersuasive in 9|| light of the lack of medical records to support such a conclusion. (/d.) Instead, the ALJ || examined other medical opinions that indicated Plaintiff began suffering symptoms after |} age twenty-two. (/d. at 22—23.) Accordingly, the ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff was || not disabled within the meaning of the Act was supported by substantial evidence.

Therefore, the ALJ did not commit error.

14] DI. CONCLUSION 15 For the reasons discussed above, 16 IT IS ORDERED affirming the August 30, 2021 decision of the ALJ, as upheld by || the Appeals Council.

18 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED directing the Clerk to enter final judgement || consistent with this Order and close this case.

20 Dated this 11th day of March, 2024.

21 —— 22 ose 23 Afonorable Susan M. Brnovich 74 United States District Judge -4-