Brown v. Board of Trustees
Cases that cite this one
13 later published cases cite this decision.
- Biddlecomb v. Haydon (Cal. Ct. App. 1935)
- Tillery v. Standard Sand & Silica Co. (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969)
- James P. Sullivan v. Shell Oil Company, Herman R. Engberson v. Shell Oil Company (9th Cir. 1956)
- Florida Power & Light Co. v. Robinson (Fla. 1953)
- Pope v. Edward M. Rude Carrier Corp. (W. Va. 1953)
- Cunningham v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. (Cal. Ct. App. 1948)
- Scott v. George A. Fuller Co. (Cal. Ct. App. 1940)
- Weiner v. May Department Stores Co. (United States District Court for the Southern District of California 1940)
- Hubbert v. Aztec Brewing Co. (Cal. Ct. App. 1938)
- Dryden v. Western Pacific Railroad (Cal. Ct. App. 1934)
- Slyter v. Clinton Construction Co. (Cal. Ct. App. 1930)
- Dobbie v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Cal. Ct. App. 1928)
- Levesque v. Fraser Paper Limited (Me. 1963)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
The action was brought by Helena Brown, the widow of Alexander Brown, and by ten children and grandchildren of the deceased, to recover damages for the death of said Alexander .Brown, alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the defendants.
The corporation defendant was the owner of a tract of land in Tehama County known as the “Stanford Vina Ranch,” and defendant Stimmel was the superintendent thereof.
Upon the close of plaintiff’s case the court granted a motion made by defendants for a nonsuit, judgment followed in their favor, and plaintiffs prosecute this appeal from said judgment.
The record discloses the following facts: On and prior to August 18, 1915, there was upon the Stanford Ranch a building known as the winery, which was constructed with brick walls and which contained a large amount of machinery. This building was destroyed by fire on said date, but the brick walls remained standing.
On September 15, 1915, Daniel R. Buckley, a member of the firm of Buckley & Brownstone, tendered to defendant Stimmel, as superintendent of the Stanford Vina Ranch, the following offer, in writing:
“I hereby offer you $700.00 for all the metal and iron in the Fermenting House—Engine Room (except boilers)—Distillery—and Carpenter Shop and the scrap pointed out in the *103 yard near the Tool Washerhouse and the scrap in the bone yard. ... As part of the consideration I agree to clean up and remove all metal and iron of every kind and description from the ruins of the buildings described above without any expense whatever to you. I agree to remove this iron and metal before October 20th, 1915.
“Sincerely yours,
“Daniel R. Buckley.
“Accepted and'rcceipt of $100.00 acknowledged.
“W. G. Stimmel, Supt.”
The deceased, Alexander Brown, was employed by Buckley & Brownstone to assist in the work of removing the metal from said building, and on September 24th, while so employed, one of the walls of the building fell upon him and caused his death. No one was with him at the time, the nearest witnesses being from two hundred to three hundred feet distant.
The complaint alleged that after the fire the brick walls of the winery were left standing unsupported; that they were dangerous and menacing and were known to defendants so to be, but that they failed to guard against such danger; that defendants were careless and negligent in failing to take down such walls or to take measures to protect persons against danger. This negligence, together with the alleged fact that defendants did not warn decedent of the defective and unsafe condition of the walls, ‘1 and in carelessly and negligently permitting said decedent in or near the vicinity of the said brick wall,” are alleged to have resulted in the death of decedent; and it was further alleged that Buckley, Brownstone, and the decedent had no knowledge of the defective and unsafe condition of said walls.
Arthur R. Thorpe testified that Brown, at the time the wall fell on him, was engaged in removing hoop iron from the fermenting-room. T. J. Frost testified that he heard the crash when the wall fell and ran to the scene of the accident; that it w;as the south wall of the building that had fallen. The defendant W. G. Stimmel, called as a witness by plaintiffs, testified to the same fact, and Mrs. Helena Brown testified as to the injuries received by her husband, his age, etc., and there was also testimony as to the amount decedent was earning as wages.
The motion for nonsuit was properly granted.
*104 The evidence shows that the fire which destroyed the distillery or winery building occurred several weeks prior to ■the date of the accident causing the death of the deceased. As the complaint alleges, the evidence shows that the walls of the building were of brick and that said walls remained standing from and after the fire until the date of the accident. There is no evidence that there was any hidden or concealed defect in the walls by reason of which they or either of them were more likely'to fall than from the mere fact that they stood unsupported. In other words, there was, so far as the evidence shows, no other danger in the walls to persons working or employed about them or who might for any reason have been near or about them before the accident than such danger as was plainly obvious to any person of average intelligence and sense, viz., that they stood unsupported. The evidence does not directly show what caused the wall to fall. As to that, the only evidence is the circumstance that the walls remained standing until the work of removing the junk and debris from between them was begun and that the falling of the south wall of the distillery which caused the accident occurred while the said work was in progress. At the time of the accident the deceased had been engaged for several days in removing the junk from the burnt building.
The extent of the interest of the defendants here in the work which Buckley & Brownstone contracted to perform for them was in having the junk and debris removed from the destroyed buildings. They ivere not at all interested in how that work was to be done or accomplished by the parties who had undertaken it. As before stated, the means that the latter might employ to carry out their contract constituted a matter of utter indifference to the defendants—indeed, a matter with which they had no authority or right to interfere, unless the means adopted for that purpose were such as might result in the destruction of other property of the defendants.
• In the case at bar the evidence, as shown, discloses that Buckley & Brownstone, the contractors, and1 not the defendants, had control of the premises or the thing that caused the accident at the time of the accident. To them (the contractors) the burnt premises were turned over for the purpose of enabling them to perform the terms of the contract, and for that purpose they were in their possession and under their exclusive control for and during the time requisite for the completion of the contract.
It follows that, if the defendants could under any view of the case be held liable for the accident and the death as a result thereof of the deceased, it was incumbent upon the plaintiffs to show that the accident was directly due to the negligence of the defendants. This burden they failed to sustain. Indeed, the circumstances, though very meager in a disclosure of the cause of the falling of the wall, tend to show, if anything at all in that particular, that it was occasioned by or through some act or acts of the employees occurring while they were engaged in removing the junk and debris from the premises. But, however that may be, we are firmly of the opinion that the evidence presented by the plaintiffs utterly failed to show that the defendants were in any sense or measure legally responsible for the unfortunate accident.
The judgment is affirmed.
Chipman, P. J., and Burnett, J., concurred.
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.