Carpenter v. Blancheri
Carpenter v. Blancheri
Opinion of the Court
This is a malpractice action, the defendant being a dentist. So far as material here, the complaint alleged that the plaintiff employed the defendant to extract twenty-two teeth; that after twelve teeth had been extracted an infection developed in plaintiff’s jaw; that on October 7, 1940, “the defendant injected into the plaintiff’s right arm on the inside of the elbow with a hypodermic needle, a poisonous substance, the character and quantity of which was at said time, and still is, unknown to plaintiff”; that immediately thereafter said arm became very painful and began to swell, causing the plaintiff to become very sick; that plaintiff was compelled to and did call a physician to treat his arm; that on November 9, 1940, the plaintiff was compelled to undergo a surgical operation on his arm “to remove tissue, which surgical operation was made necessary by reason of the said defendant’s injecting said poisonous substance in the plaintiff’s said arm”; and that “the said treatment administered to the plaintiff by the defendant as above described was negligent and not in accordance with the usual and ordinary practice of dentistry in San Diego County.” In his answer, the defendant admitted that on October 7, 1940, “he administered to plaintiff an intravenous injection for the purpose of counteracting and controlling infection in plaintiff’s system,” but denied all allegations relating to negligence on his part.
The defendant, called nnder section 2055 of the Code of Civil Procedure, testified that he gave the plaintiff a hypodermic injection on his right forearm near the elbow and that he administered “or attempted to administer a hypodermic, intravenous injection, in the plaintiff’s arm”; that the drug he administered was “mapharsen”; that this drug might be poisonous if eaten but would not be poisonous if it was injected into someone’s arm and the vein was missed; that the plaintiff complained of pain; that a little later the witness arranged for a physician to see the plaintiff and that when he reported this to the plaintiff he was informed that they had already called another doctor. The witness, however, was not allowed to answer a question as to whether or not he had inserted the needle in the vein in the plaintiff’s arm.
The physician who was called by the plaintiff on October 7, 1940, testified that he examined the plaintiff’s arm; that he determined that the trouble was caused by a “foreign
At the close of plaintiff’s case a motion for a nonsuit was granted, and the plaintiff has appealed from the judgment entered in favor of the defendant.
The main questions here presented are whether this complaint charges a negligent diagnosis only and whether, under the allegations thereof, all evidence with respect to the manner in which the treatment was administered was properly excluded. The complaint alleges that there was injected into the appellant’s arm, with a hypodermic needle, a poisonous substance the character and quantity of which are unknown to the appellant, that a surgical operation to remove tissue was made necessary by this injection, and that the treatment thus administered was negligent and not in accord with the usual practice in that community. The gist of this charge is that through the negligent injection of this substance the tissues of the appellant’s arm were so injured as to require surgical removal. While the complaint is not a model we think it cannot be said that, by its terms, it is confined to a charge of improper diagnosis and the use of the wrong remedy. The general allegations of negligence and of injury to the tissues of appellant’s arm caused by this injection are broad enough to cover the injection of a proper substance in an improper manner or the injection of a substance that should not have been injected at all. If the respondent, although using a proper substance, missed the vein and in
If it be assumed that the complaint was not sufficient for the purpose above indicated no good reason appears for refusing to permit the amendment offered. We are unable to agree with the respondent’s contention, and with the court’s holding, that the amendment offered set up such a new or changed cause of action as to be improper under the circumstances which here appear. (Klopstock v. Superior Court, 17 Cal.2d 13 [108 P.2d 906, 135 A.L.R. 318].)
The judgment is reversed.
Marks, J., and Griffin, J., concurred.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.