Mara Finch v. Block Incorporated, et al.

1 WO 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Mara Finch, No. CV-25-04247-PHX-JJT 10 Plaintiff, ORDER v. Block Incorporated, et al., 13 Defendants.

15 At issue is pro se Plaintiff Mara Finch’s Reply to Defendants [sic] Motion to Dissmiss [sic] (Doc. 45). While captioned a “reply,” Plaintiff’s filing is effectively a sur- reply to Defendant Block, Inc.’s Reply in Support of Its Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 44.)

18 No party is permitted to file a sur-reply unless that party is granted leave and “valid reasons for such additional briefing exists.” Fitzhugh v. Miller, No. CV-19-04632-PHX- DWL, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57926, at *24 (D. Ariz. Apr. 2, 2020). Here, the Court expressly restricted Plaintiff’s ability to file documents except for, inter alia, “one motion for leave to file a sur-reply.” (Doc. 43 at 2 (emphasis in original.) Despite the clear parameters set by this Court, Plaintiff did not request leave before filing her Sur-Reply.

24 Plaintiff’s failure to seek leave is sufficient grounds to strike her Sur-Reply. See Williams v. City of Tempe, No. CV-17-02161-PHX-SMB, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112129, at *7–8 (D. Ariz. July 3, 2019), aff’d sub nom. Williams v. Albertsons Companies LLC, 822 F.

27 App’x 579 (9th Cir. 2020); see also, e.g., Silvas v. GMAC Mortg., LLC, No. CV-09-00265- PHX-GMS, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118854, at *7–8 (D. Ariz. Dec. 1, 2009), as amended Qan. 5, 2010) (striking surreply where nothing therein “could be construed as a motion for 2|| leave to file a surreply”).

3 Plaintiff also presents no extraordinary circumstances warranting the filing of her Sur-Reply. See Fitzhugh, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57926, at *24 (noting “sur-replies are || highly disfavored and permitted only in extraordinary circumstances” and “discretion || should be exercised in favor of allowing a surreply only where a valid reason for such 7\| additional briefing exists” (citations and quotation marks omitted)). In fact, Plaintiff's Sur- || Reply purports to “correct” her responsive briefing and makes essentially the same 9|| arguments she did before. (See Doc. 45 at 2.) This is precisely the kind of superfluous || motion practice that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Local Rules prohibit. These || Rules are deliberate and provide an intentional, tripartite process for parties to present their || arguments to a court. First, a party files a motion setting forth all their arguments. Second, | the opposing party responds to those arguments raised in the motion. Third, the party that originally brought the motion may reply to the arguments raised in response. Absent || extraordinary circumstances, this is the end of motion practice. Otherwise, litigation would || become an endless Sisyphean task. The Court will therefore strike Plaintiffs filing.

17 IT IS ORDERED striking Plaintiff's Reply to Defendants [sic] Motion to Dissmiss || [sic] (Doc. 45).

19 Dated this Ist day of December, 2025. CN iy. wef Unifgd StatesDistrict Judge _2-