Jatto v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration

1 WO 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Hilda Jatto, No. CV-21-00604-PHX-DLR 10 Plaintiff, ORDER v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration, Defendant.

16 On September 21, 2022, the Court reversed the Social Security Administration’s non-disability decision and remanded this matter for further proceedings. (Docs. 20, 21.)

18 On remand, the Administration ruled in Plaintiff’s favor, awarding $78,667.00 in past-due benefits. (Doc. 25-3.) Plaintiff entered into a contingent-fee agreement under which she agreed to pay her attorney 25% of any past-due benefits awarded. (Doc. 25-2.) Counsel recovered $7,200.00 for administrative-hearing-level representation and now moves, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b), for an award of $12,466.75 in fees, which, together with the $7,200.00 previously awarded for administrative-hearing-level representation, equals 25% of Plaintiff’s past-due benefits. (Doc. 25-1.)

25 Whenever the Court enters a judgment favorable to a disability benefits claimant, the Court can award reasonable attorney fees in an amount not to exceed 25% of the total past-due benefits awarded to the claimant. 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A). Section 406(b) “does not displace contingent-fee agreements as the primary means by which fees are set for successfully representing Social Security benefits claimants in court. Rather, § 406(b) calls 2|| for court review of such arrangements as an independent check, to assure that they yield || reasonable results in particular cases.” Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 807 (2002).

4|| Thus, when determining whether a contingency fee request is reasonable, the Court must || first “respect the primacy of lawful attorney-client fee agreements.” Crawford v. Astrue, 6|| 586 F.3d 1142, 1150 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (internal quotations omitted). The Court starts with the contingent-fee agreement and then tests the resulting award for || reasonableness, adjusting downward “if the attorney provided substandard representation || or delayed the case, or if the requested fee would result in a windfall.” Jd. at 1149-51. When || assessing whether the requested fee would result in a windfall, the Court considers whether || the benefits were proportionate to the time spent on the case and may, if necessary, use the || lodestar calculation as a non-dispositive aid. /d. at 1151.

13 Counsel’s contingent-fee request is not greater than 25% of past-due benefits, there 14]| is no evidence of substandard performance or delay, and neither the Government nor || Plaintiff have raised any objections to the reasonableness of the request. (See Doc. 26.) || Accordingly, 17 IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiffs counsel’s motion for attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) (Doc. 25) is GRANTED. Counsel’s fees are approved in the amount of 19|| $12,466.75, payable from Plaintiff’s past-due benefits in accordance with Administration □□ policy. Plaintiff shall be refunded the attorney fees previously awarded to counsel under the Equal Access to Justice Act. (See Doc. 24.)

22 Dated this 11th day of February, 2025.

25 {Z, 26 {UO 27 Sen United States District Judge _2-