James R. Alston v. City of Surprise, et al.

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 8 James R alston, ) No. CV-25-03462-PHX-SPL ) 9 ) 10 Plaintiff, ) ORDER vs. ) ) 11 ) City of Surprise, et al., ) 12 ) 13 Defendants. ) ) 14 ) 15 Before the Court is Plaintiff James Ralson’s Complaint (Doc. 1), Application for 16 Leave to Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs (Doc. 10), Motion to 17 File Non-Electronic Exhibits (Doc. 4), and Motion to Allow Electronic Filing (Doc. 5). 18 The Court now rules as follows. I. Application to Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying Fees or 19 Costs 20 In the application to proceed without prepaying fees or costs (Doc. 10), Plaintiff 21 declares under penalty of perjury that he is unable to pay the filing fee and other costs 22 associated with this case. Plaintiff presents an Affidavit to support his application. Given 23 that Plaintiff’s expenses exceed his income, and the absence of any significant assets, the 24 motion will be granted. 25 II. In Forma Pauperis Complaint 26 A. Legal Standards 27 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the court shall dismiss an in forma pauperis action 28 1 if it determines that: 2 (A) the allegation of poverty is untrue; or 3 (B) the action or appeal – (i) is frivolous or malicious; 4 (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or 5 (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 6 7 Although much of 28 U.S.C. § 1915 outlines the manner by which prisoners may proceed 8 in forma pauperis, it applies to all in forma pauperis proceedings, not merely those filed 9 by prisoners. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2000). “It is also clear that 10 section 1915(e) not only permits but requires a district court to dismiss an in forma pauperis 11 complaint that fails to state a claim” or if it is frivolous or malicious. Id. at 1127. 12 In order to state a claim for relief, Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 13 provides that a complaint must include: (1) “a short and plain statement of the grounds for 14 the court’s jurisdiction,” (2) “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 15 pleader is entitled to relief,” and (3) “a demand for the relief sought.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). 16 The short and plain statement for relief “need not contain detailed factual allegations; 17 rather, it must plead ‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” 18 Clemens v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 534 F.3d 1017, 1022 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Bell Atl. 19 Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 20 678 (2009) (“The plausibility standard . . . asks for more than a sheer possibility that a 21 defendant has acted unlawfully.”). Rule 8 “demands more than an unadorned, the- 22 defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, and “conclusory 23 allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are not sufficient,” Pareto v. F.D.I.C., 139 24 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1998). Further, “[e]ach allegation must be simple, concise, and 25 direct.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1). Where a complaint contains the factual elements of a cause, 26 but those elements are scattered throughout the complaint without any meaningful 27 organization, the complaint does not set forth a “short and plain statement of the claim” for 28 purposes of Rule 8. Sparling v. Hoffman Constr. Co., 864 F.2d 635, 640 (9th Cir. 1988). 1 Thus, a complaint may be dismissed where it lacks a cognizable legal theory, lacks 2 sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory, or contains allegations disclosing 3 some absolute defense or bar to recovery. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 4 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988); Weisbuch v. Cnty. of L.A., 119 F.3d 778, 783, n.1 (9th Cir. 1997). 5 B. Plaintiff’s Complaint 6 In the Complaint, Plaintiff brings eleven counts against twenty Defendants. (See 7 Doc. 1). Plaintiff’s claims revolve around a dog size restriction in a dog park in Surprise. 8 (Id. at 9). Plaintiff alleges that no authorizing ordinance existed to allow the enforcement 9 of dog size restriction, and the Complaint recounts Plaintiff’s interactions with the City 10 Parks and Recreation Department, park rangers, police, and other private citizens. (Id.). 11 Plaintiff brings claims for First Amendment Retaliation (Count I), Unlawful Seizure in 12 violation of the Fourth Amendment (Count II), Violation of the Fourteenth Amendment 13 Right to Due Process (Count III), Civil Rights Conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count 14 IV), Municipal Liability (Count V), Failure to Intervene (Count VI), Defamation Per se 15 (Count VII), Abuse of Process (Count VIII), Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 16 (Count IX), Civil Conspiracy (Count X), False Light Invasion of Privacy (Count XI). (Id. 17 at 34–60). Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief as well as monetary damages. 18 (Id. at 61–62). The Complaint is 63 pages long and contains an additional 308 pages in 19 exhibits. (See Doc. 1). 20 C. Discussion 21 Plaintiff’s Complaint violates Rule 8 and will be dismissed. A complaint that says 22 “too little” may violate Rule 8 but so does “a pleading [that] says too much.” Knapp v. 23 Hogan, 738 F.3d 1106, 1109 (9th Cir. 2013) (citations omitted); see also, e.g., McHenry v. 24 Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1180 (9th Cir. 1996) (affirming dismissal of a 53-page complaint); 25 Nevijel v. N. Coast Life Ins. Co., 651 F.2d 671, 674 (9th Cir. 1981) (affirming dismissal of 26 a 48-page complaint); Agnew v. Moody, 330 F.2d 868, 870–71 (9th Cir. 1964) (affirming 27 dismissal of a 55-page complaint); Emmons v. Select Portfolio Servicing Inc., No. CV-16- 28 00557-TUC-JGZ, 2017 WL 6883690, at *3–4 (D. Ariz. Oct. 6, 2017) (dismissing a 43- 1 page complaint). 2 Plaintiff’s Complaint contains a lengthy narrative of the facts behind his claims, but 3 this is not the only defect under Rule 8.” Cafasso v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., 637 F.3d 1047, 4 1058 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[N]ormally verbosity or length is not by itself a basis for dismissing 5 a complaint.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Notwithstanding length, the 6 Complaint fails to give Defendants fair notice of Plaintiff’s claims. A pleading “without 7 simplicity, conciseness and clarity as to whom plaintiffs are suing for what wrongs[ ] fails 8 to perform the essential functions of a complaint.” McHenry, 84 F.3d at 1180. In addition, 9 “[p]leadings that make it difficult or impossible for defendants to make informed responses 10 to the plaintiff’s allegations are considered impermissible ‘shotgun’ pleadings. One type of 11 impermissible ‘shotgun’ pleading is a complaint that ‘assert[s] multiple claims against 12 multiple defendants without specifying which of the defendants are responsible for which 13 acts or omissions, or which of the defendants the claim is brought against.’ A second type 14 of ‘shotgun’ pleading is a complaint that incorporates a collection of general allegations 15 into each count by reference.” TV Ears, Inc. v. Joyshiya Dev. Ltd., No. 3:20-cv-01708- 16 WQH-BGS, 2021 WL 5396111, at *13 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 18, 2021). 17 Here, Plaintiff asserts several claims against Defendants as a whole, without 18 specifying which Defendants are responsible for which acts or omissions. In Count I, 19 Plaintiff brings a First Amendment Retaliation claim against all Defendants. (Doc. 1 at 34– 20 35). In the allegations under Count I, Plaintiff alleges that he engaged in several forms of 21 protected speech and conduct “at all relevant times,” and that Defendants “acting under 22 color of state law,” “engaged in a campaign of adverse actions against Plaintiff.” (Id. at 23 34). Plaintiff provides several examples of allegedly retaliatory acts but fails to explain 24 which Defendants engaged in what acts in retaliation against what protected speech. (Id. at 25 34–35). In Count III, Plaintiff brings a claim for Deprivation of Liberty Interest without 26 Due Process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment against all Defendants. (Id. at 38– 27 39). Again, in this Count, Plaintiff alleges numerous ways that his due process rights were 28 violated but does not attribute any specific action to any specific Defendant. (Id.). This 1 shotgun pleading style does not provide notice to Defendants and does not constitute a 2 plausible claim against any specific Defendant. In Count IV, Plaintiff brings a civil rights 3 conspiracy claim in violation of § 1983 against all Defendants. (Id. at 38). In doing so, 4 Plaintiff sets out allegations in broad strokes against groups of Defendants without 5 providing facts to explain how each alleged participant in the conspiracy entered into an 6 agreement with any other. See Franklin v. Fox, 312 F.3d 423, 441 (9th Cir. 2002) (“To 7 prove a conspiracy . . . [Plaintiff] must show an agreement or meeting of the minds to 8 violate constitutional rights.”). 9 The same is true for Counts IX, X, and XI. (Id. at 56–60). In Count IX, Plaintiff 10 brings a claim for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (“IIED”) against all 11 Defendants. (Id. at 56–57). Plaintiff’s allegations are generalized to the group, and do not 12 clarify who allegedly committed what act, describe any specific conduct, or state when the 13 conduct occurred. (Id.). In Count X, Plaintiff brings a civil conspiracy claim against all 14 Defendants. (Id. at 58–59). Describing the evidence supporting his claim, the only 15 individual Defendants identified are Defendants Knoll, Campbell, and Gaul. (Id.). Plaintiff 16 asserts that all Defendants are all jointly and severally liable for conspiracy to commit all 17 the underlying torts. (Id. at 59). Again, Plaintiff “asserts multiple claims against multiple 18 defendants without specifying which of the defendants are responsible for which acts or 19 omissions.” TV Ears, 2021 WL 5396111, at *13. Finally, in Count XI, Plaintiff brings a 20 claim for False Light Invasion of Privacy against all Defendants, alleging that “Defendants, 21 through the publications and communications alleged herein, gave publicity to a matter 22 concerning Plaintiff that placed him before the public in a false light.” (Id. at 60). The 23 generalized allegations as to all Defendants fail to provide fair notice to Defendants of the 24 specific claims against them. All of these “shotgun” claims fail under Rule 8. 25 The Court appreciates that in each Count, Plaintiff incorporates by reference the 26 preceding allegations in his Complaint. Although the Complaint may contain allegations 27 specific to each Defendant at some point throughout, Plaintiff must plead “factual content 28 that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 1 misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; see Cianci v. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 2 No. CV-25-00249-TUC-SHR, 2026 WL 173527, at *1 (D. Ariz. Jan. 22, 2026) (“A 3 complaint having the factual elements of a cause of action scattered throughout and not 4 organized into a ‘short and plain statement of the claim’ may be dismissed for failure to 5 satisfy Rule 8(a).”). Even Plaintiff’s claims against specific Defendants, for example the 6 claims for defamation and abuse of process, lack a short and plain statement of the factual 7 elements. (See Doc. 1 at 51–55). “It is not the Court’s responsibility to review a sprawling 8 narrative to determine which facts support [a plaintiff’s] claims.” Cianci, 2026 WL 173527, 9 at *2. 10 For all the reasons stated above, Plaintiff’s Complaint violates Rule 8. The shotgun 11 claims against all Defendants and failure to organize the claims into a short and plain 12 statement prevent the Court from fairly assessing the claims and fail to provide notice to 13 Defendants of the allegations against them. Therefore, the Complaint will be dismissed. 14 D. Leave to Amend 15 Plaintiff will be given an opportunity, if he chooses, to amend the complaint. See 16 Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1127 (“[A] district court should grant leave to amend even if no request 17 to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly 18 be cured by the allegation of other facts.”) (citation omitted). Any amended complaint filed 19 by Plaintiff must conform to the requirements of Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil 20 Procedure, which includes “a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s 21 jurisdiction.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1). 22 Plaintiff is advised that if he elects to file an amended complaint but fails to comply 23 with the instructions explained in this Order, fails to prosecute this action, or otherwise 24 fails to comply with the federal and local rules, the Court may dismiss the action with 25 prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil 26 Procedure, or both. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1179–80 (9th Cir. 1996) 27 (affirming dismissal with prejudice of amended complaint that did not comply with Rule 28 8(a)); Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260–61 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that the district 1 court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing a pro se plaintiff’s complaint for failing to 2 comply with court orders). 3 III. Motion to File Non-Electronic Exhibits 4 Along with his Complaint, Plaintiff filed a Motion to File Non-Electronic Exhibits 5 (Doc. 4). Plaintiff seeks to file 64 non-electronic exhibits that include letters, incident 6 reports, complaints, video and audio recordings, body-worn camera footage, and text 7 messages. (Id. at 3–5). At this time, the Court will deny the request because the exchange 8 of discovery and evidence at this stage is premature. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(d) 9 provides that “[a] party may not seek discovery from any source before the parties have 10 conferred as required by Rule 26(f), except in a proceeding exempted from initial 11 disclosure under Rule 26(a)(1)(B), or when authorized by these rules, by stipulation, or by 12 court order.” Evidence supporting the claims is not necessary because “this case is still in 13 the pleading stage” and “not in the evidence stage.” Young v. Univ. of Haw., No. 20-cv- 14 00231-DKW-RT, 2020 WL 4612380, at *5 (D. Haw. Aug. 11, 2020). “[A]t this point, 15 Plaintiff need only allege facts that will support his claims, he need not produce (or seek 16 to obtain) evidence to prove them at this time.” Id. Therefore, the Court will deny Plaintiff’s 17 Motion. 18 IV. Motion to Allow Electronic Filing 19 Plaintiff also filed a Motion to Allow Electronic Filing by a Party Appearing 20 Without an Attorney, in which he requests permission to electronically file and serve 21 documents. (Doc. 5). The motion will be denied. 22 Electronic filing requires parties to code their filing so that they are properly 23 docketed electronically. When electronically filed documents are not properly docketed, 24 they are not easily retrievable by the Court on its case management reports. Therefore, 25 because Plaintiff has not shown that he possesses the legal training necessary to properly 26 file and docket matters in this case, his request will be denied. 27 /// 28 /// 1 V. Conclusion 2 For the reasons stated above, 3 IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff's Application to Proceed in District Court Without 4| Prepaying Fees or Costs (Doc. 10) is granted. 5 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion to File Non-Electronic Exhibits (Doc. 4) is denied. 7 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion to Allow Electronic Filing (Doc. 5) 8 | 1s denied. 9 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Complaint (Doc. 1) is dismissed. 10 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff is granted leave to file an amended 11 | complaint in accordance with this Order no later than May 13, 2026. If Plaintiff elects to file an amended complaint, the amended complaint may not be served until and unless the 13 | Court screens it pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). 14 IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that if Plaintiff elects not to file an amended 15 | complaint by May 13, 2026, the Clerk of Court shall enter judgment dismissing this action 16 | without further order of this Court. 17 Dated this 15th day of April, 2026. 18 0 United States District kadge 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28