Ernest Quiroz Et Ux v. Alcoa Inc
Ernest Quiroz Et Ux v. Alcoa Inc
Opinion
¶1 We address whether an employer who used asbestos materials in its workplace before 1970 had a duty to protect the public from off-site contact with employees who may have been carrying asbestos fibers on their work clothes. Such exposure is referred to as secondary, or take-home, asbestos exposure. We hold that the employer owed no duty to the public regarding secondary asbestos exposure. No common law special relationship existed requiring the employer to protect the public from secondary asbestos exposure. Additionally, Plaintiffs/Appellants have identified no public policy giving rise to such a duty. Further, because we reject the duty framework contained in the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm ("Third Restatement"), we hold that no duty exists on that basis.
¶2 In reaching our decision today, we affirm Arizona's current duty framework in several key respects. First, duty is not presumed; in every negligence case, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving the existence of a duty. Second, pursuant to
Gipson v. Kasey
,
BACKGROUND 1
¶3 Ernest V. Quiroz died in October 2014 from mesothelioma, a form of cancer associated with exposure to asbestos. Quiroz's surviving wife, children, and parents (collectively, "the Family") filed a lawsuit, alleging Defendants Reynolds Metal Company, Alcoa, Inc., and Reywest Development Company (collectively, "Reynolds") negligently caused his death. Specifically, the Family alleges that when Quiroz's father ("Father") was working at Reynolds' plant from 1948 until 1983, his clothes were contaminated with asbestos fibers. The Family contends that when Father came home from work, Quiroz, who lived with Father as a minor from 1952 to 1970, was exposed to the asbestos fibers on Father's clothes. The Family further contends this exposure eventually caused Quiroz's mesothelioma.
¶4 The Family asserts that Reynolds had a duty to protect Quiroz from exposure to take-home asbestos. They contend Reynolds breached this duty by failing to warn Father about the dangers of secondary asbestos exposure. The Family also alleges that Reynolds failed to provide safety equipment to Father and failed to take necessary safety measures to protect Quiroz from such exposure.
¶5 Reynolds filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting it owed no duty to Quiroz. The superior court granted Reynolds' motion, and the court of appeals affirmed.
Quiroz v. ALCOA Inc.
,
¶6 We granted review because the Family raises two issues of statewide importance: (1) whether Reynolds owed a duty to Quiroz; and (2) whether Arizona should adopt the duty framework contained in the Third Restatement. We have jurisdiction pursuant to article 6, section 5(3), of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. § 12-120.24.
DISCUSSION
I.
¶7 To establish a defendant's liability for a negligence claim, a plaintiff must prove: (1) a duty requiring the defendant to
conform to a certain standard of care; (2) breach of that standard; (3) a causal connection between the breach and the resulting injury; and (4) actual damages.
Gipson
,
A. Foreseeability
¶8 Foreseeability is a concept that can be used in different ways to determine tort liability. For many years, Arizona, like most jurisdictions, used foreseeability as a factor in determining duty. A duty based on foreseeability exists when a defendant realizes or should realize that his conduct creates an unreasonable risk of harm to a "foreseeable plaintiff."
Rossell v. Volkswagen of Am.
,
¶9 Foreseeability can also be used to determine whether the defendant breached the relevant standard of care or caused the plaintiff's injury.
Gipson,
¶10 Prior to
Gipson
, some Arizona courts limited foreseeability to determining the issue of breach.
See
Markowitz
,
¶11 In
Gipson
, this Court expressly held "that foreseeability is not a factor to be considered by courts when making determinations of duty, and we reject any contrary suggestion in prior opinions."
¶12 Thus,
Gipson
enacted a sea change in Arizona tort law by removing foreseeability from our duty framework.
See, e.g.
,
Guerra v. State
,
¶13 To be clear, in eliminating foreseeability,
Gipson
changed our
duty framework
by limiting the duty analysis to special relationships and public policy
.
Infra
¶ 14. It did not, however, narrow the circumstances in which an actor may be liable for
negligent conduct
. Additionally,
Gipson
did not completely remove foreseeability from our negligence framework. Rather,
Gipson
held that foreseeability may still be used in determining breach and causation.
B. Special Relationships and Public Policy
¶14 Based on
Gipson's
elimination of foreseeability, duty in Arizona is based on either recognized common law special relationships or relationships created by public policy.
See
Guerra
,
¶15 Public policy creating a duty is based on our state and federal statutes and the common law.
See
Gipson
,
¶16 To be sure, in a country such as ours with over 300 million people, duties based on public policy are necessary to govern relationships between people who may be legal "strangers." For example, traffic laws give rise to duties regulating conduct between motorists.
Evans v. Pickett
,
II.
A. Duty Based on Public Policy
¶17 The Family urges us to recognize a duty in this case by considering various public policy grounds.
See, e.g.
,
Bloxham v. Glock, Inc.
,
¶18 In Arizona, our primary source for identifying a duty based on public policy is our state statutes.
See
Gipson
,
¶19 This litany of cases demonstrates that, in the absence of a statute, we exercise great restraint in declaring public policy. As we stated in
Ray v. Tucson Medical Center
,
The declaration of "public policy" is primarily a legislative function. The courts unquestionably have authority to declare a public policy which already exists and to base its decisions upon that ground. But in the absence of a legislative declaration of what that public policy is, before courts are justified in declaring its existence such public policy should be so thoroughly established as a state of public mind, so united and so definite and fixed that its existence is not subject to any substantial doubt.
Cf.
Stanley v. McCarver
,
Local 266, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, A. F. of L. v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement &
Power Dist.
,
¶20 We have also recognized public policy giving rise to a duty based on the common law-specifically, case law and Restatement sections consistent with Arizona law.
Supra
¶¶ 14-15. However, reliance on the common law does not mean that this Court establishes duties based on our own notions of appropriate public policy. Thus, even in those cases where we have mentioned "social concerns" in relation to tort duties, we have ultimately premised the existence of a duty on a statute or a recognized special relationship.
See, e.g.
,
Stanley
,
¶21 Accordingly, we conclude the Family has failed to identify a valid public policy creating a legal relationship giving rise to a duty.
B. Duty Based on a Special Relationship
¶22 There is no dispute that Reynolds, as Father's employer, owed a duty of care to Father.
See
Bogue v. Better-Bilt Aluminum Co.
,
¶23 We reject this argument because there is no legally recognized special relationship giving rise to a duty between Reynolds and Quiroz. Quiroz did not have an employer-employee relationship with Reynolds, and there is no allegation that Reynolds created a special relationship with Quiroz based on a contract or a negligent undertaking.
See
supra
¶ 14. Additionally, Reynolds and Quiroz shared no relationship as landowner-invitee or landowner-licensee. Quiroz suffered no injury on Reynolds' property, nor was he injured while entering or leaving Reynolds' property.
See
Wickham v. Hopkins
,
¶24 Even so, both the Family and the dissent argue that landowners such as Reynolds owe a general duty of care to the public for off-premises injuries. Specifically, they claim that Reynolds owes a duty of care to anyone who is injured by its "risk-creating conduct," "even when the harm occurs off-premises." See infra ¶¶ 95, 110.
¶25 The general duty proposed by the Family and the dissent surpasses the bounds of Arizona law. While our case law recognizes that landowners may , in some circumstances, owe a duty of care for off-premises injuries, it does not support the Family's far more sweeping claim that landowners owe a general duty to the public for off-premises injuries. 3 Indeed, none of the authorities cited by the Family or the dissent support the existence of such a broad duty.
¶26 The Family's reliance on
Udy v. Calvary Corp.
,
¶27 The court of appeals reversed, stating that the location of the injury was not a factor in determining the existence of a duty.
¶28
Udy
has no application here. Of course, if a special relationship exists between a landowner and an injured plaintiff, a duty exists even if the injury occurs off-premises.
Udy
,
¶29 The Family next contends that
Burns v. Jaquays Mining Corp.
,
¶30 In
Burns
, the defendant landowner owned an asbestos mill. The asbestos fibers and waste from the mill blew into a neighboring trailer park.
¶31 The residents eventually filed claims against the mill for negligence, gross negligence, strict liability, and nuisance, alleging their exposure to airborne asbestos increased their risk of developing asbestos-related diseases in the future.
¶32 The court of appeals affirmed the superior court's grant of summary judgment as to the residents' negligence claim.
¶33 However,
Burns
reversed the trial court's dismissal of the residents' nuisance claim.
Burns
concluded that, based on
Ayers v. Twp. of Jackson
,
¶34 The Family reads too much into
Burns
. The Family has never alleged that Reynolds created a nuisance. Perhaps more importantly,
Burns
did not address duty; it addressed damages.
¶35
MacNeil v. Perkins
,
C. Duty Based on Foreseeability
¶36 Despite
Gipson's
express rejection of foreseeability as a factor in determining duty, both the Family and the dissent attempt to support their general duty claim by citing cases and the Second Restatement sections that rely on foreseeability. For example, as support for its general off-premises duty, the dissent quotes
Crouse v. Wilbur-Ellis Co.
,
¶37 Amicus and the dissent also argue that
Carver v. Salt River Valley Water Users' Association
,
¶38 Carver does not support a general off-premises duty. Section 364, by its terms, undeniably relies on foreseeability to determine a landowner's "liability." Thus, post- Gipson , § 364 cannot be used as a basis for creating the far-reaching general duty proposed by Amicus and the dissent.
¶39 Of course,
Carver
can be reconciled with Arizona law without doing violence to
Gipson
. Indeed, it is well-established in Arizona that landowners owe a duty to persons travelling on public highways adjacent to their property.
See, e.g.
,
Carrow Co. v. Lusby
,
¶40 Finally, the Family urges us to impose a general duty on landowners for off-premises injuries based on § 371 of the Second Restatement, which provides:
A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm to others outside of the land caused by an activity carried on by him thereon which he realizes or should realize will involve an unreasonable risk of physical harm to them under the same conditions as though the activity were carried on at a neutral place.
¶41 We generally follow the Restatement unless it conflicts with Arizona law.
Barnes v. Outlaw
,
¶42 The Family asserts that, when considering a defendant's "liability" under § 371, Gipson permits us to apply this section to determine whether a landowner has breached the standard of care or caused a plaintiff's injury. We agree. Plainly, Gipson does not prohibit a court from using foreseeability to determine breach and causation. See supra ¶ 13. However, breach and causation are not at issue in this appeal. As relevant here, the Family cannot, in fidelity to Gipson , use § 371 to create a duty.
¶43 Even if we ignored the fact that § 371 is based on foreseeability, this section does not, by its terms, create or impose a general duty on landowners for off-premises injuries. Indeed, the dissent recognizes that § 371 does not create such a duty. Infra ¶ 111.
¶44 Section 371 directs that a landowner is liable for injuries he causes outside his property "under the same conditions as though the activity were carried on at a neutral place." The comments define "neutral place" to mean a place "in which both the person who does the act and the person who sustains bodily harm have an equal right or privilege or absence of right or privilege to be." Id. cmt. a. Such places include "a highway, public hall or other public place," as well as "land in the possession of a third person." Id.
¶45 In short, a landowner's liability under § 371 is not limited by the common law rules regarding a plaintiff who enters the landowner's property (designating the plaintiff as a licensee, invitee, or trespasser). Such designations have no relevance in a "neutral place" where both parties have an equal right to occupy the property. Of course, any liability under this section presupposes that the landowner owes some recognized duty to the plaintiff. Thus, absent a special relationship or public policy creating a duty, § 371 does not, by itself, create a duty.
¶46 In sum, in an effort to expand the limits of a landowner's duty for off-premises injuries, the dissent seeks to rely on cases and Restatement sections premised on foreseeability. To avoid the obvious conflict this approach creates with Gipson , they recharacterize the subject cases and Restatement sections by claiming they do not rely on foreseeability to determine duty , but rather they support "a finding of negligence and thus liability." Infra ¶ 114.
¶47 There are two fundamental problems with this approach. First, whether it falls under the general auspices of "negligence" or "liability," both the Family and the dissent are in fact using cases and Restatement sections premised on foreseeability to create a new duty. Second, by characterizing the duty analysis as one addressing "negligence" or "liability," they ignore duty as a separate element of a negligence claim, and obscure the lines between duty, breach, and causation.
¶48 Thus, we disagree with the Family and the dissent. Duty is a separate, material element of every negligence claim; it should not be effectively removed as an element by merging it with the broad terms of "negligence" and "liability." Additionally, because Gipson has changed Arizona law by removing foreseeability from the duty framework, we cannot rely on foreseeability to expand the duties of landowners.
D. Other Jurisdictions
¶49 Our determination that Reynolds owed no duty to Quiroz for secondary exposure to asbestos is consistent with decisions in other jurisdictions.
See, e.g.
,
Riedel v. ICI Ams. Inc.
,
¶50 In contrast, jurisdictions that have recognized a duty in take-home asbestos cases have relied on foreseeability, a factor that is not considered in Arizona when determining duty.
See, e.g.
,
Martin
,
II.
¶51 The Family also argues that we should recognize a duty based on the Third Restatement. Specifically, the Family cites to § 7 and to § 54, which provides that a duty exists for possessors of land "for artificial conditions or conduct on the land that poses a risk of physical harm to persons or property not on the land." See also id . § 54 cmt. b (stating that § 54 is a special application of § 7). For the reasons discussed below, we reject the Third Restatement approach.
A. Third Restatement Duty Framework
¶52 Under the Third Restatement, duty is "ordinarily" presumed to exist when a defendant, by his actions, creates a risk of harm to a plaintiff. Third Restatement § 7(a). This presumed duty relieves the plaintiff of the burden of proving duty, and requires the defendant to show that, based on some "countervailing principle or policy," a no-duty rule should apply to its case.
¶53 In deciding whether to create a no-duty rule, courts must "determine legislative facts necessary to decide whether a no-duty rule is appropriate in a particular category of cases." Third Restatement § 7 cmt. b. This procedure requires courts, at the request of the defendant, to engage in a multi-factored policy analysis, considering such matters as "general social norms of responsibility" and the "overall social impact of imposing" a duty on a "class of actors."
¶54 The Third Restatement also provides that no duty is presumed to exist when a passive defendant, through inaction, fails to protect a plaintiff from harm.
¶55 The purported distinction, however, between § 7 and § 37 is illusory, because the Third Restatement defines "risk creation" so broadly that virtually every case falls under the presumed duty of § 7. This problem stems from the fact that, practically speaking, a defendant can increase the risk of harm to a plaintiff by both his actions (§ 7) and by his failure to act to protect the plaintiff from harm (§ 37). Thus, the Third Restatement emphasizes that risk creation is not limited to conduct that
actually
creates a risk of harm but includes any conduct that might
possibly increase
the risk of harm.
See
¶56 Additionally, risk creation is not confined to the specific act that causes an injury. Rather, a defendant creates a risk of harm if, at any point during the "entire course of conduct" leading up to plaintiff's injury, he commits an act that "set in motion a risk of harm."
Satterfield
,
¶57 The illustrations provided by the Third Restatement also demonstrate how broadly it views the concept of risk creation. For example, furnishing a gun to another person creates
a presumed duty because it increases the possibility that someone might be shot with the gun.
See
¶58 Additionally, the Third Restatement's risk-creation framework essentially gives rise to a presumed duty every time a plaintiff is injured by a defendant. As a practical matter, by alleging that a defendant caused his injury, a plaintiff necessarily asserts that defendant's conduct created a risk of physical injury.
See
¶59 The Third Restatement also provides that foreseeability is not a factor in determining duty. Third Restatement § 7 cmt. j. However, like
Gipson
, foreseeability may be used to determine breach and causation.
See
¶60 Unfortunately, by eliminating foreseeability and replacing it with risk creation, the Third Restatement only generates more confusion because, as a practical matter, the two concepts are so similar they are difficult to distinguish. Foreseeability recognizes a duty when a defendant realizes or should realize that he has created an unreasonable risk of harm to a "foreseeable plaintiff."
See
supra
¶ 8. Similarly, under the Third Restatement, risk creation establishes that a duty exists when a defendant's conduct creates an unreasonable risk of harm to a plaintiff.
See
supra
¶¶ 52, 55-56;
see also
W. Jonathan Cardi & Michael D. Green,
Duty Wars
,
¶61 Conceptually, however, there is one very important difference between foreseeability and risk creation. While foreseeability limits duty to foreseeable plaintiffs who are in the "zone of danger," risk creation gives rise to a vastly broader duty encompassing both foreseeable plaintiffs and unforeseeable plaintiffs who may or may not be within the "zone of danger." See Third Restatement § 7 Reporter's Note to cmt. j (stating that under the Third Restatement, "[s]o long as the actor's conduct created a risk of harm," which is "the predicate for a duty" under § 7, then "foreseeability has no role" in determining whether a duty exists).
B. Duty Under Arizona Law
¶62 Arizona has not adopted the Third Restatement duty framework.
See
Alcombrack
,
¶63 The Third Restatement's duty framework uses a "different conceptual approach" than Arizona's.
Gipson
,
¶64 None of the cases cited by the Family or the dissent support their contention that Arizona, like the Third Restatement, presumes a duty when a defendant creates a risk of harm. The Family's reliance on
Ontiveros
for this proposition is misplaced. In
Ontiveros
, we addressed the harm caused by drunk drivers and noted that courts from other jurisdictions had also expressed concerns about this problem. 136 Ariz. at 508-09, 667 P.2d at 208-09. In this context, we referenced the following statement made by the Alaska Supreme Court in
Nazareno v. Urie,
¶65 Ontiveros 's citation to Nazareno should not be read out of context. Ontiveros did not recognize the existence of a presumed duty based on risk creation. Rather, Ontiveros addressed the issue of duty by using Arizona's well-established duty framework: special relationships and public policy. Thus, Ontiveros held that, based on a statute, a duty existed on public policy grounds. 136 Ariz. at 509-11, 667 P.2d at 209-11. In addition, Ontiveros recognized a duty based on the special relationship existing between a licensee and a patron. We stated that "[d]uty is a concept which arises out of the recognition that relations between individuals may impose upon one a legal obligation for the benefit of the other," and that "changing social conditions require recognition of a duty which extends to innocent third parties and which is based on the relation of the licensed supplier of liquor and his patron ." Id . at 508, 667 P.2d at 208 (emphasis added). We emphasized that such a duty is based on "the obligation of a licensee to help control the conduct of others who are patrons of his establishment. Such duties are recognized where a special relationship exists between the actor and the third person ." Id. at 511 n.4, 667 P.2d at 211 (emphasis added) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
¶66 The Family also conflates cases recognizing a duty based on a negligent undertaking with the Third Restatement's risk-creation framework. A duty based on a negligent undertaking does not arise solely because a defendant committed an act that might harm someone. Rather, a duty based on a negligent undertaking exists when a person, who otherwise owed no duty to plaintiff, voluntarily agrees to provide services for another person; under such circumstances, the person assumes a duty to exercise reasonable care in providing those services. Second Restatement § 323.
¶67 Thus, in
Stanley
, we held that a radiologist paid by an employer to review a job applicant's x-rays for a pre-employment
exam assumed a duty of reasonable care to the applicant in reading her x-rays.
¶68 The Family and the dissent err by placing undue emphasis on the broad language from
Ontiveros
(the "duty to avoid creating situations which pose an unreasonable risk of harm").
Supra
¶ 64. As noted above,
Ontiveros
itself did not create a duty based on this language.
See
supra
¶¶ 64-65. Likewise, none of the cases cited by the Family and the dissent actually base the existence of a duty on this language. For example, in
Gipson
, we stated (in a footnote) that "one could conclude that people generally owe a duty to exercise reasonable care to avoid causing physical harm to others."
¶69 Additionally,
Martinez v. Woodmar IV Condominiums Homeowners Ass'n
,
¶70 Finally, the dissent argues that Arizona, by adopting Second Restatement § 302, "anticipates" the risk-creation approach used by the Third Restatement. See infra ¶ 121. Specifically, the dissent argues that § 302 demonstrates that both the Second Restatement and the Third Restatement presume a duty exists when a defendant, by his affirmative actions, creates a risk of harm to a plaintiff. Infra ¶ 121.
¶71 We disagree. As a preliminary matter, § 302 addresses whether a defendant's conduct violates the standard of care (breach), not duty. See Second Restatement § 302 cmt. a ("This Section is concerned only with the negligent character of the actor's conduct, and not with his duty to avoid the unreasonable risk.").
¶72 But more importantly, § 302 does not, by its terms, create a
presumed
duty of care based on a defendant's affirmative acts. Rather, § 302, like all duties under the Restatement
Second, hinges on proof of foreseeability.
Id
. § 302 cmt. a;
see also
Prosser & Keeton, § 43, at 285 (noting that the Restatement of Torts adopted foreseeability as a basis for duty);
see
Fedie v. Travelodge Int'l, Inc.
,
¶73 Given the fact that Gipson rejects foreseeability as a factor in determining duty, § 302 cannot, consistent with our law, provide a source for duty.
C. Rejection of Third Restatement
¶74 The Third Restatement unquestionably provides a "different conceptual approach" to duty.
See
supra
¶ 63;
Gipson
,
¶75 The primary flaw in the Third Restatement's risk-creation framework is that it effectively creates a presumed duty of care owed by all people at all times. See supra § II(A). It does this in two ways. First, apart from a general admonition to do nothing to create a risk of harm to "others"-which of course, encompasses almost anything that we do-the Third Restatement provides no fixed rights or obligations. Such a duty framework, however, fails to answer the difficult question underlying duty: to whom does a person owe a duty? Rather than answering this question, the Third Restatement avoids it by stating a duty is owed to everyone all the time.
¶76 Avoiding this issue does not resolve it. As Prosser & Keeton note, "The rule that you are to love your neighbor becomes in law, you must not injure your neighbor; and the lawyer's question,.... Who, then, in law is my neighbor?" Prosser & Keeton, § 53, at 358 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In answering this question, we cannot provide any meaningful guidance to courts and practitioners without defining the rights and obligations of the parties before a plaintiff is injured. In short, we recognize that "before negligence can be predicated [on] a given act, [in] back of the act must be sought and found a duty to the individual complaining."
Palsgraf
,
¶77 Thus, in Arizona we have sought, by means of special relationships and relationships created by public policy, to define the rights and obligations of the parties
before
a defendant, by his acts or omissions, places a plaintiff at risk of physical injury.
See
supra
¶¶ 14-15, 63;
Markowitz
,
¶78 By presuming a duty is owed to everyone, the Third Restatement eliminates duty as a separate element of a negligence claim. Under the risk-creation framework, duty exists whenever a plaintiff suffers an injury; as a result, the issue of duty is subsumed by causation. See supra ¶ 58. Additionally, by focusing on a person's conduct, or how a person acts, the Third Restatement conflates duty with the standard of care.
¶79 The dissent demonstrates this flaw in the Third Restatement approach by arguing that Reynolds owed a duty to Quiroz because the "manner" in which it "operat[ed]" its factory created a risk of exposing Quiroz to take-home asbestos. See infra ¶ 95. But the manner in which Reynolds operated its plant addresses the issue of how Reynolds should have acted, not whether Reynolds owed a duty to Quiroz in the first place. As Prosser & Keeton state:
It is better to reserve "duty" for the problem of the relation between individuals which imposes upon one a legal obligation for the benefit of the other, and to deal with particular conduct in terms of a legal standard of what is required to meet the obligation.... What the defendant must do, or must not do, is a question of the standard of conduct required to satisfy the duty .
Prosser & Keeton, § 53, at 356 (emphasis added);
see also
Martinez
,
¶80 Creating a tort law system based on a presumed duty owed by everyone all the time carries with it serious consequences. As an initial matter, limitless duties expand tort liability beyond manageable bounds.
¶81 The present case illustrates this point. Under the Third Restatement approach, Reynolds would have owed a presumed duty of care to any person that Father encountered after leaving the plant (assuming, of course, that Father was carrying asbestos fibers on his clothes). As a result, Reynolds would have owed a presumed duty of care to Father's neighbors and friends, babysitters and cab drivers, waiters and bartenders, dentists and physicians, and fellow church members. If the asbestos fibers were transferred to the clothes of Father's children, then the presumed duty of care would have extended to the children's playmates, schoolmates, and teachers. And of course, if each person contacted by Father or his family members transferred asbestos fibers to other third parties, then Reynolds' presumed duty would have expanded to an even wider circle of potential plaintiffs.
¶82 Other courts addressing take-home asbestos illustrate these concerns about the limitless scope of such a duty. For example,
Satterfield
, which adopted the Third Restatement duty approach in combination with foreseeability, acknowledged that an employer's liability for take-home asbestos would extend "to those who regularly and repeatedly come into close contact with an employee's contaminated work clothes over an extended period of time, regardless of whether they live in the employee's home or are a family member."
¶83 The dissent contends, however, that adopting the Third Restatement would not lead to limitless liability because § 7(b) allows courts to create "no-duty" rules. See infra ¶ 115. While true, the burden of proving a no-duty rule rests squarely on the shoulders of the defendant. Moreover, defendants seeking relief from the presumed duty of care face a daunting task; they must convince a court that, in their cases, a no-duty rule is justified based on "general social norms of responsibility" and the "overall social impact" of imposing such a no-duty rule. See supra ¶ 53. Moreover, such a procedure is at odds with the judicial restraint we exercise in declaring public policy. See supra ¶¶ 18-19.
¶84 The dissent also claims that even with a presumed duty, a plaintiff must still prove breach and causation to impose liability on a defendant. See infra ¶ 115. Of course, this ignores the fact the Third Restatement creates a limitless duty owed by a defendant to the whole world. As Prosser & Keeton note, "[Duty] is embedded far too firmly in our law to be discarded, and no satisfactory substitute for it, by which the defendant's responsibility may be limited, has been devised." Prosser & Keeton, § 53, at 358. Plainly, presuming duty effectively creates the risk of unlimited liability because "[i]t throws the question of any limitation back into the morass of 'proximate cause' and the search for some reasonably close connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury." Id . § 43 at 287; see also Third Restatement § 29 and cmts. a and f (stating that apart from creating a no-duty rule under § 7(b), factual cause, formerly known as proximate cause, is the Third Restatement's means of limiting a defendant's liability).
¶85 The Third Restatement's limitless duty also distorts the tort law's goals of compensating injured parties and deterring negligent conduct.
See
Prosser & Keeton, § 4, at 20-26. Unlike the Third Restatement approach, we have never held that every defendant is automatically subject to tort liability whenever its negligence causes an injury to a plaintiff. Rather, before a plaintiff can seek compensation from a defendant, he must first show the defendant owed him a duty to prevent or avoid the injury in the first place.
Markowitz
,
¶86 Similarly, imposing a limitless tort duty on society may well deter negligent behavior, but it leaves little room for individual liberty and personal autonomy. Under such a framework, there are no fixed rights or duties prescribing a person's responsibilities before they act. Rather, every act a person or business engages in exposes them to tort liability.
¶87 The dissent contends, however, that the Third Restatement's duty framework reflects "the common law understanding of duty." Infra ¶ 129. In support of this assertion, it offers the hypothetical case of a person swinging a golf club. According to the dissent, when a person swings a golf club, such an action creates a duty "to persons thereby exposed to the risk of physical injury." See infra ¶ 94.
¶88 We agree a duty exists, but not based on the Third Restatement's concept of risk creation. Rather, a duty exists based on either a special relationship or a public-policy-created relationship between the golfer and those within reach of his club. 6 One does not have to look far to find a criminal statute prohibiting a person from recklessly assaulting strangers with a dangerous instrument. See A.R.S. § 13-1203(A) (stating it is a crime to assault another person); A.R.S. § 13-1204(A)(2) (stating it is a felony offense to assault a person with a dangerous instrument); see also A.R.S. § 13-105(12) (defining "dangerous instrument").
¶89 Of course, it would be "simpler" if everyone owed a legal duty of care to all people at all times. Doubtless, if such a general duty existed, courts would not have to grapple with the issue of duty at all. But "[l]ife will have to be made over, and human nature transformed" before such a duty could "be accepted as the norm of conduct, the customary standard to which behavior must conform."
Palsgraf
,
CONCLUSION
¶90 We hold Reynolds had no duty to protect Quiroz from exposure to take-home asbestos. No special relationship existed between Reynolds and Quiroz, and no duty existed based on public policy. Additionally, because we reject the duty framework contained in the Third Restatement, no duty exists on that basis. As a result, although we agree with the court of appeals' ultimate holding, because we disagree, in part, with its reasoning, we vacate its opinion. We affirm the superior court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Reynolds.
BALES, C.J., joined by PELANDER, V.C.J., as to parts I and II, dissenting:
¶91 The majority holds that an employer who knew its workers were being exposed to toxic asbestos dust on the job and failed to warn them or provide reasonable protective measures, such as overalls, showers, or changing facilities, owed no duty of care to children who developed mesothelioma from dust carried home in their parents' work clothes. Although the employer created the risk of physical harm-and failed to warn its employees or the persons ultimately injured-the majority concludes that the employer must be immunized from even the prospect of liability, no matter how reckless or otherwise unreasonable its conduct may have been. This result, the majority contends, serves to protect the employer's "individual liberty." Supra ¶ 86. One would think the children had a greater right to be free from others unreasonably exposing them to risks of debilitating and life-threatening illness.
¶92 Our tort law generally does not privilege those who expose others to unreasonable risks of physical injury, but instead seeks to compensate those who are harmed by such conduct. Recognizing a duty here-which does not mean that the employer is necessarily liable or that all persons owe a duty to others at all times-comports with Arizona caselaw, § 371 of the Second Restatement, and § 7 of the Third Restatement. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
I.
¶93 Arizona courts routinely discuss two sources of duty: special relationships and public policy. Although the majority strains to narrowly delimit these sources, this Court has defined both broadly.
See
Gipson v. Kasey
,
¶94 As a general rule, an actor owes a duty of reasonable care when engaging in activities that expose others to risks of physical harm. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 302 cmt. a (Am. Law Inst. 1965) ("Second Restatement") (noting duty to refrain from affirmative acts that involve an unreasonable risk of harm to another). If an individual "acts at all, [he or she] must exercise reasonable care to make his [or her] acts safe for others." Id . § 4 cmt. b. But our tort law imposes duties more narrowly with regard to protecting persons from risks created by others. See id . § 315 (noting there is no duty to control a third person to prevent physical harm absent circumstances, including special relationships, that may give rise to duty of control or right of protection). This distinction is illustrated by a simple example: a person swinging a golf club while walking on a sidewalk owes a duty of care to persons thereby exposed to the risk of physical injury. But a bystander would generally not have any duty to warn or otherwise protect others from the person swinging the club absent some special relationship giving rise to a right to protection.
¶95 The majority errs by refusing to recognize that the risk of physical injury here was created by the employer's manner of operating its factory-exposing its workers without warning to toxic asbestos dust and failing to provide any workplace protective measures, which resulted in the diffusion of the dust beyond the employer's premises. The employer's own risk-creating conduct suffices to create a duty of care, regardless whether the employer may have otherwise been in a "special relationship" with the injured parties that gave them a right to protection from risks created by third parties.
See
Martinez v. Woodmar IV Condominiums Homeowners Ass'n
,
II.
¶96 Recognizing the employer's potential liability here comports with both this Court's caselaw and § 371 of the Second Restatement. This Court has long recognized that a landowner owes a duty to individuals off-premises who may be harmed by the landowner's on-premises activity.
¶97 For example, in
Crouse
, the Court recognized that a cotton farmer owed a duty of care to not harm a neighboring farmer's cantaloupe fields when crop dusting his cotton fields.
Crouse v. Wilbur-Ellis Co
.,
The whole modern law of negligence, with its many developments, enforces the duty of fellow-citizens to observe in varying circumstances an appropriate measure of prudence to avoid causing harm to one another. The situations in which we are under no such duty appear at this day not as normal, but as exceptional. A man cannot keep shop or walk into the street without being entitled to expect and bound to practice observances in this kind.
¶98 Then, in Carver , this Court adopted § 364 of the Second Restatement, which states that "[a] possessor of land is subject to liability to others outside the land for physical harm caused by a structure or other artificial condition on the land, which the possessor realizes or should realize will involve an unreasonable risk of such harm."
Carver v. Salt River Valley Water Users' Ass'n
,
¶99 Furthermore, in
MacNeil
, the Court extended the attractive nuisance doctrine to encompass children injured off the landowner's property.
MacNeil v. Perkins
,
¶100 Lastly, in the most factually analogous situation to this case, our court of appeals recognized a landowner's duty to persons harmed by asbestos carried off the landowner's land. In
Burns
, residents of a trailer park sued a landowner for personal injuries and property damage based on theories of negligence, strict liability, and nuisance because the wind blew asbestos fibers from the landowner's mill onto a trailer park, thereby exposing the residents to asbestos.
Burns v. Jaquays Mining Corp
.,
¶101 The majority attempts to discount
Burns
by observing that the decision addressed damages; the "court never determined, expressly or impliedly, that the mill owner owed a duty to the residents as to airborne asbestos," and that negligence claims are distinct from nuisance claims.
Supra
¶ 34. These arguments misapprehend the significance of
Burns
. The court of appeals upheld the claim for damages for medical monitoring, and such a claim presumes a duty of reasonable care by the mill operator, whether the claim is based on negligence or nuisance.
Burns
did not specify the basis for the medical monitoring damages, but such a claim generally is grounded in the defendant's negligence.
See
In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litigation
,
¶102 But even if
Burns
approved recovery for medical monitoring based on the mill operator's creating a nuisance, a claim for nuisance reflects the duty of a possessor of land to "[s]o use your own property as not to injure the rights of another."
United Verde Extension Mining Co. v. Ralston
,
¶103 This litany of cases demonstrates that Arizona law has expressly acknowledged that a landowner's duty of care does not just encompass those who are on his or her premises or otherwise have some "special relationship" to the landowner. Rather, such a duty can extend to persons injured off the landowner's property, whether or not the landowner had some pre-existing "special relationship" with them other than the conduct creating the risk of harm.
¶104 The majority unconvincingly seeks to distinguish these cases based on the nature of the parties or their claims,
supra
¶¶ 34-39, or to discount them as basing duty on foreseeability. Pre-
Gipson
cases such as
Crouse
often conflate discussions of duty with the standard of care (which frequently turns on foreseeability), but that fact does not support denying the existence of duty, but instead recognizing that "[d]uty in a given situation is commensurate with the dangers involved."
Crouse
,
¶105 The majority discounts
Carver
as turning on the "right" to safe travel on public highways,
supra
¶ 39, but does not explain why there is no "right" to be free from being unreasonably (and unknowingly) exposed to lethal risks within one's home rather than the highway. (Of course, the duty to drive with reasonable care applies even when one drives on private property, such as a shopping center parking lot, and is not limited to those with whom the driver has a "special relationship" or to the driver's complying with traffic laws.) And even if a duty of care here must be grounded on public policy, that requirement is met by Arizona's longstanding common law principle that persons must act reasonably when they create risks of physical injury to others,
see, e.g.,
Nunez v. Prof'l Transit Mgmt. of Tucson, Inc
.,
¶106 Arizona's case law recognizing a landowner's duty to those injured by on-premises activity is consistent with § 371 of the Second Restatement, which also supports imposing potential liability on Reynolds. Section 371 provides:
A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm to others outside of the land caused by an activity carried on by him thereon which he realizes or should realize will involve an unreasonable risk of physical harm to them under the same conditions as though the activity were carried on at a neutral place.
¶107 Nothing about § 371 is novel. Rather, it reflects a long-accepted common law rule that a landowner's duty of care extends to others off the land who are physically harmed by activity occurring on the land. As Prosser and Keeton note:
The possessor of land is first of all required to exercise reasonable care, with regard to any activities which he carries on, for the protection of those outside of his premises. He may be liable if he blows a whistle where it will frighten horses in the street, or operates a barrel hoist which is dangerous to adjoining property, or runs a factory so that it gives out unnecessary noise or smoke.
Prosser & Keeton, The Law of Torts § 57, at 387 (5th ed. 1984); see also Richard A. Epstein, Torts § 12.1, at 310 (1999) (discussing a landowner's duty of care for any dangerous, artificial conditions on his premises "whose consequences spill over beyond the boundaries of the property"). In fact, the principles underlying § 371 are reiterated throughout the Second Restatement. See, e.g ., Second Restatement § 302 cmt. c., illus. 1 ("A sets a fire on his own land, with a strong wind blowing towards B's house. Without any other negligence on the part of A, the fire escapes from A's land and burns down B's house. A may be found negligent toward B in setting the fire."). Thus, at common law, a landowner's duty of care did not end at his property line.
¶108 Section 371 and the common law reflect common sense. If Dottie played baseball on her property and hit Kit, Dottie's duty of care should not be defeated simply because Kit was not on Dottie's property. See Richard A. Epstein, Torts § 12.1, at 310 (1999) ("Thus if D allows baseball to be played on his land, then liability for negligence may attach if insufficient precautions are taken to keep the ball from leaving the field."). Although a landowner may use his land for his own benefit, this privilege is "bounded by principles of reasonableness." See Prosser & Keeton, supra ¶ 107, § 57 at 386. One owes a duty to exercise reasonable care when engaging in activity on one's property. Id .
¶109 Just as Reynolds owes a duty of care to ensure that the wind does not blow asbestos dust from its factory to Quiroz's home, Reynolds should likewise owe a duty of care to ensure that its employees do not carry the asbestos dust there.
See
Dan B. Dobbs, Paul T. Hayden & Ellen M. Bublick,
The Law of Torts
§ 272 (2d ed. 2011) (observing that the idea reflected in § 371 "justifies liability for negligently allowing workers on the land to carry dangerous substances like asbestos dust off the land to the injury of others");
cf.
MacNeil
,
¶110 Quiroz does not seek to impose a duty on Reynolds to control a third party; nor does he seek to impose a broad duty owed by Reynolds to the public at large. Reynolds's relevant conduct was releasing asbestos and not containing it within its facility. Based on the summary judgment record before us, Reynolds failed to even warn its workers, much less afford them a means to prevent their carrying home asbestos dust in their clothing. Thus, the determination of liability should not turn on whether the injury was caused by wind-borne asbestos, employee-borne asbestos, or an errant fly ball; a landowner owes a duty of care when it exposes others to risks of injury, even when the harm occurs off-premises, and may be liable under § 371 if a plaintiff establishes that section's prerequisites.
¶111 The majority observes that § 371 "does not ... create ... a general duty on landowners for off-premises injuries." Supra ¶ 43. To be sure, § 371 does not itself create an independent source of duty; rather, it clarifies that those in possession of land have the same liability to others for their activities on that land as they would have if those activities were conducted in a neutral place, such as a highway. See Second Restatement § 371 cmt. a. That is, liability in these circumstances flows not from one's status as a landowner but from conduct creating an unreasonable risk of physical injury that proximately causes injury. For example, a landowner whose on-site activity unreasonably releases toxic waste that injures others off-site is liable just as the landowner would be for releasing it while transporting it on a public highway. (The cases from "other jurisdictions" cited by the majority, supra ¶ 49, do not consider § 371.)
¶112 The majority errs by arguing that § 371 cannot support the imposition of liability on Reynolds because the Second Restatement bases duty on foreseeability and Gipson rejected that approach. Supra ¶¶ 42-43. Duty under the Second Restatement does not depend on foreseeability; instead, people generally are under a duty of care with respect to their affirmative acts. Supra ¶ 94. That "duty" imposes a standard of care, i.e., acting as a reasonable person with respect to recognizable risks. See Second Restatement § 291. Under the Second Restatement, whether a risk is foreseeable does not determine whether the actor owes such a duty of care, but instead whether conduct is negligent. Id . § 284(a) (defining negligent conduct as "an act ... a reasonable man should recognize as involving an unreasonable risk of causing an invasion of an interest of another"). Failing to act reasonably with respect to foreseeable risks (those recognizable by a reasonable person) is negligence under the terminology of the Second Restatement. Id . §§ 282, 284(a). But "[c]onduct which is negligent in character does not result in liability unless there is a duty owed by the actor to the other not to be negligent." Second Restatement ch. 12, topic 4, scope note.
¶113 Various provisions of the Second Restatement define circumstances where "liability" may be imposed for negligent conduct. See, e.g ., Second Restatement § 364 (liability of possessor of land for dangerous artificial conditions on land). The majority mistakenly suggests that such provisions base duty on the foreseeability of harm. Supra ¶¶ 36, 42-43. Such provisions instead presuppose that a duty exists (that is, an actor may be liable for acting negligently) and either specify the standard of care (e.g., a possessor must not create artificial conditions that foreseeably involve an unreasonable risk of harm) or identify those whose injuries will be viewed as proximately caused by any breach. See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Physical & Emotional Harm § 54, cmt. a (Am. Law Inst. 2010) ("Third Restatement") (noting that because Restatement Second §§ 364 and 366 "were not phrased in terms of duty but instead provided the conditions for liability, they also incorporate concerns about the foreseeable risk and burden of precaution").
¶114 By rejecting foreseeability as a basis for duty,
Gipson
is consistent with the Second Restatement in distinguishing an actor's negligence (acting unreasonably in the face of foreseeable risks) from whether a defendant owes a duty of care.
See
Gipson
,
¶115 Recognizing a duty owed by a landowner engaging in risk-creating, on-site activity to those harmed by that activity does not lead to limitless liability for the landowner. As this Court recently noted in
Sanders v. Alger
, "Recognizing a duty ... is not, of course, the same as saying that [a defendant] will be liable for injuries incurred...."
¶116 In sum, because our caselaw and § 371 suggest that Reynolds could be liable for the injury caused by its release of toxic asbestos beyond its property, I would reverse the trial court's entry of summary judgment.
III.
¶117 I also disagree with the majority's rejection of § 7 of the Third Restatement. The majority depicts this provision as radically departing from our tort law by presuming that all persons owe a duty of care to all others at all times. See supra ¶ 75. But § 7 does no such thing.
¶118 Section 7 provides that "[a]n actor ordinarily has a duty to exercise reasonable care when the actor's conduct creates a risk of physical harm" unless reasons of principle or policy dictate otherwise. Third Restatement § 7. Thus, § 7 does not state or imply that there is always a duty owed to everyone. Rather, it creates the presumption of a duty.
See
W. Jonathan Cardi & Michael D. Green,
Duty Wars
,
¶119 The presumed duty under § 7 is limited to conduct creating a risk of physical harm and is expressly subject to exceptions. As § 7(b) notes, "In exceptional cases, when ... policy warrants denying or limiting liability in a particular class of cases, a court may decide that the defendant has no duty or that the ordinary duty of reasonable care requires modification."
See also
Gipson
,
¶120 As a counterpoint to § 7, § 37 clarifies that "[a]n actor whose conduct has not created a risk of physical or emotional harm to another has no duty of care to the other unless a court determines that one of the affirmative duties provided in §§ 38-44 is applicable." Third Restatement § 37. Sections 38-44 include traditional affirmative duties based on special relationships (e.g., parent and child) and the rescue doctrine. In other words, under the Third Restatement, a person does not owe a duty of care unless his or her conduct creates a risk of physical harm or an affirmative duty applies. This is a far cry from Reynolds's contention that § 7 imposes a "free flowing general duty of care at all times to all people."
¶121 Moreover, § 7 does not depart from the Second Restatement's substantive approach. The Second Restatement states:
In general, anyone who does an affirmative act is under a duty to others to exercise the care of a reasonable man to protect them against an unreasonable risk of harm to them arising out of the act. The duties of one who merely omits to act are more restricted, and in general are confined to situations where there is a special relation between the actor and the other which gives rise to the duty.
Second Restatement § 302 cmt. a. The Second Restatement's blackletter text also reflects this view, as it bases liability on, among other things, an actor's negligent conduct without separately referring to "duty." See Second Restatement § 281 (listing elements of negligence cause of action). Negligent conduct in turn is defined as a person's either acting to create an unreasonable risk of harm, id . § 284(a), or-when "under a duty to do" so-failing to protect or assist another, id . § 284(b). Thus, the Second Restatement generally presumes that people have a duty to act reasonably with respect to their affirmative acts, but liability for failing to protect another requires a duty arising from some special relationship. See Second Restatement §§ 314, 315. "Normally, where there is an affirmative act which affects the interests of another, there is a duty not to be negligent with respect to the doing of the act." Second Restatement ch. 12, topic 4, scope note. In this respect, the Second Restatement anticipates the Third Restatement's formulation: when engaging in affirmative conduct, the actor has a duty to exercise reasonable care so as to not harm others. Although § 7 of the Third Restatement refines the Second Restatement by focusing on risk creation as opposed to act and omission, it does not deviate from the general principles recognized in the Second Restatement.
¶122 Section 7's focus on risk creation reflects how this Court has long examined the existence of a legal duty. For instance, in 1925, this Court held that "[a]s a general proposition, one who voluntarily
creates
and maintains a condition for the use of others is,
in the absence of some privilege, charged with the duty to exercise care to prevent that condition from becoming a source of danger to those who use it."
Cummings
,
¶123 That a person owes a duty to abstain from negligently hurting legal strangers is not a radical or new principle.
See
Crouse
,
¶124 In rejecting § 7, the majority erroneously contends that it improperly relieves the plaintiff of the burden of "proving" the existence of duty; that it incorrectly bases duty on the fact of injury to a plaintiff, and that it "conflates duty with the standard of care." Supra ¶¶ 52, 78. Whether a duty exists is a question of law rather than fact, and the Third Restatement does not shift any burden of proof to the defendant, but instead states that "[a] defendant has the procedural obligation to raise the issue of whether a no-duty rule or some other modification of the ordinary duty of reasonable care applies in a particular case." Third Restatement § 7, cmt. b. If the existence or scope of a duty turns on disputed adjudicative facts, "the plaintiff bears the burden of proof on facts necessary to establish a duty." Id .
¶125 Under § 7, the existence of a duty clearly does not turn on the fact that a plaintiff has suffered an injury. Instead, conduct creating the risk of physical harm-antecedent to any injury-ordinarily gives rise to a duty of reasonable care. What a defendant must do to meet that duty is the standard of care, "an issue of fact that turns on the specifics of the individual case."
Gipson
,
¶126 Section 7, consistent with
Gipson
, properly distinguishes the categorical determination of the existence of duty from case-specific findings of breach or proximate cause, which may depend on foreseeability.
See
¶127 The majority also misdescribes § 7 and its implications for this case by asserting that "limitless duties expand tort liability beyond manageable bounds."
Supra
¶ 80. Accepting that Reynolds had a presumed duty of reasonable care not to expose others to asbestos released from its factory does not in itself establish liability, which would still be limited by the requirements that a plaintiff show a breach of that duty and proximately caused injuries.
See
Sanders
,
¶128 By recognizing a duty to others, § 7 protects individual liberty and personal autonomy and does not impinge on those fundamental interests as the majority argues.
See
supra
¶ 86. One of the primary tasks of the law is to "prevent collision between people, and this is done affirmatively, by recognizing the autonomy of each person over his or her person, and negatively, by prohibiting the use of force or deception to compromise that autonomy." Richard A. Epstein,
The Uneasy Marriage of Utilitarian and Libertarian Thought
,
¶129 Third Restatement § 7 simply reflects the common law understanding of duty to strangers-that a person has a duty to exercise reasonable care so as not to harm others when engaging in activity that entails a risk of physical harm. Rather than reaffirm this principle, the majority seeks to restrict the recognition of duty to circumstances in which a plaintiff can demonstrate some special relationship or a statutorily based public policy. In doing so, the majority ignores "black letter law repeated by an overwhelming majority of courts: that a defendant owes a duty of care not to act in a way that creates a risk of harm to others" and risks engaging in a "pointless, confusing, and sometimes obfuscating effort[ ] to find a basis for a duty when a defendant created a risk of physical harm to [another]." Cardi & Green, supra ¶ 118, at 716, 727. Our established tort principles, and the goals of deterring careless behavior and compensating those injured by it, would be better served by recognizing that while we do not owe a duty of care to all others at all times, we do generally owe a duty to not unreasonably subject others to the risk of physical harm.
Because this case involves an appeal from a grant of summary judgment, we view the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving parties.
Andrews v. Blake
,
We note that several federal statutes regulating asbestos were enacted
after
1970, the last date of Quiroz's secondary exposure to asbestos.
See, e.g.
,
Because the Family's claim is limited to a negligence claim, we do not discuss a landowner's potential liability for off-premises injuries premised on strict liability. For example, companies that design, manufacture, sell or distribute asbestos materials and products may be held strictly liable for injuries caused to plaintiffs, regardless of where the injury occurs.
See
O.S. Stapley Co. v. Miller
,
At bottom, the underlying liability for both the landowner and the insecticide company in
Crouse
was, like the landowner's liability in
S. A. Gerrard Co. v. Fricker
,
The annotations to Second Restatement § 302, cmt. a note that Leppke mistakenly cited § 320 rather than § 302. Second Restatement, case citations by jurisdiction.
To the extent the hypothetical reflects the "common law understanding of duty," such an understanding would, of course, incorporate the concept of foreseeability in determining the existence of a duty. However, because the Third Restatement relies solely on risk creation and it prohibits using foreseeability to determine duty, the act of swinging a golf club would give rise to a duty that was not contemplated by the common law. Specifically, the hypothetical presumes a duty exists as to unforeseeable plaintiffs outside the zone of danger of the golf club, e.g., a duty owed to a plaintiff ten miles away. See supra ¶¶ 8, 59-60; Third Restatement § 7 cmt. j. In short, unlike the common law, the Third Restatement would presume a limitless duty exists to everyone simply because the defendant started swinging a golf club.
Reference
- Full Case Name
- Ernest v. QUIROZ and Mary Quiroz, Husband and Wife, Plaintiffs/Appellants, v. ALCOA INC., Et Al., Defendants/Appellees.
- Cited By
- 40 cases
- Status
- Published