McCabe v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration

1 WO 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Tammi R McCabe, No. CV-22-00192-PHX-DLR 10 Plaintiff, ORDER v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration, Defendant.

16 On April 25, 2023, the Court reversed the Social Security Administration’s non- disability decision and remanded for a calculation and award of benefits. (Docs. 21, 22.)

18 On remand, the Administration awarded Plaintiff $225,496.00 in past-due benefits. (Doc.

19 26 at 7.) Plaintiff entered into a contingent-fee agreement under which she agreed to pay her attorney 25% of any past-due benefits awarded. (Doc. 26-1.) Counsel now moves, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b), for an award of $56,000.00 in fees, which does not exceed 25% of Plaintiff’s past-due benefits. (Doc. 26.)

23 Whenever the Court enters a judgment favorable to a disability benefits claimant, the Court can award reasonable attorney fees in an amount not to exceed 25% of the total past-due benefits awarded to the claimant. 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A). Section 406(b) “does not displace contingent-fee agreements as the primary means by which fees are set for successfully representing Social Security benefits claimants in court. Rather, § 406(b) calls for court review of such arrangements as an independent check, to assure that they yield || reasonable results in particular cases.” Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 807 (2002).

2|| Thus, when determining whether a contingency fee request is reasonable, the Court must 3|| first “respect the primacy of lawful attorney-client fee agreements.” Crawford v. Astrue, 586 F.3d 1142, 1150 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (internal quotations omitted). The Court || starts with the contingent-fee agreement and then tests the resulting award for || reasonableness, adjusting downward “if the attorney provided substandard representation 7\| or delayed the case, or if the requested fee would result in a windfall.” Jd. at 1149-51. When || assessing whether the requested fee would result in a windfall, the Court considers whether || the benefits were proportionate to the time spent on the case and may, if necessary, use the || lodestar calculation as a non-dispositive aid. Jd. at 1151.

11 Counsel’s contingent-fee request is not greater than 25% of past-due benefits, there || is no evidence of substandard performance or delay, and neither the Government nor || Plaintiff have raised any objections to the reasonableness of the request. (See Doc. 27.)

Although the fee request translates to a seemingly high effective hourly rate of $1,513.51, || the Court does not find this amount is outside the bounds of reasonableness, given awards in other Social Security cases. (See Doc. 26 at 8-9). Accordingly, 17 IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiffs counsel’s motion for attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) (Doc. 26) is GRANTED. Counsel’s fees are approved in the amount of 19|| $56,000.00, payable from Plaintiffs past-due benefits in accordance with Administration □□ policy. Plaintiff shall be refunded the attorney fees previously awarded to counsel under the Equal Access to Justice Act. (See Doc. 25.)

22 Dated this 11th day of February, 2025.

25 {Z, 26 {UO 27 Sen United States District Judge _2-